Characteristics and analysis of major U.S. air carrier accidents between 1991 and 2010 by Boss, Kevin Korey
   CHARACTERISTICS AND ANALYSIS OF MAJOR   
   U.S. AIR CARRIER ACCIDENTS  
   BETWEEN 1991 AND 2010 
 
   By 
   KEVIN KOREY BOSS 
   Bachelor of Science in Professional Flight Technology  
   Purdue University 
   West Lafayette, Indiana 
   2002 
 
   Master of Aeronautical Science in Aerospace Management 
   Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
   Daytona Beach, Florida 
   2006 
 
   Master of Science in Aerospace Administration & Logistics 
   Southeastern Oklahoma State University 
   Durant, Oklahoma 
   2007 
 
   Submitted to the Faculty of the 
   Graduate College of the 
   Oklahoma State University 
   in partial fulfillment of 
   the requirements for 
   the Degree of 
   DOCTOR OF EDUCATION 
   July, 2012  
ii 
 
CHARACTERISTICS AND ANALYSIS OF MAJOR   
U.S. AIR CARRIER ACCIDENTS  
BETWEEN 1991 AND 2010 
 
 
   Dissertation Approved: 
 
   Dr. Timm Bliss 
  Dissertation Adviser 
 
   Dr. Steve Marks 
Committee Member 
 
   Dr. Todd Hubbard 
Committee Member 
 
   Dr. James Key 
  Outside Committee Member 
 
  Dr. Sheryl A. Tucker 












TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter          Page 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 1 
 
 New Pilot Certification Requirements for U.S. Air Carriers ................................. 3 
 Statement of the Problem ..................................................................................... 5 
 Purpose of the Study ............................................................................................ 7 
 Research Questions ............................................................................................. 8 
 Significance of the Study ..................................................................................... 8 
 Assumptions ...................................................................................................... 11 
 Limitations ........................................................................................................ 11 
 Operational Terms and Definitions .................................................................... 12 
 Acronyms .......................................................................................................... 17 
 
 
II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE .............................................................................. 18 
  
 Flight Training and Certification ........................................................................ 18 
 Operational Flight Experience ........................................................................... 21 
 Air Carrier Operations ....................................................................................... 23 
 Air Carrier Safety .............................................................................................. 24 
 Causal and Contributing Factors in Aviation Accidents ..................................... 26 
 Characteristics of Major U.S. Air Carrier Accidents: 1978 – 1990 ..................... 30 
 Characteristics of Major U.S. Air Carrier Accidents: 1991 – 2001 ..................... 32 
 Conceptual Framework of Current Study ........................................................... 35 
 
 
III. METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................ 42 
 
 Population ......................................................................................................... 44 
 Adherence to Principles of Ethical Conduct ....................................................... 45 
 Sampling Procedure ........................................................................................... 45 
 Section of Variables........................................................................................... 45 
 Sources of Data ................................................................................................. 46 
 Data Collection .................................................................................................. 49 
 Procedures for Missing Data .............................................................................. 50 
 Measurement of the Variables ........................................................................... 51 
 Data Analysis .................................................................................................... 54 
 Reliability and Validity ...................................................................................... 55 
iv 
 
Chapter          Page 
 
IV. FINDINGS ........................................................................................................ 60 
 
 Research Question #1 (Operational Characteristics) ........................................... 63 
  Environmental ............................................................................................. 63 
  Type of Operation ........................................................................................ 68 
  Aircraft Information ..................................................................................... 73 
  Phase of Flight ............................................................................................. 77 
 Research Question #2 (Pilot Characteristics)...................................................... 81 
  Age .............................................................................................................. 81 
  Gender ......................................................................................................... 82 
  Certification ................................................................................................. 84 
  Duration of Employment ............................................................................. 87 
  Total Flight Time ......................................................................................... 90 
  Flight Time in Make/Model ......................................................................... 93 
  Flight Time in Make/Model and Position ..................................................... 95 
  Flying Assignment ....................................................................................... 97 
  Crew Familiarity .......................................................................................... 99 
  Medical and Toxicological ......................................................................... 103 
  Trained and Qualified ................................................................................ 104 
  Previous Accidents, Incidents, and Enforcements....................................... 105 
  Driver's License Suspension and Revocations ............................................ 105 
  Unsatisfactory Flight Evaluations .............................................................. 106 
  Content Analysis #1:  Causal and Contributing Factors .............................. 107 
  Content Analysis #2:  Additional Sequence-of-Events Findings ................. 114 
 Research Question #3 (Summary of Significant Differences) ........................... 117 
  
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................. 119 
 
  
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................. 128 
 
 Recommendation #1 ........................................................................................ 128 
 Recommendation #2 ........................................................................................ 128 
 Recommendation #3 ........................................................................................ 129 
 Recommendation #4 ........................................................................................ 130 










APPENDICES ...................................................................................................... 144 
 
 APPENDIX A - CONSENT TO REPRODUCE FIGURE ............................... 145 
  
 APPENDIX B - ACCIDENT SELECTION DATA ......................................... 147 
 
 APPENDIX C - ENVIRONMENTAL DATA ................................................. 152 
 
 APPENDIX D - AIR CARRIER DATA .......................................................... 155 
 
 APPENDIX E - AIRCRAFT DATA ................................................................ 157 
 
 APPENDIX F - INJURY AND FATALITY DATA ........................................ 160 
 
 APPENDIX G - PHASE OF FLIGHT DATA .................................................. 163 
 
 APPENDIX H - AGE DATA .......................................................................... 165 
 
 APPENDIX I - GENDER DATA .................................................................... 167 
 
 APPENDIX J - CERTIFICATE DATA ........................................................... 169 
 
 APPENDIX K - EMPLOYMENT DATA ........................................................ 171 
 
 APPENDIX L - TOTAL FLIGHT TIME DATA ............................................. 174 
 
 APPENDIX M - MAKE/MODEL FLIGHT TIME DATA ............................... 176 
 
 APPENDIX N - FLIGHT TIME IN TYPE AND POSITION DATA ............... 178 
 
 APPENDIX O - CREW ASSIGNMENT DATA ............................................. 180 
 
 APPENDIX P - CREW FAMILIARITY DATA .............................................. 182 
 
 APPENDIX Q - DRUGS AND ALCOHOL DATA ......................................... 184 
 
 APPENDIX R - PROPERLY TRAINED AND QUALIFIED DATA .............. 188 
 
 APPENDIX S - ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, FAA ENFORCEMENT DATA .... 190 
 
 APPENDIX T - DRIVER LICENSE SUSPENSION/REVOCATION DATA . 192 
 
 APPENDIX U - UNSATISFACTORY FLIGHT EVALUATION DATA........ 194 
 




APPENDICES ...................................................................................................... 144 
  
 APPENDIX W - PRIMARY NON-PERSON RELATED EVENT DATA ....... 214 
 
 APPENDIX X - PRIMARY PERSON RELATED EVENT DATA ................. 217 
 
 APPENDIX Y - DIRECT UNDERLYING EVENT DATA ............................. 223 
 








LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table           Page 
 
   1.     Air Carrier Safety Data: 1990 – 2009 ............................................................ 26 
   2.     Selected Major U.S. Air Carrier Accidents .................................................... 61 
   3.     Make/Model of Accident Aircraft: 1991-2010 .............................................. 73 
   4.     Total Time Captain ....................................................................................... 90 
   5.     Total Time First Officer ................................................................................ 91 
   6.     Make and Model Captain .............................................................................. 93 
   7.     Make and Model First Officer ....................................................................... 94 
   8.     Type and Position Captain ............................................................................ 95 
   9.     Type and Position First Officer ..................................................................... 96 
   10.     Summary of Significant Differences (Operational Characteristics) ............ 117 






LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure           Page 
 
   1.     Pilot Certificates: 1991 – 2010 ........................................................................ 2 
   2.     Accidents by Period of Day: 1978-2001 ........................................................ 33 
   3.     Accidents by Phase of Flight: 1991-2001 ...................................................... 33 
   4.     Involvement of Other Factors........................................................................ 34 
   5.     Reason's Model ............................................................................................. 36 
   6.     6-Step Operational Risk Management Process .............................................. 40 
   7.     Accidents by Year Group: 1991-2010 ........................................................... 62 
   8.     Accidents by Season: 1991-2010 .................................................................. 63 
 9.     Pilot Performance cited by Season ................................................................ 64 
   10.     Accidents by Period of Day: 1991-2010 ...................................................... 64 
   11.     Accidents by Hour: 1991-2010 ................................................................... 65 
 12.     Pilot Performance Cited by Period of Day ................................................... 65 
   13.     Accidents by Light Condition: 1991-2010 ................................................... 66 
   14.     Pilot Performance Cited by Light Condition ................................................ 67 
   15.     Accidents by Meteorological Condition: 1991-2010 ................................... 67 
   16.     Pilot Performance Cited by Meteorological Conditions ............................... 68 
   17.     Accidents by Scheduled/Non-Scheduled Service: 1991-2010 ...................... 69 
 18.     Pilot Performance Cited by Scheduled Service ............................................ 69 
   19.     Accidents by Passenger/Cargo Service: 1991-2010 ..................................... 70 
 20.     Pilot Performance Cited by Passenger/Cargo Service .................................. 70 
   21.     "Doing-Business-As" another Carrier: 1991-2010 ....................................... 71 
 22.     Pilot Performance Cited by DBA ................................................................ 71 
   23.     "Doing-Business-As" Year Group Comparison ........................................... 72 
   24.     Age of Aircraft ........................................................................................... 74 
   25.     Required Flight Crew: 1991-2010 ............................................................... 74 
 26.     Pilot Performance Cited by Required Crew ................................................. 75 
   27.     Number of Engines: 1991-2010 .................................................................. 75 
 28.     Pilot Performance Cited by Number of Engines .......................................... 76 
   29.     Type of Engines: 1991-2010 ....................................................................... 76 
 30.     Pilot Performance Cited by Type of Engines ............................................... 77 
   31.     Phase of Flight: 1991-2010 ......................................................................... 78 
   32.     Pilot Performance Cited by Phase of Flight: 1991-2010 .............................. 79 
   33.     Meteorological Conditions and Phase of Flight: 1991-2010 ........................ 80 
   34.     Age Distribution of Accident Captains ........................................................ 81 
   35.     Age Distribution of Accident First Officers ................................................. 82 
ix 
 
Figure           Page 
 
   36.     Gender Distribution of Accident Captains ................................................... 82 
   37.     Gender Distribution of Accident First Officers ............................................ 83 
   38.     Crew Composition by Gender: 1991-2010 .................................................. 83 
 39.     Pilot Performance Cited by Gender Composition ........................................ 84 
   40.     Highest Certificate Held by First Officers: 1991-2010................................. 85 
 41.     Pilot Performance Cited by First Officer Certificate .................................... 85 
   42.     Accidents Involving Commercially Certificated First Officers .................... 86 
   43.     Highest Certificate of First Officers by Year Group .................................... 87 
   44.     Captain Years of Employment with Accident Air Carrier ............................ 88 
   45.     Years of Employment with Accident Air Carrier: Captain ........................... 88 
 46.     First Officer's Years of Employment ........................................................... 89 
   47.     Years of Employment: First Officers ........................................................... 89 
   48.     Total Time of Captains ............................................................................... 90 
   49.     Total Time of First Officers ........................................................................ 92 
 50.     Pilot Performance Cited by First Officer Total Flight Time ......................... 93 
   51.     Time in Make/Model Captain ..................................................................... 94 
   52.     Time in Make/Model First Officer .............................................................. 95 
   53.     Time Make/Model and Position Captain ..................................................... 96 
   54.     Time Make/Model and Position First Officer .............................................. 97 
   55.     Flying/Monitoring Assignment ................................................................... 98 
 56.     Pilot Performance Cited by Flying Assignment ........................................... 98 
   57.     Flying/Monitoring Assignment by Year Group ........................................... 99 
   58.     First Day of Pairing (Current Sequence).................................................... 100 
 59.     Pilot Performance Cited by First Day of Pairing (Current Sequence) ......... 100 
   60.     First Leg of the Day .................................................................................. 101 
 61.     Pilot Performance Cited by First Leg of Day ............................................. 101 
   62.     First Pairing Together ............................................................................... 102 
 63.     Pilot Performance Cited by Past Pairings .................................................. 103 
   64.     Involvement of Factors ............................................................................. 107 
   65.     Pilot Performance as a Factor/Cause ......................................................... 108 
   66.     Pilot Performance Cited by Year Group .................................................... 109 
   67.     Environment as a Factor/Cause ................................................................. 109 
   68.     Environment Cited by Year Group ............................................................ 110 
   69.     Mechanical as a Factor/Cause ................................................................... 111 
   70.     Mechanical Cited by Year Group .............................................................. 111 
   71.     Other Persons as a Factor/Cause ............................................................... 112 











The demand for air travel in the U.S. grew from 172 million passengers in 1970 to 
more than 630 million passengers in 2010 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011; Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics, 2011).  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has 
projected the number of passengers to reach “…more-than one billion by 2015, and      
1.2 billion by 2020” (Price, 2007).   
As a result, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2011) has predicted the employment of 
pilots to grow by 12% between 2008 and 2018.  The International Air Transport 
Association (IATA) has estimated the industry would need 17,000 new pilots annually to 
meet the industry’s projected growth (Kirby, 2007).  According to the IATA, if nothing is 
done, this will translate into a world-wide shortage of approximately 42,000 pilots by 
2020 (2008).  “Experts estimate that from now until 2025, airlines around the world will 
need to hire more than 300,000 new pilots to fly all the new jets – about 19,000 – 
expected to join the fleet by then; and replace retirees and others who leave” (Kaur, 
2007).   
While demand for air travel has steadily increased over the past several decades, 
the total number of pilots certified for commercial operations has remained relatively 
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stable when both groups of Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) and commercial certificate 
holders are combined.  While there has been an overall increase in the total number of 
ATP certificated pilots, the overall number of commercially certificated pilots has 






Note. Data derived from “1991 – 2000 Estimated Active Airmen Certificates Held” and 
“2001 – 2010 Estimated Active Airmen Certificates Held” by the Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2011. 
 
As indicated by Figure 1, fluctuations between any given years were relatively 
slight.  The estimated active airmen certificate data published by the FAA indicated there 
were 123,705 commercially certificated pilots and 142,198 ATP certificated pilots in 
2010 (FAA, 2011).  Thus, commercially certificated pilots represented slightly over 46% 
of the combined potential workforce of 265,903 pilots in 2010. 
Between 2006 and 2007, a number of U.S. air carriers were forced to reduce 











































Pilot Certificates: 1991 - 2010
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passenger demand for air travel.  Trans States Airlines indicated during an AABI meeting 
in 2007 that minimum flight time hiring requirements were reduced from 1,500 hours to 
500 hours.  Atlantic Southeast Airlines’ hiring requirements were reduced from 1,200 
hours to 500 hours and American Eagle’s hiring requirements were reduced from 2,000 
hours to 800 hours (AABI, 2007).  
 Typically, a reduction in an air carrier’s minimum flight time hiring requirements 
occurs when the supply of pilots is insufficient to meet the passenger demand for air 
travel.  Reducing flight time requirements allows an air carrier to increase the labor pool 
by attracting pilots with fewer flight hours, pilots who would otherwise be less than 
competitive for employment.   
New Pilot Certification Requirements for U.S. Air Carriers 
 In 2009, following the crash of a Colgan Air DHC-8, legislation was introduced 
to increase the minimum flight time and certification requirements for all flight 
crewmembers serving in 14 CFR 121 air carrier operations.  On October 14, 2009, the 
U.S. House of Representatives signed H.R. 3371, the “Airline Safety and Pilot Training 
Improvement Act of 2009”, which sought in part, to require all flight crewmembers 
serving in 14 CFR 121 air carrier operations to hold an ATP certificate and possess at 
least 1,500 hours of total flight experience.  The bill was then forwarded to the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation for further consideration (FAA, 
2010).   
The review of literature failed to address what action was taken by the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.  However, on February 8, 2010, 
the FAA published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR), requesting 
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public comment, data, or views regarding new pilot certification requirements for air 
carriers.  The intent of the ANPR was to “…gather information on whether current 
eligibility, training, and qualification requirements for commercial pilot certification are 
adequate for engaging in such [Part 121] operations” (Government Printing Office, 
2010).  According to the FAA, the Colgan Air Flight 3407 accident “…focused attention 
on whether a commercially-rated copilot in Part 121 operations receives adequate 
training…to be able to recognize a potentially dangerous situation and respond in a safe 
and timely manner” (2010).   
On August 1, 2010, the President of the United States signed H.R. 5900, the 
“Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010”, which was 
adopted by the 111th Congress as Public Law 111-216 (The White House, 2010).  Public 
Law 111-216, Title II, Sec. 216, mandated all flight crewmembers serving in 14 CFR Part 
121 air carrier operations to hold an ATP certificate.  Title II, Sec. 217, mandated that in 
order to qualify for an ATP certificate, an individual shall possess at least 1,500 total 
hours of flight experience (Government Printing Office, 2010) 
“The requirement that each flight crewmember for a Part 121 air carrier hold an 
airline transport pilot certificate under Part 61 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, 
shall begin to apply on the date that is 3 years after the date of enactment” (Government 
Printing Office, 2010).  Until the requirements of the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation 
Administration Extension Act of 2010 take effect, individuals holding a commercial pilot 
certificate and instrument rating are authorized to serve as first officers of an aircraft 
operated under 14 CFR 121.   
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For decades, this made it possible for aspiring airline pilots to apply for an entry 
level first officer position with as little as 250 hours of total flight time.  Although highly 
unlikely for a brand new commercial pilot with 250 hours to gain employment with a 
major U.S. air carrier, several collegiate institutions throughout the U.S. provided training 
in advanced transport category aircraft and maintained preferential hiring programs with 
a variety of U.S. air carriers.  This made it possible for a handful of college graduates 
with advanced training to apply for employment with a reduced number of total flight 
hours.  This also afforded aspiring airline pilots an opportunity to seek employment with 
an air carrier where they could start building seniority and working towards retirement.   
Access to commercially rated first officers also made it possible for air carriers to 
draw from a larger pool of applicants when the demand for air travel dictated a need for 
additional pilots.  This was important, as on occasion the demand for air travel exceeded 
what air carriers could collectively provide for without hiring additional pilots.  When 
faced with a shortage of pilots, air carriers were able to increase the hiring pool by 
utilizing commercially certificated pilots.  Under the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation 
Administration Extension Act of 2010, air carriers will no longer be able to extend 
employment to the pool of commercially certificated pilots. 
Statement of the Problem 
 The Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Extension Act of 2010 will require all 
flight crewmembers, to include first officers, serving in 14 CFR 121 U.S. air carrier 
operations to hold an ATP certificate and possess at least 1,500 hours of total flight 
experience.  There is, however, a provision within the Act which authorizes the FAA to 
grant credit for specific academic training courses toward the 1,500 total flight hour 
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requirement if a determination is made “…that allowing a pilot to take specific academic 
training courses will enhance safety more than requiring the pilot to fully comply with the 
flight hours requirement” (Government Printing Office, 2010).   
As mentioned, the FAA issued an ANPR for New Pilot Certification 
Requirements for Air Carrier Operations in 2010.  The FAA highlighted the Colgan Air 
DHC-8 accident, the need to improve pilot performance and professionalism, and 
requested public comment, data, or views regarding the certification of pilots engaged in 
14 CFR 121 operations.  Specifically, the FAA sought to gather “…recommendations on 
whether the existing flight-crew eligibility, training, and qualification requirements 
should be increased for commercial pilots engaged in Part 121 operations” (Government 
Printing Office, 2010).   
In the case of the Colgan Air DHC-8 accident, the captain held an ATP certificate 
and “…had accumulated 3,379 hours of total flying time, including 3,051 hours in turbine 
airplanes, 1,030 hours as pilot-in-command (PIC), and 111 hours on the [DHC-8] Q400” 
(NTSB, 2010).  The first officer held a commercial pilot certificate and “…had 
accumulated 2,244 hours of total flying time, including 774 hours in turbine airplanes and 
on the [DHC-8] Q400” (NTSB, 2010).  While the first officer held only a commercial 
certificate, both pilots involved in the Colgan Air DHC-8 accident possessed more than 
1,500 hours of total flight experience. 
The Colgan Air DHC-8 accident raised many concerns among legislators and 
regulators with regard to existing flight time and certification requirements for pilots 
engaged in 14 CFR 121 air carrier operations.  The decision to increase those 
requirements appeared to support the notion that commercially certificated pilots and/or 
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pilots with less than 1,500 hours of total flight experience pose a greater level of risk than 
pilots who hold an ATP certificate and have more than 1,500 hours of flight time.  
Unfortunately, it was not known whether the flight time, level of certification, or other 
characteristics of the pilots involved in the Colgan Air DHC-8 accident were 
characteristic of pilots who were involved in other major U.S. air carrier accidents.  
Therein laid the problem.  What were the characteristics of major U.S. air carrier 
accidents?  With regard to a future increase in flight time and certification requirements 
for 14 CFR 121 air carrier operations, there was a need to better understand the 
characteristics of previous air carrier accidents.   The existing body of literature, or lack 
thereof, presented an opportunity for additional research regarding this issue. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to describe the characteristics of major U.S. air 
carrier accidents between 1991 and 2010 operated under 14 CFR 121.  For the purpose of 
this study, an accident was included if the following criteria were met: the accident 
involved a U.S. air carrier operating under 14 CFR 121 between 1991 and 2010 and the 
NTSB conducted a major investigation.  Major investigations were defined as 
investigations in which the NTSB adopted an aircraft accident report (AAR) or aircraft 
accident brief (AAB). 
A select number of operational related variables and pilot related variables were 
used to describe the characteristics of major U.S. air carrier accidents in terms of 
operational characteristics and pilot characteristics.  According to the NTSB, “previous 
accident investigations have identified a large set of operational and human performance 
factors as being related to the occurrence or seriousness of errors” (1994).  Variables 
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related to the operational characteristics of major U.S. air carrier accidents included: 
phase of flight; period of day; type of operation; equipment type; and involvement of 
environmental factors, mechanical factors, and other persons.  Variables related to the 
characteristics of pilots included: flight experience; level of certification; duration of 
employment with the accident air carrier; crew assignment; crew familiarity; the 
involvement of pilot performance; past unsatisfactory ratings; FAA accidents, incidents, 
and violations; and prior driver's license suspensions and revocations. 
Research Questions 
 This study was exploratory in nature and was guided by the following research 
questions: 
1. What were the operational characteristics of major U.S. air carrier accidents 
between 1991 and 2010 based on select operational related variables? 
 
2. What were the characteristics of the pilots involved in major U.S. air carrier 
accidents between 1991 and 2010 based on select pilot related variables?  
 
3. Based on the select variables, were the characteristics of pilots involved in 
major U.S. air carrier accidents in which pilot performance was cited as a causal 
or contributing factor significantly different than the characteristics of pilots 
involved in accidents in which pilot performance was not cited as a causal or 
contributing factor? 
 
Significance of the Study 
Upward pressures on the demand for air travel will result in upward pressures on 
the demand for labor.  As witnessed in 2006 and 2007, several air carriers were forced to 
reduce minimum flight time hiring requirements in order to hire a sufficient number of 
pilots.  Under the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Extension Act of 2010, air carriers 
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operating under 14 CFR 121 will potentially lose access to the more than 100,000 
commercially certificated pilots with an instrument rating, according to FAA data, or 
approximately 45% of the potential labor supply under existing regulations (FAA, 2011).  
This is a significant number of personnel and could have potentially negative 
consequences given the cyclical nature of the aviation industry.  The findings of this 
study may prove useful in a cost-benefit safety analysis. 
Additionally, the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Extension Act of 2010 is 
geared, in part, toward protecting passengers and decreasing the level of risk present in 
the U.S. air carrier industry by increasing flight time and certification requirements for 
pilots engaged in 14 CFR 121 air carrier operations.  From a risk management 
perspective, it involves the implementation of a control measure.  As later discussed in 
the review of literature, there are six steps involved in the Operational Risk Management 
(ORM) process: identify the hazards; assess the risks; analyze risk control measures; 
make control decisions; implement risk controls; and supervise and review (FAA, 2000).  
“Risk management must be a fully integrated part of planning and executing any 
operation, routinely applied by management, not a way of reacting when some 
unforeseen problem occurs” (FAA, 2000).   
This study identified the characteristics of major U.S. air carrier accidents 
between 1991 and 2010.  Using pilot related variables previously mentioned, this study 
compared the characteristics of pilots involved in major accidents citing pilot 
performance as a causal or contributing factor with the characteristics of pilots involved 
in major accidents in which pilot performance was not a causal or contributing factor in 
order to determine whether any significant differences existed.  The findings of this study 
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may aid in the identification of hazards, assessment of the risk, and analysis of risk 
control measures.   
Finally, the findings of this study may prove useful to aviation administrators 
responsible for the supervision and review of such control measures, which will require a 
pre-data post-data comparison in order to determine their effectiveness.  The findings of 





















The following assumptions applied to this study: 
1.  NTSB aircraft accident reports (AAR), aircraft accident briefs (AAB), factual 
reports, and probable cause reports are an accurate and reliable source of accident 
data and information. 
 
2.  The characteristics of pilots involved in past major U.S. air carrier accidents is 
relevant to flight-crew eligibility, training, and certification requirements for 




The following limitations applied to this study: 
1.  This study was limited to major U.S. air carrier accidents between 1991 and 
2010 operating under 14 CFR 121.  Non-major accidents, incidents, and other 
operations were not included in this study.  For the purpose of this study, an 
accident was included if the following criteria were met: the accident involved a 
U.S. air carrier operating under 14 CFR 121 between 1991 and 2010 and the 
NTSB conducted a major investigation.  Major investigations were defined as 
investigations in which the NTSB adopted an aircraft accident report (AAR) or 
aircraft accident brief (AAB).  Therefore, caution should be used with regard to 

















Operational Terms and Definitions 
Aircraft accident – “an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which 
takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight 
and all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious 
injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage" (Code of Federal 
Regulations, 2011). 
Accident air carrier – refers to the air carrier involved in an accident.  Also see air carrier. 
Aircraft engine - "an engine that is used or intended to be used for propelling aircraft.  It 
includes turbosuperchargers, appurtenances, and accessories necessary for its 
functioning, but does not include propellers" (Code of Federal Regulations, 2011) 
Active failure – a failure or error “…whose effects are felt almost immediately…active 
errors are associated with the performance of the ‘front-line’ operators of a complex 
system: pilots, air traffic controllers, ships’ officers, control room crews and the like” 
(Reason, 1990). 
Air carrier – “a person who undertakes directly by lease, or other arrangement, to engage 
in air transportation” (Code of Federal Regulations, 2011) 
Air travel – refers to transportation by means of an aircraft. 
Airmen – refers to the holder of a pilot certificate. 
Approach – under instrument flight rules it means “from the Initial Approach Fix (IAF) 
to the beginning of the landing flare”. Under visual flight rules it means “from the point 
of VFR pattern entry, or 1,000 feet above the runway elevation, to the beginning of the 
landing flare” (NTSB, 2011). 
Aviation Accident/Incident Database (AIDS) - "contains incident data records for all 
categories of civil aviation...that occurred between 1978 and the present" (FAA, 2012). 
Aviation Accreditation Board International (AABI) - "a nonprofit 501 © (3) organization 
that meets twice a year and sets standards for all aerospace programs taught in colleges 
and universities around the United States and around the world" (AABI, 2012). 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) - "a component of the Research and Innovative 
Technology Administration (RITA)...BTS creates, manages, and shares transportation 





Captain – “a person who (1) has final authority and responsibility for the operation and 
safety of the flight; (2) has been designated as pilot in command before or during the 
flight; and (3) holds the appropriate category, class, and type rating, if appropriate, for the 
conduct of the flight” (Government Printing Office, 2011). 
Characteristic(s) – "a distinguishing trait, quality, or property" (Merriam-Webster, 2012). 
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) - "the codification of the general and permanent rules 
published in the Federal Register by the executive departments and agencies of the 
Federal Government" (GPO Access, 2012). 
Control measure – “any action or activity that can be used to prevent, eliminate or reduce 
a significant hazard” (Food and Drug Administration, 1997) 
Copilot – “a pilot who is designated to be the second in command of an aircraft during 
flight time” (Government Printing Office, 2011). 
Crew assignment – refers to the distribution of flying and monitoring duties. 
Crewmember – “a person assigned to perform duty in an aircraft during flight time” 
(Code of Federal Regulations, 2011). 
Cruise – “any level flight segment after arrival at initial cruise altitude until the start of 
descent to the destination” (ICAO, 2011). 
Descent – under instrument flight rules it means “descent from cruise to either Initial 
Approach Fix (IAF) or VFR pattern entry”. Under visual flight rules it means “descent 
from cruise to the VFR pattern entry or 1,000 feet above the runway elevation, whichever 
comes first” (ICAO, 2011). 
Fatal injury – “any injury which results in death within 30 days of the accident” (Code of 
Federal Regulations, 2011). 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) - a regulatory agency under the Department of 
Transportation responsible for providing "...the safest, most efficient aerospace system in 
the world" (FAA, 2010).  The FAA establishes and enforces rules and regulations 
pertaining to the U.S. aerospace system. 
First officer – “a pilot who is designated to be the second in command of an aircraft 
during flight time” (Government Printing Office, 2011). 
Flight crewmember – “means a pilot, flight engineer, or flight navigator assigned to duty 
in an aircraft during flight time” (Code of Federal Regulations, 2011). 
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Flight time – “pilot time that commences when an aircraft moves under its own power for 
the purpose of flight and ends when the aircraft comes to rest after landing” (Government 
Printing Office, 2011). 
Go-around – “a maneuver following an uncompleted approach, which involves transition 
to a climbing flightpath” (NTSB, 1998). 
Incident – “an occurrence other than an accident, associated with the operation of an 
aircraft, which affects or could affect the safety of operations” (Code of Federal 
Regulations, 2011). 
International Air Transportation Association (IATA) - "an international trade body, 
created over 60 years ago by a group of airlines...IATA represents some 240 airlines 
comprising 84% of total air traffic.  The organization also represents, leads and serves the 
airline industry in general" (IATA, 2012). 
Landing – means “from the beginning of the landing flare until the aircraft exits the 
landing runway, comes to a stop on the runway, or when power is applied for takeoff in 
the case of a touch-and-go landing” (NTSB, 2011). 
Latent failure – a failure or error “…whose adverse consequences may lie dormant within 
the system for a long time, only becoming evident when they combine with other factors 
to breach the system’s defenses…most likely to be spawned by those whose activities are 
removed in both time and space from the direct control interface: designers, high-level 
decision makers, construction workers, managers and maintenance personnel” (Reason, 
1990). 
Major investigation - investigations in which the NTSB adopted an aircraft accident 
report (AAR) or aircraft accident brief (AAB). 
Major U.S. air carrier accident – an accident involving an aircraft operated under 14 CFR 
Part 121 between 1991 and 2010 for which the NTSB conducted a major investigation of 
the accident.  Major investigations were defined as investigations in which the NTSB 
adopted an aircraft accident report (AAR) or aircraft accident brief (AAB). 
Maneuvering – “intentional low altitude or aerobatic flight operations” (NTSB, 2011). 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) - "an independent federal agency charged 
with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents, promoting transportation 
safety, and assisting victims of transportation accidents and their families (NTSB, 2012). 
NTSB Aviation Accident Database - "contains information from 1962 and later about 
civil aviation accidents and selected incidents within the United States, its territories and 
possessions, and in international waters" (NTSB, 2012). 
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Operational Risk Management (ORM) - "a decision-making tool to systematically help 
identify operational risks and benefits and determine the best course of action for any 
given situation" (FAA, 2000). 
Operator – “any person who causes or authorizes the operation of an aircraft, such as the 
owner, lessee, or bailee of an aircraft” (Code of Federal Regulations, 2011). 
Phase of flight – “refers to a period within a flight” (ICAO, 2011). 
Pilot in command – “a person who (1) has final authority and responsibility for the 
operation and safety of the flight; (2) has been designated as pilot in command before or 
during the flight; and (3) holds the appropriate category, class, and type rating, if 
appropriate, for the conduct of the flight” (Government Printing Office, 2011). 
Precondition – refers to a prerequisite or “…proper or desired condition or frame of mind 
especially in preparation” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2011).  “These are a set of 
qualities possessed by both machines and people: reliable equipment of the right kind; a 
skilled and knowledgeable workforce; an appropriate set of attitudes and motivators; 
work schedules, maintenance programs and environmental conditions that permit 
efficient and safe operations; and codes of practice that give clear guidance regarding 
desirable (safe and/or efficient) and undesirable (unsafe and/or inefficient) performance” 
(Reason, 1990). 
Rating - "means a statement that, as a part of a certificate, sets forth special conditions, 
privileges, or limitations" (Code of Federal Regulations, 2011). 
Risk - "the probability and severity of accident or loss from exposure to various hazards, 
including injury to people and loss of resources" (FAA, 2000). 
Risk management - "management activity ensuring that risk is identified and eliminated 
or controlled within established program risk parameters" (FAA, 1998). 
Second in command – “a pilot who is designated to be the second in command of an 
aircraft during flight time” (Government Printing Office, 2011). 
Serious injury – “any injury which: (1) Requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, 
commencing within 7 days from the date of the injury was received; (2) results in a 
fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose); (3) causes severe 
hemorrhages, nerve, muscle, or tendon damage; (4) involves any internal organ; or (5) 
involves second- or third-degree burns, or any burns affecting more than 5 percent of the 
body surface” (Coded of Federal Regulations, 2011). 
Standing – “Prior to pushback or taxi, or after arrival, at the gate, ramp, or parking area, 
while the aircraft is stationary” (NTSB, 2011). 
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Substantial damage – “damage or failure which adversely affects the structural strength, 
performance, or flight characteristics of the aircraft, and which would normally require 
major repair or replacement of the affected component.  Engine failure or damage limited 
to an engine if only one engine fails or is damaged, bent fairings or cowlings, dented 
skin, small punctured holes in the skin or fabric, ground damage to rotor or propeller 
blades, and damage to landing gear, wheels, tires, flaps, engine accessories, brakes, or 
wingtips are not considered ‘substantial damage’ for the purpose of this part” (Code of 
Federal Regulations, 2011). 
Takeoff – “from the application of takeoff power, through rotation and to an altitude of 
35 feet above runway elevation” (NTSB, 2011). 
Taxi – “the aircraft is moving on the aerodrome surface under its own power prior to 
takeoff or after landing” (NTSB, 2011). 
Type - "as used with respect to the certification, ratings, privileges, and limitations of 
airmen, means a specific make and basic model of aircraft, including modifications 
thereto that do not change its handling or flight characteristics.  Examples include: DC-7, 
1049, and F-27" (Code of Federal Regulations, 2011). 
United States air carrier – “means a citizen of the United States who undertakes directly 
by lease, or other arrangement, to engage in air transportation” (Government Printing 
Office, 2011). 
Unsatisfactory ratings – means the failure to successfully demonstrate the minimum level 
of proficiency required for issuance of an airmen certificate, rating, or other qualification 














AABI – Aviation Accreditation Board International 
AIDS – Accident/Incident Data System 
ANPR – Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
ATP – Airline Transport Pilot 
BTS – Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
CFI – Certified Flight Instructor 
CFR – Code of Federal Regulations 
FAA – Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR – Federal Aviation Regulation 
IATA – International Air Transportation Association 
IMC – Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
NTSB – National Transportation Safety Board 
ORM – Operational Risk Management 
PIC – Pilot-in-Command 






REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
The Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Extension Act of 2010 was geared, in 
part, toward protecting passengers and decreasing the level of risk present in the U.S. air 
carrier industry by increasing flight time and certification requirements for pilots engaged 
in air carrier operations.  This chapter provides an overview of the existing body of 
literature as it relates to: flight training and certification; operational flight experience; air 
carrier operations; air carrier safety; causes and contributors of aircraft accidents; and 
accident findings between 1978-1990 and 1991-2001.  The conceptual framework for this 
study was built upon our understanding of accident causation and effective risk 
management. 
Flight Training and Certification 
 Aircraft operations in the U.S. are conducted under a variety of rules and 
regulations.  Pilots engaged in those operations are required to receive an appropriate 
level of training and certification.  The FAA is the federal administration charged with 
the establishment and enforcement of these rules as they pertain to aeronautics and space.  
Each of the various rules and regulations are contained within Title 14 of the Code of 
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Federal Regulations (CFR), commonly referred to as the Federal Aviation Regulations 
(FARs).  The majority of commercial and air carrier operations in the U.S. are conducted 
under either 14 CFR Parts 135 or 121.  Regulations governing the certification of pilots, 
flight instructors, and ground instructors; pilot schools; and general operating and flight 
rules are contained within 14 CFR Parts 61, 141, and 91 respectively.   
 Pilot training begins when an individual enrolls in a flight training program that is 
operated under either 14 CFR Parts 61 or 141 and obtains a student pilot certificate.  
Student pilot certificates are issued by an aviation medical examiner following medical 
examination and qualify a student to begin flight training.  Student pilots must be at least 
16 years of age and they are provided instruction on the basics of flight, to include but not 
limited to: preflight planning and preparation; taxi procedures; takeoffs and landings; 
straight and level flight; climbs and turns; descents; transition to various airspeeds; 
emergency procedures; ground reference maneuvers; approaches and landings; go-around 
procedures; cross-country flight; and night flight (Code of Federal Regulations, 2011).  
Student pilots also learn about weather, collision avoidance, navigation, navigation aids, 
air traffic control (ATC) procedures, and all other general operating and flight rules.  
Once a student pilot has acquired the appropriate level of aeronautical knowledge, flight 
proficiency, and aeronautical experience, he or she is then eligible to apply for a private 
pilot certificate, which requires at least 40 hours of total flight time and the successful 
completion of a private pilot practical test.  In order to receive a private pilot certificate, 
an individual must also be at least 17 years of age and hold a third class medical 
certificate (Code of Federal Regulations, 2011). 
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 If an individual wishes to pursue a career as a professional pilot, he or she must 
then obtain a commercial pilot certificate.  The commercial pilot certificate requires 
additional aeronautical knowledge, flight proficiency, and aeronautical experience 
beyond that which is required for a private pilot certificate.  The commercial pilot 
certificate enables an individual to carry passengers and engage in flight operations for 
the purpose of compensation or hire.  Applicants for a commercial pilot certificate are 
required to be at least 18 years of age, obtain at least 250 hours of total flight time, and 
demonstrate proficiency in all areas of the commercial pilot Practical Test Standards 
(PTS).  However, with regard to operations conducted under 14 CFR Part 121, the holder 
of a commercial pilot certificate must also possess an instrument rating and is limited to 
only those duties of a first officer, or second-in-command (Code of Federal Regulations, 
2011). 
 The Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate is the highest level of certification 
available and requires the highest level of demonstrated aeronautical knowledge, flight 
proficiency, and aeronautical experience.  Possession of an ATP certificate enables pilots 
to upgrade from the first officer position and perform the duties of a captain, or pilot-in-
command, of aircraft operated under 14 CFR Part 121.  In order to establish eligibility for 
an ATP certificate, individuals must be at least 23 years of age, obtain at least 1,500 
hours of total flight time, and demonstrate proficiency in all areas of the applicable ATP 
PTS (Code of Federal Regulations, 2011).   
There are a number of additional certificates and ratings a pilot may obtain in 
addition to the private pilot, commercial pilot, and ATP certificates, including but not 
limited to: an instrument rating; multi-engine rating; and Certified Flight Instructor (CFI) 
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certificates.  As previously mentioned, the instrument rating is required for operations 
conducted under 14 CFR Parts 135 and 121 and a multi-engine rating is required if 
operations involve multi-engine aircraft.  Type ratings are typically required as well.  For 
a complete listing of the various requirements for each level of certification and operation 
discussed, refer to Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations.    
Operational Flight Experience 
 Initial flight training and certification are only the beginning of a pilot’s journey 
to air carrier operations.  Professional pilots begin their career with a commercial pilot 
certificate and various other flight instructor certificates, instrument ratings, multi-engine 
ratings, and type ratings.  The ATP certificate is not obtained until the commercially 
certificated pilot acquires at least 1,500 hours of total flight time.  This requires pilots to 
build flight time and develop a wide range of operational flight experience along the way. 
If you want to fly for an airline, you’ll need to do more than simply earn 
the required ratings.  Although the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
requires a minimum of 250 hours to qualify for a commercial pilot 
certificate, the reality is that to be competitive for an airline job you will 
need to have somewhere between 1,500 and 3,000 hours of total flight 
time, including 200 to 500 hours of multiengine time.  The FAA calls the 
difference between what is legally required and what is actually expected 
of professional pilots “the gap” (Phillips, n.d.). 
 
 The majority of pilots begin their career building flight time as an instructor with 
a local flight school or collegiate flight program.  “Then he or she will probably spend a 
year or two working as a CFI to shore up the logbook and boost the number of coveted 
multiengine hours” (Phillips, n.d.).  With hard work and determination, it is possible for a 
flight instructor to build as many as 1,500 hours in as little as one or two years.  Other 
opportunities do exist for the newly certificated commercial pilot to begin building 
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operational flight experience.  Some of the more common examples include banner 
towing, aerial photography, ferry flights, agricultural application, pipeline patrol, and 
sight-seeing tours.  However, many of the entry level positions mentioned provide little 
exposure to the many other types of experience considered important at the air carrier 
level.   
Air carrier operations often involve busy airports and interaction with passengers 
and flight attendants.  Aircraft are operated at higher altitudes, faster speeds, and in 
instrument meteorological conditions.  The majority of air carriers also operate highly 
automated turbine-powered multi-engine aircraft which require multiple crewmembers.  
While flight instruction provides an excellent opportunity to acquire a significant amount 
of flight time in a relatively short period of time, it has its limitations.  According to 
Atlantic Southeast Airlines, “ASA is looking for pilots with stick & rudder skills (basics), 
proficiency in automation, task management, decision-making, crew resource 
management, and an understanding of ‘why’” (AABI, 2007).  
Corporate, air taxi, and charter operations provide pilots with additional 
opportunities to acquire more complex operational flight experience.  “The types of 
airplanes flown vary between turbo-prop planes (i.e. King-Air), executive jets (i.e. 
Citations to Gulfstreams), and large jets (i.e. Boeing 737)” (AvScholars, n.d.).  Flights are 
usually conducted in turbine-powered multi-engine aircraft at higher altitudes and faster 
speeds.  Pilots are likely to gain a significant amount of exposure to passengers, various 
weather conditions, and operations involving multiple crewmembers.  “Once acquiring 
about 1,200 hours of total time and 200 hours of multiengine experience, that airline-
bound pilot will flood the regional airlines with applications” (Phillips, n.d.). 
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Air Carrier Operations 
 Air carrier operations are conducted under the regulations of 14 CFR Parts 135 or 
121.  Part 135 regulations apply to commuter and on-demand operations.  Part 135 
operations typically involve flights by businesses, corporations, and commuter airlines.  
However, it has become quite common for commuter airlines, normally operating under 
Part 135, to code-share with a major air carrier operating under Part 121.  This was a 
result of deregulation and development of the “hub and spoke” system.  Code-sharing 
enabled major carriers to service locations otherwise not possible and typically provided 
some type of economic advantage (NTSB, 1994).   
However, Part 135 operations require less oversight and are subject to a less 
stringent set of regulations than those conducted under Part 121.  According to the NTSB, 
“…despite past efforts of government and industry to bring about safety improvements, 
accident rates for commuter airlines continue to be twice as high as the rates for domestic 
Part 121 airlines” (1994).  The ticketing process is often extremely transparent in most 
cases.  Passengers believe they have booked a flight with a major carrier operating under 
Part 121, only to find they are boarding one or more aircraft operated by a code-share 
partner.  
Commuter airlines that have a code-sharing arrangement with a major 
airline typically paint their aircraft with the color scheme of the major 
airline, and they do business under a company name that closely resembles 
the major airline, such as “Northwest Airlink,” “Delta Connection,” 
“United Express,” “American Eagle,” and so on.  Although these names 
might imply ownership and control by a major airline, this is not 
necessarily the case.  A code-sharing arrangement may or may not involve 
some degree of ownership of the commuter airline by its major airline 




In the case of the Colgan Air DHC-8 accident in 2009, “Colgan Air became a 
Continental Connection through a marketing alliance-code share agreement with 
Continental Airlines” (Colgan Air, 2008).  This enabled Colgan Air to operate as 
Continental Connection Flight 3407 under Part 121.  This accident gained a significant 
amount of attention and prompted, in part, legislation for the Airline Safety and Federal 
Aviation Extension Act of 2010. 
Part 121 regulations apply to domestic, flag, and supplemental operations.        
Part 121 operations typically include flights conducted by major air carriers who are 
subject to the most stringent set of requirements and regulations of all other commercial 
operations.  “Some of the regulatory differences between Part 121 domestic air carrier 
operations and Part 135 commuter air carrier operations occur in the areas of flight 
operations, pilot training programs, flight time limits, operational control, and 
maintenance”  (NTSB, 1994).  For example, pilots engaged in Part 121 operations are 
limited to no more than 1,000 flight hours in any calendar year, whereas Part 135 pilots 
are limited to no more than 1,200 flight hours in any calendar year for scheduled 
operations (Code of Federal Regulations, 2011). 
Air Carrier Safety 
 Today, air carrier operations are extremely safe.  “Since the 1950s…the drive to 
reduce the accident rate has yielded unprecedented levels of safety…In fact, the number 
of commercial accidents has decreased to a point where today, fewer than two accidents 




The passenger fatality rate per million enplanements declined from 0.42 in 
1970-78, to 0.30 in 1979-85, to 0.18 in 1986-88.  Based on 1986-88 
fatality rate, the average passenger boarding a U.S. air carrier had a 
99.999982 percent [sic] chance of surviving the flight.  These data indicate 
that the U.S. commercial air transportation system is extremely safe 
(NTSB, 1994). 
 
According to more recent safety data published by the BTS, there were more than 
197 million Part 121 aircraft departures between 1990 and 2009.  During that same 
period, there were 723 accidents resulting in 1,718 fatalities and 576 serious injuries.  The 
fatality rate for Part 121 operations was 0.0087 fatalities per 100,000 departures during 
this period (BTS, 2011).  There were 31 million Part 135 commuter departures between 
1990 and 2009.  During that same period, there were 200 accidents resulting in 256 
fatalities and 97 serious injuries.  The fatality rate for Part 135 commuter operations was 
0.0082 fatalities per 100,000 departures during this period (BTS, 2011).  Safety data for 















Air Carrier Safety Data: 1990 - 2009 
Type of Operation Part 135 Commuter Part 121 Air Carrier 
Total fatalities 256 1,718 
Total serious injuries 97 576 
Total accidents 200 723 
Total accidents, fatal 43 57 
Aircraft-miles (millions) 4,485 134,889 
Rates per 100 million aircraft-miles 
Fatalities 0.0571 0.0127 
Serious injuries 0.0216 0.0043 
Total accidents 0.0446 0.0054 
Total accidents, fatal 0.0096 0.0004 
Aircraft departures 
(thousands) 31,403 197,447 
Rates per 100,000 aircraft departures 
Fatalities 0.0082 0.0087 
Serious injuries 0.0031 0.0029 
Total accidents 0.0064 0.0037 
Total accidents, fatal 0.0014 0.0003 
Flight hours (thousands) 22,498 324,726 
Rates per 100,000 flight hours 
Fatalities 0.0114 0.0053 
Serious injuries 0.0043 0.0018 
Total accidents 0.0089 0.0022 
Total accidents, fatal 0.0019 0.0002 
 
 
Note. Data derived from “Table 2-9: U.S. Air Carrier Safety Data” and “Table 2-10: U.S. 
Commuter Air Carrier Safety Data,” by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2011. 
 
 Although extremely rare, air carrier accidents do still occur on occasion.  Several 
decades’ worth of aviation research has identified a significant number of factors as either 
causal or contributing in the occurrence of such accidents. 
Causal and Contributing Factors in Aviation Accidents 
 There are a number of ways in which aviation researchers have classified the 
many factors involved in aviation accidents.  For example, the FAA has identified a 
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number of threat categories and common themes (2011).  Threat categories include: bird 
hazards; cabin safety; hazardous cargo; flight deck layout; avionics confusion; crew 
resource management; fuel exhaustion; fuel tank ignition; inclement weather and icing; 
incorrect piloting techniques; in-flight upsets; lack of system isolation and segregation; 
landing and takeoff excursions; midair and ground incursions; pressurization and 
decompression failures; structural failures; uncommanded thrust reversal; uncontained 
engine failure; uncontrolled fire; and wind shear.  Common themes include: flawed 
assumptions; human error; organizational lapses; pre-existing failures; and unintended 
effects (FAA, 2011).  While this list is not all inclusive, it illustrates that a great number 
of factors have been identified as causal or contributing in the occurrence of past aviation 
accidents.  While a full review of each and every factor is well beyond the scope of this 
chapter, the majority of aviation accidents involve some type of environmental, 
mechanical, or human factor. 
Environmental Factors 
 The environment plays an important and significant role in aviation safety, as 
environmental factors are often cited as a causal or contributing factor in aircraft accident 
reports.  Environmental factors include phenomenon such as thunderstorms, cloud 
ceilings, icing, wind shear, turbulence, microburst, and volcanic ash activity to name a 
few.  According to the FAA, “Between 1994 and 2003, there were 19,562 aircraft 
accidents involving 19,823 aircraft.  Weather was a contributing or causal factor in 4,159 
(21.3%) of these accidents” (n.d.).  The FAA’s findings are consistent with those in a 
1996 study conducted by the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation, in which weather was a 
factor in 17% of the 75 fatal accidents studied (1996).  However, Haiss, Chapman, and 
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Wells (2010) identified 126 accidents through content analysis and reported only 5% of 
the accidents were attributed to environmental factors. 
 Wildlife, such as birds and deer, are another environmental factor which have 
received significant attention over the past few decades.  In fact, the FAA has maintained 
a Wildlife Strike Database since 1990 in order to track and record wildlife strikes (2011).  
According to the FAA, there have been more than 99,000 wildlife strikes involving 
aircraft since 1990 (FAA, 2011).  In 1995, a U.S. Air Force E-3 ingested Canadian geese 
into the No. 1 and No. 2 engines, resulting in a loss of power, collision with terrain, and 
the deaths of 22 crewmembers (Flight Safety Foundation, 1996).  More recently, in 2009, 
a U.S. Airways flight encountered a flock of birds shortly after takeoff in New York City, 
resulting in a full loss of power and an emergency landing on the Hudson River (CBS 
News, 2009).  
Mechanical Factors 
On July 19, 1989, at 1516 [3:16 PM], a DC-10-10, N1819U, operated by 
United Airlines as flight 232, experienced a catastrophic failure of the No. 
2 tail-mounted engine during cruise flight.  The separation, fragmentation 
and forceful discharge of the stage 1 fan rotor assembly parts from the No. 
2 engine led to the loss of three hydraulic systems that powered the 
airplane’s flight controls.  The flight crew experienced severe difficulties 
controlling the airplane, which subsequently crashed during an attempted 
landing at Sioux Gateway Airport, Iowa.  There were 285 passengers and 
11 crewmembers onboard.  One flight attendant and 110 passengers were 
fatally injured (NTSB, 1990). 
 
Airplanes are extremely complex machines and contain a tremendous number of 
mechanical parts.  Mechanical failures have been documented as causal or contributing 
factor in a number of aircraft accidents.  “For example, in the early years of aviation it 
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could reasonably be said that the aircraft itself was responsible for the majority of aircraft 
accidents.  That is, early aircraft were intrinsically unforgiving and, relative to their 
counterparts today, mechanically unsafe” (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  However, 
Wiegmann and Shappell also point out, “…the number of aviation accidents attributable 
solely to mechanical failure has decreased markedly over the past 40 years…” (2001).  
Mechanical failures have been reported to account for about 28% of aviation accidents 
(Haiss et al, 2010).  According to the FAA, modern transport aircraft are based on a “fail-
safe design concept”.  In other words, failures which would otherwise have catastrophic 
consequences are designed to ensure failure is extremely improbable (FAA, 2004).  
According to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 46% of the U.S. commercial fleet 
was over 17 years of age in 1997.  By 2001, only 31% of the fleet was over 15 years of 
age (BTS, n.d.). 
Human Factors 
In the 1960s when the problem of error first began to attract attention, the 
estimated contribution of these human factors problems to transport 
accidents was around 20 per cent [sic].  In 1990, however, this estimate 
had increased fourfold to 80 per cent [sic].  It wasn’t so much that people 
had become more fallible as that greatly improved materials and 
engineering techniques had brought the human factor into greater 
prominence (Reason, 2008). 
 
“As aircraft have become more reliable, humans have played a progressively more 
important causal role in aviation accidents” (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  Human 
factors have become an important issue with regard to aviation, as human error is often 
cited as one of the leading causes in aviation accidents.  A 1996 study conducted by the 
Bureau of Air Safety Investigation found that in 75 fatal aircraft accidents, “Over 70% of 
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the accidents involved pilot factors.  The most common pilot factors were related to poor 
judgment and decision making…Other common factors were in-flight decisions or 
planning and attempted operation beyond experience or ability” (1996).  Haiss, et al, 
(2010) found that of 126 aviation accidents identified through content analysis, 67% were 
attributed to human error. 
Characteristics of Major U.S. Air Carrier Accidents: 1978 – 1990 
In 1994, the NTSB conducted a review of 37 major U.S. air carrier accidents 
between 1978 and 1990 in which flight-crew performance was cited as either a causal or 
contributing factor.  The NTSB found that the captain was the flying pilot and the first 
officer was the non-flying pilot in 81% of the accidents when unadjusted and 87% of the 
accidents when adjusted for factors which might have favored a particular crew 
assignment (1990).  “Half of the captains had logged at least 14,000 hours; the least 
experienced captain had 4,028 hours…Half of the first officers had logged more than 
5,110 hours; the least experienced first officer had 1,800 hours” (NTSB, 1994). 
 In addition, the NTSB reviewed several other factors such as time in accident 
aircraft type, time in type and crew position, duration of employment in crew position, 
and crew familiarity.  According to the NTSB, “Experience in the accident aircraft type 
can be relevant to a crewmember’s familiarity with aircraft handling characteristics and 
the unique systems, controls, and displays of each type of aircraft” (1994).  The NTSB 
found that 43% of first officers had less than 500 hours in accident aircraft type.  When 
experience in accident aircraft type and time in crew position where considered together, 
first officers had a median of 419 hours in the accident aircraft type and crew position 
(NTSB, 1994).  “For 17 (53 percent) [sic] of the 32 first officers, the accident occurred 
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within their initial year as a first officer for the carrier” and “In 11 (73 percent) [sic] of 
the 15 accidents for which data were available, the accident occurred on the crew’s first 
day flying together; and in 7 (44 percent) [sic] of the 16 accidents for which data were 
available, the accident flight was the crew’s first flight together” (NTSB, 1994). 
 Regardless of total flight experience, be it 500 hours or 5,000 hours, all U.S. air 
carrier pilots have to endure a ‘first year’ of employment.  Many pilots, if not most, will 
begin their air carrier career in an aircraft make and model in which they have little to no 
previous flying experience.  Schedule changes and positional upgrades will require all 
new crews to experience a first flight together or first day flying together. 
 The NTSB’s 1994 review represented the entire population of major U.S. air 
carrier accidents between 1978 and 1990 in which flight-crew performance was cited as a 
causal or contributing factor.  A high percentage of the major accidents either occurred 
within the first officers first year of employment, while the first officer had less than 500 
hours of flight time in the accident aircraft type, during the crew’s first flight together, or 
during the crew’s first day flying together.  Yet, all of the pilots included in this study 
possessed more than 1,500 hours of total flight experience. 
 However, the NTSB’s 1994 review is nearly twenty years old and the aviation 
industry has progressed significantly since the early 1990s.  Unlike many aircraft 
operated between 1978 and 1990, most modern aircraft are equipped with advanced 
technologies which were just being introduced in the early to late 1990s.  Such 
technologies include advanced alert and warning systems and fully digital instruments, 
displays, and flight control systems.  According to the NTSB, “None of the accidents 
examined in this study involved airplanes equipped with the latest generation of glass-
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cockpit flight deck automation…The Safety Board recognizes that the highly automated 
flight deck has potential for affecting the monitoring/challenging function of 
crewmembers” (1994).  In addition, navigation aids and Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
facilities have been modernized.  There has also been an increase in access to information 
critical for flight safety.  All U.S. air carrier pilots are now required to complete initial 
and refresher Crew Resource Management (CRM) training. 
Characteristics of Major U.S. Air Carrier Accidents: 1991 – 2001 
 More recently, Dismukes, Berman, and Loukopoulos (2007) conducted a similar 
study in which they compared major U.S. air carrier accident data between 1991 and 
2001 with the NTSB’s findings between 1978 and 1990.  The findings revealed there had 
been a significant decrease in the number of accidents per year during the more recent 
timeframe.  When adjusted for an increase in the number of flights, Dismukes et al found 
that between 1984 to 1990 and 1991 to 2001, the accident rate per 100,000 departures 
decreased from 0.0396 to 0.0183 respectively (2007).  “This apparent improvement may 
have come about through the widespread adoption of crew resource management 
training” (Dismukes et al, 2007).  With regard to period of day, the findings revealed an 
overrepresentation of accidents during the overnight (2200 – 0559) period of day, which 
was “within the limits of statistical uncertainty” when compared with the findings of the 
NTSB’s 1994 study (Dismukes et al, 2007).  Figure 2 depicts the percentage of accidents 











Note. Data derived from “The Limits of Expertise, Table 20.3” by Dismukes et al, 2007. 
 
Dismukes et al also found the distribution of accidents by phase of flight to be 
within the limits of statistical uncertainty when compared with the findings of the NTSB.  
“Even though the takeoff and approach/landing phases present the shortest periods of 
exposure to risk, these phases incurred the highest number of accidents” (Dismukes et al, 






Note. Data derived from “The Limits of Expertise, Table 20.4” by Dismukes et al, 2007. 










































































Note. Data derived from “The Limits of Expertise, Table 20.5” by Dismukes et al, 2007. 
  
 With regard to flight delay status, Dismukes et al also found that delay status 
“was similar for both periods” studied.  55% of flights between 1978 and 1990 and 
53.3% of accidents between 1991 and 2001 were in a delayed status (Dismukes et al, 
2007). 
Pressure to maintain scheduled arrival time might conceivably lead flight 
crews to make less conservative decisions and, in particular, might 
contribute to plan continuation errors such as failing to discontinue a 
planned approach when it becomes inappropriate/dangerous to do so.  
This pressure could be externally generated or self-imposed, conscious or 
unconscious (Dismukes et al, 2007). 
 
 Regarding duration of employment with the accident air carrier, Dismukes et al 
reported findings consistent with those of the NTSB.  41% of first officers had less than 
one year of experience with their airline.  “These seven pilots had a median of 118 hours 
of experience as first officers at their current airline” (Dismukes et al, 2007).  However, 
Dismukes et al also reviewed the circumstances surrounding the accidents involved and 
suggest “…that in most cases greater experience among the first officers would probably 
not have affected the outcome” (Dismukes et al, 2007).  When consideration was given to 
























which pilot was flying and which pilot was monitoring, Dismukes et al found the captain 
was the flying pilot in 79% of accidents between 1991 and 2001.  This finding was also 
consistent with the NTSB’s 1994 findings, in which the captain was the flying pilot in 
81% of accidents (Desmukes et al, 2007). 
Conceptual Framework of Current Study 
 The existing body of literature provides insight into the complexities associated 
with aviation safety.  While there has been a significant reduction in the accident rate 
over the past few decades, pilot performance remains an important area of interest for 
legislators, administrators, and managers in the combined effort to create an ever safer 
industry.  The Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Extension Act of 2010 is geared, in 
part, toward protecting passengers and reducing the level of risk associated with U.S. air 
carrier operations through an increase in flight time and certification requirements for 
pilots engaged in air carrier operations.  The conceptual framework for this study comes 















From "Human Error," by James Reason, 1990, p. 202.  Copyright 1990 by the Cambridge 
University Press.  Reprinted with permission of the Cambridge University Press. 
  
 Reason’s Model is frequently used in the aviation industry as a model of accident 
causation (Chesterfield, 2002).  The model involves “…a succession of defensive layers 
separating potential losses from the local hazards…Only when a series of holes ‘line up’ 
can an accident trajectory pass through the defenses to cause harm to people, assets and 
the environment” (Reason, 2008).   
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Active failures, or unsafe acts, are felt almost immediately (Reason, 1990).  “In 
general, active errors are associated with the performance of the ‘front-line’ operators of 
a complex system: pilots, air traffic controllers…” (Reason, 1990).  An example of an 
active failure might include the failure of a first officer to challenge the captain when he 
or she has reason to believe something unsafe has occurred or is about to occur.   
Latent failures include the preconditions and are “…most likely to be spawned by 
those whose activities are removed in both time and space from the direct control 
interface: designers, high-level decision makers, construction workers, managers and 
maintenance personnel…latent errors pose the greatest threat to the safety of a complex 
system” (Reason, 1990).  Latent failures “…occur because the designers, builders, 
managers and operators cannot foresee all possible accident scenarios” (Reason, 2008).  
An example of a latent failure might include the existence of a corporate culture in which 
first officers are afraid to challenge the captain when he or she believes something unsafe 
has occurred or is about to occur because they fear company reprisal. 
In 2009, the FAA issued an ANPR to address whether a commercially certificated 
first officer engaged in Part 121 operations receives sufficient training and experience to 
recognize and respond to a potentially dangerous situation (FAA, 2009).  As viewed 
through Reason’s model, training and experience represent the preconditions.  “Adverse 
consequences may lie dormant within the system for a long time, only becoming evident 
when they combine with other factors to breach the system’s defenses” (Reason, 1990). 
Risk Management 
Risk management plays an important role in the aviation industry.  Risk is present 
anytime there is a danger or probability of loss to something.  In order to reduce or 
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eliminate the likelihood something is lost, stakeholders often implement a systematic 
approach to manage such risk.  Risk Management has been defined as “the selection and 
implementation of a strategy of control of risk, followed by monitoring and evaluation of 
the effectiveness of that strategy” (Government of Canada, 2005).  The FAA defines risk 
as “…the probability and severity of accident or loss from exposure to various hazards, 
including injury to people and loss of resources” (2000). 
 According to the Parenteral Drug Association (PDA), concern for risk and risk 
management began with the inception of the Industrial Revolution (n.d.).  Steam engines 
of the late 1700s and early 1800s were particularly dangerous.  “Steam engines, 
particularly those used on ships, had a potential to cause a greater number of casualties 
than other man made inventions that had been devised” (PDA, n.d.).  Between 1816 and 
1848, nearly 2,563 people were killed in accidents involving steamboats (PDA, n.d.). 
Eventually, Congress grew concerned over the number of fatalities involving 
steam engines, and in 1838, established the Steamboat Inspection Service.  According to 
PDA, the Steamboat Inspection Service established the first set regulations for any 
industry.  Unfortunately, early regulations were ineffective and the number of casualties 
continued to remain high.  In 1852, Congress took action and moved oversight from the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) to the Department of Treasury (DOT) (PDA, n.d.). 
Since the early days of the Industrial Revolution, much progress has been made in 
reducing risk, risk management, and the prevention of injuries and/or loss of life.  Today, 
nearly every industry has some type of regulatory body in place, responsible for keeping 
the workplace a safer place to work.  The FAA is the regulatory body for the U.S. 
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aviation industry.  The mission, “…provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in 
the world” (FAA, 2005). 
Operational Risk Management 
 Operational Risk Management (ORM) “…is a decision-making tool to 
systematically help identify operational risks and benefits and determine the best course 
of action for any given situation” (FAA, 2000).  It is most beneficial to reduce or 
eliminate known risks in the developmental phase of any process.  Unfortunately, this is 
not always possible.  In the aviation industry, risk is always present.  Each flight is 
unique and all flights are subject to risk.  For this reason, ORM is quite useful in the 
aviation industry as it can be used to identify and manage inherent risks. 
 There are six steps involved in ORM: identify the hazards; assess the risks; 
analyze risk control measures; make control decisions; implement risk controls; and 
supervise and review (FAA, 2000).  “Risk management must be a fully integrated part of 
planning and executing any operation, routinely applied by management, not a way of 
reacting when some unforeseen problem occurs” (FAA, 2000).  There are four basic 
principles upon which the ORM model is based: accept no unnecessary risk; make risk 
decisions at the appropriate level; accept risk when benefits outweigh the costs; and 










6-Step Operational Risk Management Process 
 
 
Note. Derived from “FAA System Safety Handbook” by the Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2000. 
 
Air carrier accidents are extremely rare.  While prediction of a particular accident 
is highly unlikely, Reason’s Model of accident causation and concepts of risk 
management form the conceptual framework for this study, as they are useful in the 
identification and control of potential vulnerabilities in the aviation system.  “One of the 
most important aspects of safety management is to identify error-prone situations” 
(Reason, 2008).  This study identified the characteristics of major U.S. air carrier 
accidents between 1991 and 2010.  The existing body of literature provided a basis for 
the selection of variables in this study.  The results, findings, and conclusion of this study 
may prove useful in the first two steps of the ORM process; identify the hazards and 
assess the risk.  In addition, the results of this study may prove useful in the future as 
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aviation administrators supervise and review the effectiveness of controls resulting from 
























The studies conducted by the NTSB (1994) and Dismukes et al (2007) pertaining 
to major U.S. air carrier accidents laid the groundwork for the current study.  However, 
both studies were limited to only those accidents citing pilot performance as a causal or 
contributing factor.  This study provides a more recent look at the characteristics of major 
U.S. air carrier accidents between 1991 and 2010 operated under 14 CFR 121.  In 
addition, this study expands upon the population studied to also include air carrier 
accidents in which pilot performance was not cited as a casual or contributing factor.   
This study was carried out using archival data and contributes to the existing body 
of literature as it pertains to the characteristics of major U.S. air carrier accidents.  The 
conceptual framework for this study was built upon our understanding of accident 
causation and effective risk management.  A case control methodology was used to 
compare the characteristics of air carrier accidents citing pilot performance as a causal or 






The case control methodology is commonly used in epidemiological 
research to compare a group of interest, such as people with a certain 
disease (that is, “cases”) with a group of individuals from the same 
population who do not exhibit the disease (that is, “controls”).  Control 
groups may be randomly selected from within the population of interest or 
may be selected to “match” cases on certain variables, such as age, sex, or 
exposure to potential risk factors…For example, one study, which 
compared fatal-to-the-pilot GA crashes to those in which the pilot 
survived, found that aircraft fires, off-airport locations, nighttime flight, 
and IMC were linked to pilot fatality.  Another study examining predictors 
of pilot fatality among weather related GA accidents resulted in similar 
findings (NTSB, 2005). 
 
Major U.S. air carrier accidents citing pilot performance as a causal or 
contributing factor were the group of “cases”.  Accidents not citing pilot performance as a 
causal or contributing factor were the group of “controls”.  The two groups represented 
the entire population of major U.S. air carrier accidents between 1991 and 2010 operating 
under 14 CFR 121 and were compared with one another to determine whether any 
statistical differences existed between select variables.  The researcher was particularly 
interested in determining whether a statistical difference existed between groups with 
regard to flight experience and level of certification.   
The remainder of this chapter describes the methodology used in this study, to 
include: the population; sampling procedure; selection of the variables; sources of data; 
data collection; procedures for missing data; measurement of the variables; data analysis; 
and reliability and validity.  The findings, conclusions, and recommendations are reported 







Between 1991 and 2010, there were more than 139 million aircraft departures 
within the U.S. air carrier industry (BTS, 2011).  During that same period, only 747 
accidents occurred while operated under 14 CFR 121 (NTSB, 2011).  51 of the 747 
accidents were operated under 14 CFR 121 and resulted in an NTSB aircraft accident 
report (AAR) or aircraft accident brief (AAB).  These accidents included scheduled and 
non-scheduled passenger and cargo flights.  Flights originated from several airports 
within the U.S. during various hours of the day and months of the year.  There were a 
number of U.S. air carriers involved, as well as a variety of different types of aircraft. 
The group of captains and first officers included in this study represented a 
relatively small group of pilots with regard to the overall population of pilots holding an 
ATP or commercial pilot certificate.  According to FAA data, there were no fewer than 
256,158 individuals in possession of either an ATP or commercial certificate in any given 
year between 1991 and 2010 when both groups were combined (FAA, 2011).  While the 
number of commercial certificates decreased from 148,365 to 123,705 between 1991 and 
2010, the number of ATP certificates increased from 112,167 to 142,198 between 1991 
and 2010.  Fluctuations between any given years were relatively slight.   
In order to qualify for employment with a U.S. air carrier, first officers are 
required to hold at least a commercial pilot certificate with an instrument rating and must 
have reached their 18th birthday.  However, the majority of air carrier pilots are at least 
23 years of age and in possession of an ATP certificate, as this is a mandatory 
requirement in order to serve as the captain of an aircraft operated under 14 CFR 121.  
Additionally, air carrier pilots were required to retire upon reaching their 60th birthday 
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until just recently.  Pilots between the age of 60 and 65 have only been eligible for 
continued employment since December, 2007 (FAA, 2007). 
Although there were only 50 accidents selected in this study, it represents the 
entire population, or census, of major U.S. air carrier accidents between 1991 and 2010 
operated under 14 CFR 121.   
Adherence to Principles of Ethical Conduct 
 Institutional Review Board (IRB) review was not required to perform this study as 
the researcher did not obtain: (1) "data through intervention or interaction with the 
individual"; or (2) "identifiable private information" (OSU, 2008).  Each of the reports 
included in this study were produced and made public by the NTSB.  Identities of each of 
the accident pilots were not made public by the NTSB nor the researcher of this study.   
Sampling Procedure 
 Sampling procedures were not required in this study, as all major U.S. air carrier 
accidents between 1991 and 2010 operated under 14 CFR 121 for which the NTSB 
conducted a major investigation of the accident were selected.  Major investigations were 
defined as investigations in which the NTSB adopted an aircraft accident report (AAR) or 
aircraft accident brief (AAB). 
Selection of Variables 
The variables considered in this study included many of the variables considered 
by the NTSB (1994) and Dismukes et al (2007).  They have also received significant 
attention from accident investigators and a number of other researchers.  Variables 
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related to the operational characteristics of major U.S. air carrier accidents included: 
phase of flight; period of day; type of operation; equipment type; and involvement of 
environmental factors, mechanical factors, and other persons.  Variables related to the 
characteristics of pilots included: flight experience; level of certification; duration of 
employment with the accident air carrier; crew assignment; crew familiarity; the 
involvement of pilot performance; past unsatisfactory ratings; FAA accidents, incidents, 
and violations; and prior driver's license suspensions and revocations.  
This study was exploratory in nature and relied upon both quantitative and 
qualitative data to answer the research questions.  The following variables were 
considered by the NTSB in 1994 but not considered in this study: crewmember workload; 
time-since-awakening; flight delay status; information available when errors occurred; 
stress; and organizational structure and function of the organization.   
Sources of Data 
 This study was carried out using archival data.  “Archival data are those that are 
present in existing records or archives.  The researcher simply examines or selects the 
data for analysis” (McBurney & White, 2007).  McBurney and White further state, 
“Archival research is appropriate in many instances…logistics may make it infeasible to 
conduct an experiment relating to the variables of interest” (2007). 
The NTSB’s Aviation Accident Database and Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University’s Hunt Library were used to gather the archival data for this study.  The NTSB 
Aviation Accident Database provided access to the factual reports and probable cause 
reports.  The Hunt Library provided access to the NTSB’s full aircraft accident reports 
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(AAR) and aircraft accident briefs (AAB), as several of the older reports were not readily 
available on the NTSB's website. 
The NTSB Aviation Accident Database is web-based and contains factual reports 
and probable cause reports for accidents and selected incidents from 1962 and later.  
Narrative reports are provided in PDF format and must be downloaded individually.   
 Factual reports are typically a couple pages in length and provide a brief overview 
factual data, including but not limited to: date of the event; aircraft registration number; 
occurrence type; location and time; aircraft information summary; weather; and pilot 
information. 
 Probable cause reports are typically a couple pages in length as well, and provide 
a brief overview of the probable cause of the accident.   Data and information contained 
within these reports include: aircraft information; injuries and fatalities; accident location; 
weather conditions; pilot information; sequence-of-events; causal and contributing 
factors; and brief narrative stating the probable cause.   
Full accident reports are published by the NTSB following a major accident 
investigation.  These reports are often a hundred pages or more in length and provide 
both quantitative and qualitative accident data.  They provide a detailed narrative account 
of the events which transpired and rely on information from a variety of credible sources.  
The NTSB may hold a public hearing to gather additional information from experts and 
witnesses.  Following months of testing and analysis, the NTSB releases an abstract, 
followed by a full report “…containing the Board’s conclusions, probable cause, and 
safety recommendations” (NTSB, 2011). 
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 “For archival data to be scientifically useful, the agency collecting the data must 
ask questions similar to the scientists or must inadvertently collect data that are valuable 
to the scientist” (McBurney & White, 2007).  The NTSB is considered to be a neutral 
party and leading authority with regard to the accident investigation process.  This allows 
the NTSB to identify factual data and report information objectively with regard to the 
findings, probable cause, and recommendations. 
In 1974, Congress reestablished the NTSB as a completely separate entity, 
outside the DOT, reasoning that “…No federal agency can properly 
perform such (investigatory) functions unless it is totally separate and 
independent from any other…agency of the United States”.  The NTSB, 
which has no authority to regulate, fund, or be directly involved in the 
operation of any mode of transportation, conducts investigations and 
makes recommendations from an objective viewpoint.  Since its inception, 
the NTSB has investigated more than 132,000 aviation accidents and 
thousands of surface transportation accidents (NTSB, 2011). 
 
There were other sources which could have been used to gather data, such as  the 
FAA Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS).   Unfortunately, this database contains a 
significant number of fields which contain missing data and is primarily concerned with 
data related to aircraft incidents.  Additionally, the AIDS database contains a limited 
amount of data pertaining to the captain only.  It would have been nearly impossible to 
determine whether all of the data contained within the AIDS database was accurately 
input without cross-referencing other documents, such as the ones used in this study.  
Therefore, NTSB full accident reports, accident briefs, factual reports, and probable 






The first step in the data collection process was to identify all U.S. air carrier 
accidents between 1991 and 2010 operated under 14 CFR 121.  The NTSB Aviation 
Accident Database was used to filter the system for: (1) accidents with an event start date 
of "01/01/1991"; (2) an event end date of "12/31/2010"; (3) investigation type - 
"Accident"; and (4) operation - "Part 121: Air Carrier".  All other fields were left at the 
default value in order to include all accidents that fit within the limits of the search.  This 
resulted in the identification of 747 "Part 121: Air Carrier" "Accidents" between 
"01/01/1991" and "12/31/2010". 
The second step in the data collection process was to identify which accidents 
resulted in a major investigation.  The NTSB's web-based list of aircraft accident reports 
and aircraft accident briefs was cross-referenced with the Hunt Library's web-based list of 
reports and briefs.  Each of the reports and briefs were assigned a designator by the 
NTSB which specifies the year in which the report was adopted and a sequential number 
in which they are ordered.  For example, the seventh report to be adopted in 2009 was 
AAR-09-07.  The fourth brief to be adopted in 2007 was AAB-07-04.  This enabled the 
researcher to sequentially check all of the reports for each year between 1991 and 2010.  
No reports were missing based on a sequential check.  While there was no way to ensure 
the sequence in a given year ended with the last available report, both the NTSB list and 
Hunt Library list were cross-referenced to ensure both lists ended with the same 
sequential report.  Both lists were consistent with one another and the researcher 
determined the probability of missing a report in any given year to be extremely low.  See 
Appendix B for a sequential list of NTSB reports and briefs. 
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The third step in the data collection process was to go through each report and 
determine which of the accidents involved a U.S. air carrier operating under 14 CFR 121.  
This resulted in the identification of 51 accidents which met the criteria required for 
inclusion in this study (see Appendix B).  Further analysis revealed that one of the 51 
accidents (AAR 09/04) was the result of a ground fire prior to engine start.  The 
information contained within this report focused on the ignition of supplemental oxygen 
stored within a supernumerary compartment while the aircraft was still parked, prior to 
engine start.  Thus, AAR 09/04 was excluded from this study.  This resulted in the 
selection of 50 accidents.  
Microsoft Excel was used to record all of the data, thereby enabling the researcher 
to centrally organize and record data from 47 aircraft accident reports, 3 aircraft accident 
briefs, 50 factual reports, and 50 probable cause reports into one database with 
standardized rows and columns for future analysis.  Once all data inputs were complete, 
the researcher then cross-referenced each of the narrative documents with the final 
Microsoft Excel database to ensure all of the variables were transferred accurately with a 
minimal risk of input error.  Appendices B through Z have been provided to document all 
the recorded measurements.  This provides other researchers with an opportunity to 
validate the accuracy of this study and/or aid in the analysis of future studies. 
Procedures for Missing Data 
 The archival data used in this study was collected from historical NTSB accident 
reports.  Given the historical nature of the data, it was acknowledged by the researcher 
that certain NTSB accident reports might contain missing data for one or more of the 
variables under investigation.  In such cases, the findings were reported only for those 
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accidents in which such data was available and the researcher was explicit in reporting 
such findings.  For example, if data for a particular variable was available in only 40 of 
the 50 accident reports, the researcher stated in the findings that for this particular 
variable, data was only available for 40 of the accidents.  This procedure for reporting the 
findings was consistent with the procedures used by the NTSB in 1994 and Dismukes et 
al (2007). 
Measurement of the Variables 
“Minimizing measurement error is critical.  This is best accomplished by 
developing a well-thought-out operational definition of the measurement procedure and 
by diligently using the operational definition in the research” (Graziano & Raulin, 2007).  
Each of the variables considered in this study were operationally defined in order to 
provide a reliable means of measurement.  Operational definitions were modeled after the 
definitions established by the NTSB in 1994.  The following operational definitions were 
used in the measurement of the variables: 
Operational Related Variables 
1. Phase of flight – This variable was categorized as: taxi; takeoff; climb; 
maneuvers; cruise; descent; approach; and landing.  Measurements were recorded 
on a nominal scale of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 respectively. 
 
2. Period of day – This variable was measured on a nominal scale.  Score data was 
translated into categorical data.  Period of day was recorded as afternoon-evening 
(1400 – 2159 local), overnight (2200 – 0559 local), or morning-midday (0600 – 
1359 local) and recorded on a nominal scale of 1, 2, and 3 respectively. 
 
3. Type of operation – This variable was categorized as: scheduled or non-
scheduled passenger; and passenger or cargo service.  Measurements were 
recorded on a nominal scale of 1 and 2 for each of the two categories respectively. 
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4. Equipment type – There were several aspects concerning the type of aircraft 
used.  Therefore, a number of variables were considered with regard to equipment 
type:  
 
a. Number of flight crewmembers – This variable was categorized as: two 
pilots; or two pilots and an engineer. Measurements were recorded on a 
nominal scale of 1 and 2 respectively. 
 
b. Number of engines – This variable was categorized as: two engines; 
three engines; and four engines.  Single engine operations are not 
authorized under 14 CFR 121.  Measurements were recorded on a nominal 
scale of 1, 2, and 3 respectively. 
 
c. Type of engines – This variable was categorized as: turbo-prop; 
turbofan; and turbojet.  Measurements were recorded on a nominal scale 
of 1, 2, and 3 respectively. 
 
5. Involvement of environmental, mechanical, and factors related to other   
persons – This variable was categorized as: environmental; mechanical; and other 
persons.  “The term ‘other persons,’ in this context, includes air traffic controllers, 
air carrier and airport management, regulatory authorities, ramp/maintenance 
personnel, and pilots of other aircraft” (NTSB, 1994).  Environmental factors, 
mechanical factors, and other persons were recorded if the NTSB cited such 
factors as a causal or contributing factor in the probable cause statement and 
assigned a value of (C) = Cause or (F) = Factor for the findings reported in the 
“Brief of Accident” report.  Measurements were recorded on a nominal scale of 1, 
2, and 3 respectively.  In the event a variable was cited as both a cause and factor, 
the variable was recorded as a nominal 4. 
 
Pilot Related Variables 
 
1. Flight experience – There are several aspects concerning the types of flight 
experience a pilot might accumulate.  Flight hours were used as the measurement 
of flight experience in this study.  Flight hours were recorded on a ratio scale 
using score data.  Flight hours were measured the following way: 
 
a. Total hours of flying experience – A measurement of the cumulative 




b. Hours of experience in the accident aircraft type – A measurement of 
the cumulative number of flight hours accumulated in the accident aircraft 
make and model at the time of the accident, regardless of crew position. 
 
c. Hours of experience in aircraft type and crew position – A measurement 
of the cumulative number of flight hours accumulated in a specific crew 
position in the accident aircraft make and model (e.g. B-737 first officer) 
at the time of the accident. 
 
2. Level of certification – This variable was categorized as ATP certificate or 
commercial certificate.  Other levels of certification were not measured, as pilots 
are required to hold either an ATP certificate of commercial pilot certificate in 
order to engage in U.S. air carrier operations.  Data was recorded for the highest 
level of certification held, not to include additional ratings or flight instructor 
certificates.  For example, a commercial pilot with an instrument rating and flight 
instructor certificate was recorded as a commercial pilot certificate.  
Measurements were recorded on a nominal scale of 1 or 2 respectively. 
 
3. Duration of employment with accident air carrier – This variable categorized 
on a nominal scale as less than one year of employment with the accident air 
carrier or more than one year with the accident air carrier.  Measurements were 
recorded on a nominal scale of 1 or 2 respectively. 
 
4. Crew assignment – This variable was categorized as captain flying/first officer 
monitoring or captain monitoring/first officer flying.  Measurements were 
recorded on a nominal scale of 1 or 2 respectively. 
 
5. Crew familiarity – The NTSB (1994) identified two measures of crew 
familiarity in their study in which a high percentage of accidents seemed to occur.  
This study measured crew familiarity in the following manner: 
 
a. First sequence/pairing together – This variable was categorized as the 
first pairing together or not the first pairing together.  Measurements were 
recorded on a nominal scale of 1 or 2 respectively. 
 
b. First day flying together (current pairing/sequence) – This variable was 
categorized as the first day flying together or not the first day flying 
together on the trip sequence.  Measurements were recorded on a nominal 




c.  First leg of the day – This variable was categorized as the first leg of 
the day or not the first leg of the day.  Measurements were recorded on a 
nominal scale of 1 or 2 respectively. 
 
6. Pilot performance involved – This variable was categorized as pilot 
performance cited as a causal/contributing factor or not cited as a 
causal/contributing factor.  Measurements were recorded on a nominal scale of 1 
or 2 respectively. 
 
7. Past unsatisfactory ratings – This variable was categorized as previous 
unsatisfactory rating or no previous unsatisfactory rating.  For the purpose of this 
study, unsatisfactory ratings were recorded only if the NTSB reported so in the 
aircraft accident report or brief.    Measurements were recorded on a nominal 
scale of 1 or 2 respectively.  Multiple unsatisfactory ratings were not measured 
separately; they were recorded as a nominal 1. 
 
Data Analysis 
The purpose of this study was to identify the characteristics of major U.S. air 
carrier accidents between 1991 and 2010.  “The appropriate statistical procedure depends 
on the research question(s) we are asking and the type of data we collected” (Siegle, 
2011).   
This study relied upon quantitative and qualitative data in order to answer the 
following research questions: 
1. What were the operational characteristics of major U.S. air carrier accidents 
between 1991 and 2010 based on select operational related variables? 
 
2. What were the characteristics of the pilots involved in major U.S. air carrier 
accidents between 1991 and 2010 based on select pilot related variables?  
 
3. Based on the select variables, were the characteristics of pilots involved in 
major U.S. air carrier accidents in which pilot performance was cited as a causal 
or contributing factor significantly different than the characteristics of pilots 




Descriptive statistics were used to describe the characteristics of major U.S. air 
carrier accidents in terms of measures of central tendency, variation, range, variance, and 
percentiles.  
Descriptive statistics are used to describe the basic features of the data in a 
study.  They provide simple summaries about the sample and the 
measures.  Together with simple graphic analysis, they form the basis of 
virtually every quantitative analysis of data…With descriptive statistics 
you are simply describing what is or what the data shows (Trochim, 2006). 
 
The first two research questions were designed to answer basic questions 
regarding the characteristics of major air carrier accidents.  Thus, descriptive statistics 
were considered to be the appropriate statistical method.   
Inferential, non-parametric, statistics were used to answer the third research 
question, which was designed to answer whether a statistical difference existed between 
two groups.  “With inferential statistics, you are trying to reach conclusions that extend 
beyond the immediate data alone” (Trochim, 2006).  The nature of the data collected in 
this study was previously identified in the operational definition for each of the variables.  
Chi-square was used to determine statistical differences between variables with nominal 
data.  According to Graziano and Raulin, a chi-square test is appropriate for determining 
statistical difference between nominal data (2007).  Data was analyzed using the PASW 
17.0, previously referred to as the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). 
Reliability and Validity 
 “Researchers study relationships among variables.  Assessing variables means 
quantifying them.  The quantification process, called measurement, involves applying the 
number system to the variable…nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio measurements” 
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(Graziano & Raulin, 2007).  In order for the measurements to be scientifically useful, 
they must be reliable and valid (McBurney & White, 2007). 
Reliability 
Reliability is the extent to which an experiment, test, or any measuring 
procedure yields the same results on repeated trials.  Without the 
agreement of independent observers able to replicate research procedures, 
or the ability to use research tools and procedures that yield consistent 
measurements, researchers would be unable to satisfactorily draw 
conclusions, formulate theories, or make claims about the generalizability 
of their research (Colorado State University, 2011). 
 
 “Good measures give consistent results, regardless of who does the measuring.  
This is referred to as the reliability of the measure” (Graziano & Raulin, 2007).  
Reliability was established through the development of an operational definition for each 
of the variables.  Operational definitions enable the researcher to translate abstract 
concepts “…to a concrete level so that they can be manipulated or measured” (Graziano 
& Raulin, 2007).  For example, flight experience may be gained in a number of ways.  It 
is an abstract concept.  While one pilot may have more experience than another flying in 
poor weather conditions, he or she may have less experience with regard to the 
aerodynamic characteristics of a particular aircraft.  For this reason, flight experience is 
often measured in terms of flight time.  According to the NTSB, “total flight hours, 
however gained, represent each pilot’s general seasoning” (1994).  Operational 
definitions for each of the variables have been discussed.  This provides independent 
researchers with the ability to replicate the measurement procedures of this study with 
consistent results.  Reliability was also established through the selection of NSTB 
accident reports, factual reports, and probable cause reports as the source of data.  These 
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reports are readily available to other researchers and are produced by the leading 
authority with regard to accident investigation. 
Validity 
 “Validity of an instrument means it measures what it was meant to 
measure…Through the collection of evidence over time, a case is built for the validity of 
measures, which is dependent upon the theoretical models and hypothesis” (Spector, 
1981).  Each of the variables included in the design of this study were selected following 
an extensive review of literature.  The variables were selected, in part, due to the 
significant amount of attention they have received in previous research studies 
concerning aviation accidents and pilot performance.   
Previous accident investigations have identified a large set of operational 
and human performance factors as being related to the occurrence of 
seriousness of errors.  These factors…include the following: type of 
operation; phase of flight; flight delay status; equipment type; 
crewmember position and function; workload of the crewmember and 
quality of information available to the crewmember when an error 
occurred; fatigue; fitness; stress; past performance evaluations; mutual 
familiarity of the crewmembers; training; experience; and air carrier 
organizational structure and function (NTSB, 1994). 
 
 Validity was established using operational definitions for each of the variables 
and through the selection of measurement procedures consistent with those used in 
previous research studies and within the aviation industry.  Validity was also established 
through the selection of NSTB accident reports, factual reports, and probable cause 
reports as the source of data.  These reports are readily available to other researchers and 





 In order for a measurement to have good construct validity, it should measure 
whatever construct it is supposed to measure and not something else (McBurney & 
White, 2007).  Each of the measurements selected in this study are consistent with 
measurements used in previous studies.  For example, flight time was an operationally 
defined measurement of flight experience.  According to the NTSB, “Crewmembers gain 
flight experience in a variety of general aviation, military, and air carrier settings.  Total 
flight hours, however gained, represent each pilot’s general seasoning” (NTSB, 1994).  
This study measured flight experience on a ratio scale using flight hours, which is 
consistent with the score data pilots use to record experience in their logbooks.  In 
addition, the FAA associates flight hours with aeronautical experience for the purpose of 
certification.  For example, with regard to aeronautical experience, 14 CFR 61.129 states, 
“…a person who applies for a commercial pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine 
class rating must log at least 250 hours of flight time as a pilot…” (FAA, 2011). 
Content Validity 
 “Content validity is the notion that a test should sample the range of the behavior 
that is represented by the theoretical concept being measured.  An intelligence test, for 
example, should measure general knowledge, verbal ability, spatial ability, and 
quantitative skills among others” (McBurney & White, 2007).  Content validity was 
established through the selection of variables and measurements which measure a range 
of the concepts in this study.  For example, crew familiarity was measured in terms of a 
crew’s first day flying together and a crew’s first together.  Flight experience was 
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measured in terms of total hours of flying experience, hours of experience in the accident 
aircraft type, and hours of experience in the crew position.  Equipment type was 
measured in terms of number of flight crew required to operate the aircraft, number of 
engines, and type of engines.  Thus, a range of behavior was sampled for many of the 
variables being studied. 
Criterion Validity 
 According to Creswell, “criterion-related validity determines whether the scores 
from an instrument are a good predictor of some outcome (or criterion) they are expected 
to predict” (2008).  The purpose of this study was exploratory in nature and designed to 
describe the characteristics of major U.S. air carrier accidents between 1991 and 2010.  
This study did not involve hypothesis testing, nor was it designed to predict certain 
outcomes.  Therefore, criterion validity was not established in this study, as regression 









The purpose of this study was to identify the characteristics of major U.S. air 
carrier accidents between 1991 and 2010 operated under 14 CFR 121.  For the purpose of 
this study, an accident was included if the following criteria were met: the accident 
involved a U.S. air carrier operating under 14 CFR 121 between 1991 and 2010 and the 
NTSB conducted a major investigation.  Major investigations were defined as 
investigations in which the NTSB adopted an aircraft accident report (AAR) or aircraft 
accident brief (AAB).  A search for accidents which met the criteria for inclusion in this 
study resulted in the identification of 51 cases.  As previously discussed, one of the 51 
accidents (AAR 09/04) was the result of a ground fire prior to engine start.  The 
information contained within this report focused on the ignition of supplemental oxygen 
stored within a supernumerary compartment while the aircraft was still parked, prior to 
engine start.  Thus, AAR 09/04 was excluded from this study, resulting in the final 
selection of 50 accidents.  The 50 accidents selected for inclusion in this study are 





Selected Major U.S. Air Carrier Accidents 
NTSB Report Event Date City Carrier 
AAR-11/02 27-Jan-09 Lubbock, TX Empire Airlines 
AAR-10/04 20-Dec-08 Denver, CO Continental Airlines 
AAR-10/03 15-Jan-09 Weehawken, NJ US Airways 
AAR-10/01 12-Feb-09 Clarence Center, NY Colgan Air, Inc 
AAR-09/03 28-Sep-07 St Louis, MO American Airlines 
AAR-08/02 12-Apr-07 Traverse City, MI Pinnacle Airlines 
AAR-08/01 18-Feb-07 Cleveland, OH Shuttle America 
AAR-07/07 7-Feb-06 Philadelphia, PA United Parcel Service 
AAR-07/06 8-Dec-05 Chicago, IL Southwest Airlines 
AAR-07/05 27-Aug-06 Lexington, KY Comair 
AAR-07/04 19-Dec-05 Miami, FL Flying Boat, Inc 
AAR-06/03 13-Aug-04 Florence, KY Air Tahoma, Inc 
AAR-06/01 19-Oct-04 Kirksville, MO Corporate Airlines 
AAB-06/02 24-May-03 Amarillo, TX Southwest Airlines 
AAR-05/02 9-May-04 San Juan, PR Executive Airlines 
AAR-05/01 18-Dec-03 Memphis, TN Federal Express 
AAR-04/04 12-Nov-01 Belle Harbor, NY American Airlines 
AAR-04/02 26-Jul-02 Tallahassee, FL Federal Express 
AAR-04/01 8-Jan-03 Charlotte, NC Air Midwest 
AAR-03/02 16-Feb-00 Rancho Cordova, CA Emory Worldwide Airlines 
AAB-02/04 5-Mar-00 Burbank, CA Southwest Airlines 
AAR-02/01 31-Jan-00 Port Hueneme, CA Alaska Airlines 
AAR-01/02 1-Jun-99 Little Rock, AR American Airlines 
AAR-01/01 3-Mar-91 Colorado Springs, CO United Airlines 
AAB-01/01 9-Feb-98 Chicago, IL American Airlines 
AAR-00/03 17-Jul-96 East Moriches, NY Trans World Airlines 
AAR-00/02 31-Jul-97 Newark, NJ Federal Express 
AAR-99/01 8-Sep-94 Aliquippa, PA USAir (US Airways) 
AAR-98/03 5-Sep-96 Newburgh, NY Federal Express 
AAR-98/02 7-Aug-97 Miami, FL Fine Airlines 
AAR-98/01 6-Jul-96 Pensacola, FL Delta Air Lines 
AAR-97/06 11-May-96 Miami, FL ValuJet Airlines 
AAR-97/03 19-Oct-96 Flushing, NY Delta Air Lines 
AAR-97/01 19-Feb-96 Houston, TX Continental Airlines 
AAR-96/07 7-Jan-96 Nashville, TN ValuJet Airlines 
AAR-96/05 12-Nov-95 East Granby, CT American Airlines 
AAR-96/04 20-Dec-95 Jamaica, NY Tower Air 
AAR-96/03 8-Jun-95 Atlanta, GA ValuJet Airlines 
AAR-96/01 31-Oct-94 Roselawn, IN Simmons Airlines 
AAR-95/05 22-Nov-94 Bridgetown, MO Trans World Airlines 
AAR-95/03 2-Jul-94 Charlotte, NC USAir (US Airways) 
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NTSB Report Event Date City Carrier 
AAR-95/01 2-Mar-94 Flushing, NY Continental Airlines 
AAR-94/06 1-Feb-94 New Roads, LA Simmons Airlines 
AAR-94/04 18-Aug-93 Guantanamo Bay, Cuba American International 
Airways 
AAR-94/01 14-Apr-93 Dallas Ft Worth, TX American Airlines 
AAR-93/04 30-Jul-92 Jamaica, NY Trans World Airlines 
AAR-93/02 22-Mar-92 Flushing, NY USAir (US Airways) 
AAR-92/05 15-Feb-92 Swanton, OH Air Transport International 
AAR-91/09 17-Feb-91 Cleveland, OH Ryan International Airlines 




There were 50 accidents between 1991 and 2010 which met the criteria required 
for inclusion in this study.  Thirty-one accidents (62%) occurred between 1991 and 2000 
and nineteen accidents (38%) occurred between 2001 and 2010, representing a 39% 































Research Question #1:  What were the operational characteristics of major U.S. air carrier 
accidents between 1991 and 2010 based on select operational related variables? 
 
Operational Characteristics 
Variables related to the operational characteristics of major U.S. air carrier 
accidents included: phase of flight; period of day; annual season; light condition; 
meteorological condition; type of operation; equipment type; and involvement of 
environmental factors, mechanical factors, and other persons.   
Environmental Information 
 Environmental related variables included season of year, period of day, light 
condition, and meteorological conditions.   
Season of year data was available for all of the accidents.  Eight accidents (16%) 
occurred during the spring months (March 21 – June 20).  Twelve accidents (24%) 
occurred during the summer months (June 21 – September 22).  Twelve accidents (24%) 
occurred during the autumn months (September 23 – December 20).  Eighteen accidents 



























There was not a significant difference between groups of pilots with regard to the 





Period of day data was available for all of the accidents.  Eleven accidents (22%) 
occurred during the morning-midday hours (0600-1359).  Twenty-six accidents (52%) 
occurred during the afternoon-evening hours (1400-2159).  Thirteen accidents (26%) 




















































There was not a significant difference between groups of pilots with regard to the 
period of day in which the accidents occurred, X2(df = 2, N = 50) = 1.088, p = 0.581.  Nor 
was there a significant difference between groups of pilots with regard to the time of day 
in which the accidents occurred based upon the 24-hour clock, X2(df = 19, N = 50) = 


















































 Light condition data was available for all of the accidents.  One accident (2%) 
occurred during dawn.  Twenty-three accidents (46%) occurred during daylight hours.  
Five accidents (10%) occurred during dusk.  Twenty-one accidents (42%) occurred 






 There was a significant difference between groups of pilots with regard to the 
light condition in which the accidents occurred, X2(df = 3, N = 50) = 10.529, p = 0.015.  
However, this statistical difference only occurred when the periods of dawn and dusk 
were included in the analysis.  These are relatively short periods of time and mark a 
transition from night to day and day to night.  One accident, not involving pilot 
performance, occurred during the period of dawn and five accidents, one involving and 
four not involving pilot performance, occurred during the period of dusk.  Therefore, a 
second chi-square test was performed to compare only “daylight" and "night" lighting 
conditions.  This analysis revealed there was not a significant difference between groups 
of pilots with regard to daylight and night light conditions, X2(df = 1, N = 44) = 2.460, p 
= 0.117.   
























Meteorological data was available for all accidents.  Thirty-one (62%) of the 
accidents occurred during visual meteorological conditions (VMC) and nineteen 






 There was a significant difference between groups of pilots with regard to the 
meteorological conditions in which the accidents occurred, X2(df = 1, N = 50) = 6.494, p 
= 0.011.  Of the thirty-one accidents which occurred during VMC conditions, seventeen 








































(55%) involved pilot performance and fourteen (45%) did not involve pilot performance.  
However, of the nineteen accidents which occurred during IMC conditions, seventeen 
(89.5%) involved pilot performance while only two (10.5%) did not involve pilot 






These findings suggest that pilot performance played a disproportionately greater 
role in the accidents which occurred during IMC conditions than they did during VMC 
conditions. 
Type of Operation 
Variables related to the type of operation included scheduled and non-scheduled 
operations, passenger and cargo flights, and whether an air carrier was operating under its 
own name or “doing business as” (DBA) another carrier.   
 
 





















Scheduling data was available for 47 accidents.  Forty-six accidents (98%) were 






There was not a significant difference between groups of pilots with regard to 
whether the accident air carrier was scheduled or non-scheduled, X2(df = 1, N = 47) = 
























Passenger/cargo flight data was available for 49 accidents.  Thirty-seven accidents 
(74%) were conducted as passenger flights and twelve accidents (24%) were conducted 






There was not a significant difference between groups with regard to whether the 
accident air carrier was operating as a passenger or cargo flight, X2(df = 2, N = 50) = 
















































 Data related to whether an air carrier was operating under its own name or “doing 
business as” another carrier was available for all 50 accidents.  Forty-one accidents (82%) 
occurred while the accident air carrier was operating under its own name.  Nine accidents 






 There was not a significant difference between groups of pilots with regard to 
whether the accident air carrier was operating under its own name or doing-business-as 















































 Further analysis was performed to determine whether there was a significant 
difference between year groups, irrespective to the citing of pilot performance.  Of the 
thirty-one accidents between 1991 and 2000, twenty-eight carriers (90%) were not doing-
business-as another carrier while three carriers (10%) were doing-business-as another 
carrier.  Of the nineteen accidents between 2001 and 2010, thirteen carriers (68%) were 
not doing-business-as another carrier while six carriers (32%) were doing-business-as 
another carrier.  There was a significant difference between year groups with regard to 
whether an accident air carrier was doing-business-as another carrier, X2(df = 1, N = 50) = 
3.828, p = 0.050.  While the findings suggest a significant increase in the number of DBA 
accidents, it is highly likely there was also an overall increase in the number of 

































 Aircraft related variables included aircraft age, required number of flight crew, 




Make/Model of Accident Aircraft: 1991-2010 
Aircraft Type Number Percent 
Airbus A300 1 2% 
Airbus A320 1 2% 
Avions de Transport Regional ATR 42 1 2% 
Avions de Transport Regional ATR 72 2 4% 
Raytheon Beechcraft 1900D 1 2% 
Boeing 727 2 4% 
Boeing 737 7 14% 
Boeing 747 2 4% 
British Aerospace BAE-J3201 1 2% 
Bombardier Challenger CL-600 2 4% 
Convair CV-580 1 2% 
Douglas DC-8 5 10% 
Douglas DC-9 7 14% 
Douglas DC-10 2 4% 
Bombardier DHC-8 1 2% 
Embraer ERJ-170 1 2% 
Fokker F-28 1 2% 
Grumman Turbo Mallard G-73T 1 2% 
Lockheed L-1011 1 2% 
McDonnell Douglas DC-10 1 2% 
McDonnell Douglas DC-11 1 2% 
McDonnell Douglas MD-82 3 6% 
McDonnell Douglas MD-83 2 4% 
McDonnell Douglas MD-88 2 4% 
Saab 340B 1 2% 
   







 Age of aircraft data was available for 41 of the accidents.  The mean aircraft age 






Required flight crew data was available for all of the accidents.  Thirty-eight 
accidents (76%) involved aircraft requiring two pilots only.  Twelve accidents (24%) 



















































There was not a significant difference between groups of pilots with regard to the 
number of flight crew required to operate the aircraft, X2(df = 1, N = 50) = 0.678, p = 





Number of engines data was available for all of the accidents.  Thirty-six 
accidents (72%) involved two-engine aircraft.  Seven accidents (14%) involved three-















































There was not a significant difference between groups of pilots with regard to the 
number of engines installed on the accident aircraft, X2(df = 2, N = 50) = 3.078, p = 





Type of engine data was available for all of the accidents.  Nine accidents (18%) 
involved aircraft utilizing turboprop engines.  Forty-one accidents (82%) involved 
aircraft utilizing turbofan engines.  Zero accidents (0%) involved aircraft utilizing 
















































 There was not a significant difference between groups of pilots with regard to the 
type of engines (turboprop, turbofan, turbojet) installed on the accident aircraft, X2(df = 1, 





Phase of Flight 
 Phase of flight data was available for all accidents.  Zero accidents (0%) occurred 
during taxi.  Thirteen accidents (26%) occurred during takeoff.  Six accidents (12%) 
occurred during climb.  One accident (2%) occurred while maneuvering.  Two accidents 
(4%) occurred during cruise.  Two accidents (4%) occurred during descent.  Fourteen 
accidents (28%) occurred during approach.  Twelve accidents (24%) occurred during 
































 There was a significant difference with regard to the phases of flight in which the 
accidents occurred with regard to the citing of pilot performance, X2(df = 6, N = 50) = 
13.871, p = 0.031.  Further analysis revealed that nineteen accidents (38%) occurred 
during the combined takeoff and climb phases of flight and twenty-six accidents (52%) 
occurred during the combined approach and landing phases of flight.  There were only 
five accidents (10%) which occurred during the maneuvering, cruise, or descent phases of 
flight and only one of those accidents involved pilot performance.   
The distribution for the citing/not citing of pilot performance for each phase of 
flight was nearly even for takeoff, climb, and descent.  There were only three accidents 
which occurred during the maneuvering and descent phases and only one (2%) involved 
pilot performance.  However, twelve (86%) of the fourteen accidents which occurred 
during the approach phase of flight involved pilot performance.  Eleven (92%) of the 
twelve accidents which occurred during the landing phase of flight involved pilot 
performance.   

























These findings suggest that pilot performance played a disproportionately greater 
role during the approach and landing phases than during any other phase of flight. 
Analysis was also performed to see if there were any significant differences with 
regard to the phases of flight and environmental conditions, irrespective of the citing/not 
citing of pilot performance.  There was not a significant difference with regard to the 
phase of flight in various meteorological conditions, X2(df = 6, N = 50) = 8.535, p = 
0.201.  There was not a significant difference with regard to the phase of flight and 
season of year, X2(df = 18, N = 50) = 20.721, p = 0.294.   There was not a significant 
difference with regard to phase of flight and period of day, X2(df = 12, N = 50) = 8.074, p 
= 0.779.  Nor was there a significant difference with regard to phase of flight and 
daylight/night lighting conditions, X2(df = 5, N = 44) = 8.259, p = 0.143.   
 
 














































































Research Question #2:  What were the characteristics of the pilots involved in major U.S. 
air carrier accidents between 1991 and 2010 based on select pilot related variables? 
 
Characteristics of the Accident Pilots 
Variables related to the characteristics of pilots included: age; gender; flight 
experience; level of certification; duration of employment with the accident air carrier; 
crew assignment; crew familiarity; the involvement of pilot performance; past 
unsatisfactory ratings; FAA accidents, incidents, and violations; and prior driver's license 
suspension and revocations. 
Crewmember Age 
 Crewmember age data was available for all of the captains.  The age of captains 






Age data was available for 49 first officers.  The age of first officers ranged 
between 24 and 57 years old with a mean of 39 years of age. 


























Gender of Crewmembers 
Gender data was available for all captains.  Forty-seven captains (94%) were male 
















































Gender data was available for all first officers.  Forty-six first officers (92%) were 







Forty-three accidents (86%) involved an all male crew of pilots.  Seven accidents 
(14%) involved a male/female crew of pilots.  Zero accidents (0%) involved an all female 




























There was not a significant difference between groups with regard to the 
composition of crews by gender in which the accidents occurred, X2(df = 1, N = 50) = 







Certificate data was available for all captains and first officers.  All captains 
(100%) held an ATP certificate.  This was expected as possession of an ATP certificate is 
required in order to perform pilot-in-command duties under 14 CFR 121.  Twelve first 
































There was not a significant difference between groups of first officers with regard 





 Further analysis revealed that of the twelve accidents involving a first officer 
whose highest certificate was a commercial certificate, three (25%) occurred between 
1991 and 2000 and nine (75%) occurred between 2001 and 2010.   
 















































 Irrespective of the citing/not citing of pilot performance, there was a significant 
difference between 1991-2000 and 2001-2010 with regard to the distribution of accidents 
based upon the highest certificate held by first officers between periods, X2(df = 1, N = 
50) = 9.175, p = 0.002.  Between 1991 and 2000, twenty-eight first officers (90%) held 
an ATP certificate while only three (10%) held a commercial certificate.  Between 2001 
and 2010, ten first officers (53%) held an ATP certificate and nine (47%) held a 







Distribution of Accidents Involving Commercially 
























 These findings suggest a significant shift in the distribution of major U.S. air 
carrier accidents involving commercially certificated first officers during the later period.  
It was unknown what the actual employment distribution was among ATP and 
commercially certificated first officers who were involved in 14 CFR 121 air carrier 
operations during either period.   
Duration of Employment  
Employment data was available for all of the captains.  The accident captains’ 
duration of employment ranged from less than one month to over 30 years of 
employment with the accident air carrier, with a mean of 12.2 years.  Only one captain 
(2%) had less than one year of employment with the accident air carrier.  Forty-nine 































 There was not a significant difference between groups with regard to whether the 
captain had more or less than one year of employment with the accident air carrier, X2(df 





Employment data was available for 49 first officers.  The accident first officers’ 
duration of employment ranged from less than one month to over 32 years of 
employment with the accident air carrier, with a mean of 5.4 years.  Thirteen first officers 
































































(26.5%) had less than one year of employment with the accident air carrier.  Thirty-six 
first officers (73.5%) had more than one year of employment with the accident air carrier.  
There was not a significant difference between groups of first officers with regard to 
whether the first officer had more or less than one year of employment with the accident 




















































 Nor was there a significant difference between the periods of 1991-2000 and 
2001-2010 with regard to first officers' duration of employment, X2(df = 1, N = 49) = 
0.406, p = 0.524.   
Total Flight Time 
Total flight time data was available for all of the captains.  The least experienced 
captain had 2,500 hours of total flight time and the most experienced captain had 25,000 
hours of total flight time, with a mean of 11,994 hours. 
Table 4 













































































There was not a significant difference between groups of pilots with regard to 
whether the captain had more or less than 1,500 hours of total flight time as 100% of 
captains had over 1,500 hours of total flight time. 
Total flight time data was available for all of the first officers.  The least 
experienced first officer had 1,096 hours of total flight time and the most experienced 
first officer had 17,734 hours of total flight time, with a mean of 6,838 hours.  Only two 
first officers (4%) had less than 1,500 hours of total flight time.  Forty-eight first officers 
(96%) had more than 1,500 hours of total flight time.  Of the two first officers with less 
than 1,500 hours, one possessed 1,096 hours and the other possessed 1,420 hours of total 
flight time.   
Table 5 
 























 There was a significant difference between groups with regard to whether the first 
officer had more or less than 1,500 hours of flight time, X2(df = 1, N = 50) = 4.427, p = 
0.035.  Of the first officers with more than 1,500 hours of total flight time, thirty-four 
(71%) were involved in an accident citing pilot performance as a causal or contributing 
factor and fourteen (29%) were involved in an accident not citing pilot performance as a 
causal or contributing factor.  Of the two first officers with less than 1,500 hours of total 
time, neither (0%) were involved in an accident citing pilot performance as a causal or 

































































 The findings suggest that first officers with less than 1,500 hours of total flight 
time did not contribute to any major U.S. air carrier accidents between 1991 and 2010.   
Flight Experience in Make/Model 
 Hours of flight time in the accident make and model was available for all of the 
captains.  The least experienced captain had 111 hours in make/model and the most 
experienced captain had 16,000 hours in make/model, with a mean of 3,113 hours. 
Table 6 
 








Pilot Performance Cited by First Officer Total 

























Hours of flight time in the accident make and model was available for all first 
officers.  The least experienced first officer had 20 hours in make/model and the most 
experienced first officer had 8,060 hours in make/model, with a mean of 1,683 hours. 
Table 7 
 




































































Flight Experience in Make/Model and Position (e.g. B737 Captain) 
Hours of flight time in the accident make/model and position was available for 46 
captains.  The least experienced captain had 26 hours as a captain in the accident aircraft 
make/model and the most experienced captain had 16,000 hours as a captain in the 
accident aircraft make/model, with a mean of 2,048 hours. 
Table 8 
 































































Hours of flight time in the accident make/model and position was available for 46 
first officers.  The least experienced first officer had 20 hours as a first officer in the 
accident aircraft make/model and the most experienced first officer had 8,060 hours as a 
first officer in the accident aircraft make/model, with a mean of 1,503 hours.  Table 9 and 
Figure 54 present the distribution for first officers in make/model and position. 
Table 9 
 






























































 Flying assignment data was available for 49 accidents.  Measurements were made 
in terms of “assigned” duties.  In other words, if the first officer was assigned flying 
duties and the captain took control of the aircraft before, during, or after the accident 
occurred, the first officer was recorded as the flying pilot. 
 The captain was performing flying duties and the first officer was performing 
monitoring duties in twenty-two (45%) of the accidents.  The first officer was performing 
























































 There was not a significant difference between groups of pilots with regard to 
which pilot was performing the flying duties and which pilot was performing the 





Nor was there a significant difference between 1991-2000 and 2001-2010 with 
regard to crew assignment, irrespective of the citing/not citing of pilot performance X2(df 














































 Crew familiarity was measured in terms of (1) first day of pairing on the current 
sequence/pairing; (2) first leg of the day on the current pairing; and (3) whether the 
accident sequence pairing was the first pairing together. 
 First day of pairing on the current/accident sequence/pairing was available for 46 
accidents.  Twenty-five accidents (54%) occurred during the first day of crew pairing.  







































 There was not a significant difference between groups with regard to whether the 
accident occurred on the crew’s first day of pairing on the current sequence/pairing, X2(df 





 First leg of the day data was available for 49 accidents.  Twenty-nine accidents 
(59%) occurred during the first leg of the day.  Twenty accidents (41%) occurred after the 
crew had already completed at least one leg that day prior to the accident leg.  It is 







































important to note that not all trip sequences involve multiple legs per day.  It is possible 
that a portion of the accidents which occurred during the first leg of the day involved a 






 There was not a significant difference between groups of pilots with regard to 
whether the accident occurred on the first flight-leg of the day, X2(df = 1, N = 49) = 













































 Data related to whether the accident crew had flown together in the past on 
another pairing sequence was available for 24 accidents.  Thirteen flight crews (54%) had 
been paired together on at least one pairing, other than the accident pairing, in the past.  
For eleven flight crews (46%), the accident sequence pairing was the first time the 






 There was not a significant difference between groups of pilots with regard to 
whether the accident occurred during the first pairing between pilots, X2(df = 1, N = 24) = 































Medical and Toxicological 
 Toxicological data for major drugs of abuse was available for 46 captains and 44 
first officers.  All forty-six captains (100%) tested negative for major drugs of abuse.  All 
forty-four first officers (100%) tested negative for major drugs of abuse.  Major drugs of 
abuse included: marijuana; cocaine, phencyclidine, amphetamines, and opiates.  
Appendix Q provides a list of prescription and over-the-counter substances detected 
through toxicological testing. 
 Toxicological data for ethanol (alcohol) was available for 36 captains and 32 first 
officers.  Thirty-three captains (92%) tested negative for ethanol.  While the toxicological 
tests of three captains (8%) tested positive for ethanol, the NTSB stated in each of these 
cases that the presence of ethanol was either consistent with or likely a result of 
postmortem ethanol production (decomposition).  Thirty first officers (94%) tested 
negative for ethanol.  While the toxicological tests of two first officers (6%) tested 
positive for ethanol, the NTSB stated in each of these cases that the presence of ethanol 























was either consistent with or likely a result of postmortem ethanol production 
(decomposition). 
Trained and Qualified 
 Data related to whether each crewmember was properly trained and qualified in 
accordance with FAA regulations and company policy was available for all captains and 
first officers.  Forty-nine captains (98%) were properly trained and qualified to perform 
their assigned duties.  One captain (2%) was using the prescription drug Phenobarbital for 
a gastrointestinal problem.  According to the NTSB, Phenobarbital was “contraindicated 
for use by airline pilots” (1991).  While this case was recorded as not qualified for the 
purpose of this study, the NTSB stated “The flightcrews of both airplanes were properly 
trained and qualified for the flights except for the self-medication practices of two 
pilots…the postmortem presence of Phenobarbital in the captain of USA1493 and over-
the-counter medication in the first officer of SKW5569 did not contribute to the accident” 
(1991).  There was not a significant difference between groups of pilots with regard to 
whether the captain was qualified to perform the assigned duties, X2(df = 1, N = 50) = 
2.168, p = 0.141.   
 Forty-nine first officers (98%) were properly trained and qualified to perform 
their assigned duties.  One first officer (2%) “…held a current Federal Aviation 
Administration airman medical certificate at the time of the accident; however, he failed 
to provide information about his medical condition (anxiety) or his use of the prescription 
drug alprazolam when he applied for the certificate” (NTSB, 1991).  There was not a 
significant difference between groups of pilots with regard to whether the first officer 
was qualified to perform the assigned duties, X2(df = 1, N = 50) = 0.480, p = 0.488.   
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Previous Accidents, Incidents, and Enforcements 
 Data related to previous aircraft accidents, incidents, and enforcements was 
available for 38 captains and 35 first officers.  Four captains (10.5%) had been involved 
in a previous aviation accident, incident, or enforcement action.  Thirty-four captains 
(89.5%) had not been involved in a previous aviation accident, incident, or enforcement 
action.  None of the first officers (0%) had been involved in a previous aviation accident, 
incident, or enforcement action.  There was not a significant difference between groups 
with regard to whether the captain had a previous aviation accident, incident, or 
enforcement action, X2(df = 1, N = 38) = 0.495, p = 0.482, and there was not a significant 
difference between groups with regard to whether the first officer had a previous aviation 
accident, incident, or enforcement action as none of the first officers were involved in 
such occurrences.   
Driver’s License Suspension or Revocation 
 Data related to driver’s license suspensions or revocations was available for 26 
captains and 27 first officers.  Twenty-six captains (100%) had no history of a driver’s 
license suspension or revocation.  One first officer (4%) had been subject to a driver’s 
license suspension/revocation.  The remaining 26 first officers (96%) had no history of 
driver’s license suspension/revocation.  There was not a significant difference between 
groups with regard to whether the captain had a previous driver’s license suspension as 
none of the captains were involved in such actions.  There was not a significant 
difference between groups with regard to whether the first officer had a previous driver’s 
license suspension or revocation, X2(df = 1, N = 27) = 0.437, p = 0.508.   
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Unsatisfactory Flight Evaluations 
 Captains and first officers were recorded as having a past unsatisfactory flight 
evaluation only if the NTSB reported so in the aircraft accident report or brief.  Without 
access to actual FAA airman records, it was impossible to review the full evaluation 
history of all crewmembers to determine whether there were any unreported failures.  
Seven accidents (14%) involved a crewmember with one or more previous unsatisfactory 
flight evaluations.  Five accidents (10%) involved a captain with one or more previous 
unsatisfactory flight evaluations.  Four accidents (8%) involved a first officer with one or 
more previous unsatisfactory flight evaluations.  Two out of fifty accidents (4%) involved 
a captain and first officer who both had one or more previous unsatisfactory flight 
evaluations.  There was not a significant difference between groups with regard to 
whether the captain had one or more past unsatisfactory flight evaluations, X2(df = 1, N = 
50) = 2.614, p = 0.106.  There was not a significant difference between groups with 
regard to whether the first officer had one or more past unsatisfactory flight evaluations, 












Content Analysis #1: Causal and Contributing Factors 
 Content analysis was first performed on the cause and factor finding statements 
for each of the accidents.  For the purpose of this particular analysis, causal and 
contributing factors were classified as: pilot performance; environmental; mechanical; 
and other persons.  The “(C) = Cause, (F) = Factor” Findings Legend in the “Brief of 
Accident” reports were used as a means to accurately record each of the measurements.   
 Causal and contributing factor data was available for all of the accidents.  Thirty-
four accidents (68%) cited pilot performance as a causal or contributing factor.  Fifteen 
accidents (30%) cited the environment as a causal or contributing factor.  Twelve 
accidents (24%) cited mechanical factors as a causal or contributing factor.  Thirty-one 


























 Thirty-four accidents (68%) cited pilot performance as a causal or contributing 
factor.  One accident (2%) cited pilot performance as a contributing factor but not a 
cause.  Sixteen accidents (32%) cited pilot performance as cause but not a contributing 
factor.  Seventeen accidents (34%) cited pilot performance as both a causal and 
contributing factor.  The remaining sixteen accidents (32%) did not cite pilot 





 Further analysis between year groups revealed there was not a significant 
difference between 1991-2000 and 2001-2010 with regard to the involvement of pilot 
































 Fifteen accidents (30%) cited the environment as a causal or contributing factor.  
Twelve accidents (24%) cited the environment as a contributing factor but not a cause.  
One accident (2%) cited the environment as a cause but not a contributing factor.  Two 
accidents (4%) cited the environment as both a causal and contributing factor.  The 














































 Further analysis between year groups revealed there was not a significant 
difference between 1991-2000 and 2001-2010 with regard to the involvement of the 






 Twelve accidents (24%) cited mechanical factors as a causal or contributing 
factor.  Two accidents (4%) cited mechanical factors as a contributing factor but not a 
cause.  Ten accidents (20%) cited mechanical factors as a cause but not a contributing 
factor.  Zero accidents (0%) cited mechanical factors as both a causal and contributing 
factor.  The remaining thirty-eight accidents (76%) did not cite mechanical factors as 
































 Further analysis between year groups revealed there was not a significant 
difference between 1991-2000 and 2001-2010 with regard to the involvement of 
mechanical issues as a causal or contributing factor, X2(df = 1, N = 50) = 1.133, p = 


















































 Thirty-one accidents (62%) cited other persons as a causal or contributing factor.  
Fourteen accidents (28%) cited other persons as a contributing factor but not a cause.  
Ten accidents (20%) cited other persons as a cause but not a contributing factor.  Seven 
accidents (14%) cited other persons as both a cause and contributing factor.  The 







  Further analysis between year groups revealed there was not a significant 
difference between 1991-2000 and 2001-2010 with regard to the involvement of other 































































Content Analysis #2: Additional Sequence-of-Events Findings 
 A second analysis was performed on each of the findings listed in the sequence-
of-events section of NTSB's "Brief of Accident" reports.  For the purpose of this 
particular analysis, the researcher focused on: (1) primary non-person related findings 
(Aircraft/Environment); (2) primary person-related findings (Operations/Performance); 
(3) direct underlying events; and (4) indirect underlying events.  
  Each of the findings listed in the sequence-of-events section of the "Brief of 
Accident" reports were originally coded by NTSB investigators in accordance with the 
NTSB Coding Manual.  While the briefs themselves were only available in narrative 
format, the researcher simply used the NTSB Coding Manual to recode and categorize 
each of the variables.  Data for each of the variables was available for all 50 accidents. 
Non-Person Related Findings 
 The NTSB reported one or more non-person related finding (environment or 
aircraft) in thirty-two (64%) of the accidents.  Fifteen accidents (30%) cited the 
environment as a non-person related finding.  This finding was consistent with the first 
content analysis.  Nineteen accidents (38%) cited either an aircraft system or structure as 
a non-person related finding.  Eighteen accidents (36%) did not involve any type of non-
person related event.  Snow and ice were the two most frequently reported non-person 
weather related events. 
Person Related Findings 
 Forty-four accidents (88%) cited one or more person related finding as a causal or 
contributing factor.  Thirty-four accidents (68%) cited the flight crew as a person related 
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finding.  This finding was consistent with findings of the first content analysis.  The 
majority of primary person related findings were attributed to either: (1) aircraft handling; 
(2) planning and decision-making; (3) communication and information; or (4) 
maintenance.   
 Twenty-five accidents (50%) cited aircraft handling as a person related finding.  
Of those twenty-five accidents, four (16%) cited aircraft control as an element of aircraft 
handling, four (16%) cited directional control, and three accidents (12%) cited airspeed 
(8%, 8%, and 6% of all accidents selected in this study, respectively).   
 Twenty accidents (40%) cited planning and decision-making as a causal or 
contributing flight crew factor.  Of those twenty accidents, five (25%) cited 
noncompliance with procedures and directives (10% of all accidents selected in this 
study).  Noncompliance with procedures and directives was the most frequently cited 
element of planning and decision-making.  Four accidents (20%) cited the lack of use or 
noncompliance with checklists as a planning and decision-making element (8% of all 
accidents selected in this study).   
 Thirteen accidents (26%) cited communication/information/ATC as a causal or 
contributing person related factor.  Of those thirteen accidents, six (46%) were attributed 
to the flight crew and three (23%) were attributed to ATC personnel (12% and 6% of all 
accidents selected in this study, respectively).  Crew/group coordination, which includes 
crew resource management (CRM), was reported in six (46%) of those accidents which 
cited communication/information/ATC (12% of all accidents selected in this study).  




Direct Underlying Events 
 Direct underlying events were reported in thirty-two (64%) of the accidents 
selected in this study.  Of those thirty-two accidents, ten (31%) cited inadequate 
procedures attributed to company management, the manufacturer, the FAA, or 
maintenance personnel (20% of all accidents selected in this study).  Eight accidents 
(25%) cited a physiological condition (16% of all accidents selected in this study).  
Fatigue was the most frequently reported underlying physiological condition (N = 7, 22% 
of accidents reporting a direct underlying event and 14% of all accidents selected in this 
study).  Inadequate flight crew training, lack of experience, or lack of familiarity with the 
aircraft was reported in four accidents (8% of all accidents selected in this study). 
Indirect Underlying Events 
 Indirect underlying events were reported in twelve (24%) of the accidents selected 
in this study.  Of those twelve accidents, five (42%) cited inadequate surveillance of 
operation (10% of all accidents selected in this study).  Three accidents (25%) cited 
inadequate certification/approval, three accidents (25%) cited inadequate substantiation 
process, and three accidents (25%) cited insufficient standard/requirements as an indirect 
underlying event (6%, 6%, and 6% of all accidents selected in this study, respectively). 
 Due to the complexity and intricacy of the data gathered for the second content 
analysis, additional analysis was not performed.  Additional analysis was also beyond the 





Research Question #3:  Based on the select variables, were the characteristics of pilots 
involved in major U.S. air carrier accidents in which pilot performance was cited as a 
causal or contributing factor significantly different than the characteristics of pilots 
involved in accidents in which pilot performance was not cited as a causal or contributing 
factor? 
 
 Research question #3 was addressed throughout this chapter as part of the 
narrative discussion as it pertained to each of the operational and pilot related variables.  
Table 10  and Table 11 present a summary of the findings already discussed.   
Table 10 – Summary of Significant Differences (Operational Characteristics) 
 
Variable Significance 
Season of year .806 
Period of day .581 
Time of day (24-hour clock) .693 
Light condition (dawn, daylight, dusk, night) **.015 
Light condition (daylight/night) .117 
Meteorological condition **.011 
Scheduled/non-scheduled .468 
Passenger/cargo .785 
Required flight crew .410 
Number of engines .215 
Type of engines .925 




** = denotes a significant difference between groups of pilots with regard to the 











Table 11 – Summary of Significant Differences (Pilot Characteristics) 
  
Variable Significance 
Crew composition (gender) .124 
Certificate held (first officer) .551 
Duration of employment (captain) .488 
Duration of employment (first officer) .492 
Total flight time (captain) N/A 
Total flight time (first officer) **.035 
Crew assignment .280 
First day of pairing (current sequence) .923 
First leg of the day .742 
First pairing together (past pairings considered) .475 
Properly qualified (captain) .141 
Properly qualified (first officer) .488 
Prior accidents/incidents/enforcements (captain) .482 
Prior accidents/incidents/enforcements (first officer) N/A 
Driver's license suspension/revocation (captain) N/A 
Driver's license suspension/revocation (first officer) .508 
Unsatisfactory flight evaluations (captain) .106 




** = denotes a significant difference between groups of pilots with regard to the 












The purpose of this study was to identify the characteristics of major U.S. air 
carrier accidents between 1991 and 2010 operated under 14 CFR 121.  For the purpose of 
this study, an accident was included if the following criteria were met: the accident 
involved a U.S. air carrier operating under 14 CFR 121 between 1991 and 2010 and the 
NTSB conducted a major investigation.  Major investigations were defined as 
investigations in which the NTSB adopted an aircraft accident report (AAR) or aircraft 
accident brief (AAB).  Variables related to the operational characteristics of major U.S. 
air carrier accidents included: phase of flight; period of day; annual season; light 
condition; meteorological condition; type of operation; equipment type; and involvement 
of environmental factors, mechanical factors, and other persons.  Variables related to the 
characteristics of pilots included: age; gender; flight experience; level of certification; 
duration of employment with the accident air carrier; crew assignment; crew familiarity; 
the involvement of pilot performance; past unsatisfactory ratings; FAA accidents, 
incidents, and violations; and prior driver's license suspension and revocations. 
 Major U.S. air carrier accidents citing pilot performance as a causal or 
contributing factor were the group of “cases”.  Accidents not citing pilot performance as 
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a causal or contributing factor were the group of “controls”.  The two groups represented 
the entire population of major U.S. air carrier accidents between 1991 and 2010 operating 
under 14 CFR 121 and were compared with one another to determine whether any 
statistical differences existed between select variables.  The researcher was particularly 
interested in determining whether a statistical difference existed between groups with 
regard to flight experience and level of certification, as Public Law 111-216 will require 
all first officers to obtain an ATP certificate and possess at least 1,500 hours of total 
flight time.   
Conclusions 
Research Question #1:  What were the operational characteristics of major U.S. air carrier 
accidents between 1991 and 2010 based on select operational related variables? 
 
 There were 50 accidents between 1991 and 2010 which met the criteria required 
for inclusion in this study.  Of those, thirty-one accidents (62%) occurred between 1991 
and 2000 and nineteen (38%) occurred between 2001 and 2010, representing a 39% 
decrease in the number of major U.S. air carrier accidents in the later period.  This 
finding supports the notion that the U.S. air carrier industry has continued on its path 
towards an ever safer industry.   
 With regard to the environment, the findings of this study indicate there was not a 
significant difference between those accidents involving pilot performance and those 
accidents not involving pilot performance with regard to season of year, period of day, 
and daytime/night light conditions.  There was, however, a significant difference between 
meteorological conditions with regard to the involvement of pilot performance as a causal 
or contributing factor.  Pilots were cited in seventeen (55%) of the thirty-one accidents 
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which occurred during flight in VMC conditions but were cited in thirteen (89.5%) of the 
nineteen accidents which occurred during flight in IMC conditions.  These findings 
suggest that pilot performance played a disproportionately greater role in the accidents 
which occurred during IMC conditions than they did during VMC conditions. 
 With regard to the different types of aircraft operations, the findings of this study 
indicate there was not a significant difference between those accidents involving pilot 
performance and those accidents not involving pilot performance with regard to 
scheduled, non-scheduled, passenger, or cargo services.  While there was not a significant 
difference with regard to whether a carrier was doing-business-as another carrier during 
the cumulative period between1991 and 2010, there was a significant different between 
the 1991-2000 and 2001-2010 year groups (irrespective of the citing/not citing of pilot 
performance).  The findings indicate there was a significant increase in the number of 
accidents involving air carriers who were doing business under another carrier's name 
during the later period.  However, it is highly likely there was also an overall increase in 
the number of partnerships between carriers during the later period. 
 With regard to the types of aircraft involved in those accidents, the mean age of 
accident aircraft was 15.89 years old, with a standard deviation of 13.307.  There was not 
a significant difference between those accidents citing pilot performance as a causal or 
contributing factor and those not citing pilot performance as a causal or contributing 
factor with regard to the number of flight crew required to operate the aircraft, the 
number of engines installed, or the type of engines.   
 With regard to the phases of flight in which the accidents occurred, there was a 
significant difference.  Nineteen (38%) of the fifty accidents occurred during the takeoff 
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and climb phases of flight.  Twenty-six (52%) of the fifty accidents occurred during the 
approach and landing phases of flight.  These four phases consume a relatively short 
amount of flight time, but account for a disproportionately significant percentage of 
accidents.  Meanwhile, only five (10%) of the fifty accidents occurred during the 
maneuvering, cruise, and descent phases of flight.  Even more interesting was that the 
distribution of accidents either attributed to or not attributed to pilot performance was 
nearly identical for the takeoff and climb phases while twelve (86%) of the fourteen 
accidents during approach and eleven (92%) of the twelve accidents during landing cited 
pilot performance as either a causal or contributing factor.  These findings suggest that 
pilot performance played a disproportionately greater role during the approach and 
landing phases than during any other phase, to include the takeoff and climb phases of 
flight.  With regard to the environmental conditions present during the various phases of 
flight, irrespective of the citing/not citing of pilot performance, neither meteorological 
conditions, season of year, period of day, nor daylight/night light conditions were found 
to be of significant difference. 
Research Question #2:  What were the characteristics of the pilots involved in major U.S. 
air carrier accidents between 1991 and 2010 based on select pilot related variables? 
 
 The age of captains ranged between 25 and 59 years old with a mean of 47 years 
and the age of first officers ranged between 24 and 57 years old with a mean of 39 years.  
Forty-seven (94%) of the fifty captains were male and three (6%) were female.  Forty-six 
(92%) of the fifty first officers were male and four (8%) were female.  The 
disproportionate number of males was most likely the result of an underrepresentation of 
women in aviation.  As a result, forty-three (86%) of the fifty flight crews were 
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comprised of an all male crew of pilots.  Seven (14%) of the fifty crews were comprised 
of both a male and female pilot and none of the accidents (0%) involved an all female 
crew of pilots.  There was not a significant difference between groups with regard to the 
composition of crews by gender. 
 All of the captains (100%) held an ATP certificate.  This was expected as 
possession of an ATP certificate is required in order to perform pilot-in-command duties 
under 14 CFR 121.  Twelve (24%) of the fifty first officers were commercially 
certificated and thirty-eight (76%) were ATP certificated.  While there was not a 
significant difference between those accidents citing pilot performance as a causal or 
contributing factor and those not citing pilot performance during the cumulative period 
between 1991 and 2010, there was a significant difference between the 1991-2000 and 
2001-2010 year groups irrespective of the citing/not citing of pilot performance.  
Between 1991 and 2000, only three (10%) of the thirty-one accidents involved a 
commercially certificated first officer.  However, nine (47%) of the nineteen accidents 
which occurred between 2001 and 2010 involved a commercially certificated first officer.  
This finding suggests a significant shift in the distribution of major U.S. air carrier 
accidents involving commercially certificated first officers during the later period.  It was 
unknown what the actual employment distribution was among ATP and commercially 
certificated first officers who were involved in 14 CFR 121 air carrier operations during 
either period.  However, this finding may be of particular interest with regard to the 
certification requirements imposed by Public Law 111-216. 
 The accident captains’ duration of employment ranged from less than one month 
to over 30 years of employment with the accident air carrier, with a mean of 12.2 years 
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and the accident first officers’ duration of employment ranged from less than one month 
to over 32 years of employment with the accident air carrier, with a mean of 5.4 years.  
Only one (2%) of captains had less than one year of employment with the accident air 
carrier.  However, thirteen (26.5%) of the fifty first officers had less than one year of 
employment with the accident air carrier.  There was not a significant difference between 
groups with regard to duration of employment and citing/not citing of pilot performance. 
 The least experienced captain had 2,500 hours of total flight time and the most 
experienced captain had 25,000 hours of total flight time, with a mean of 11,994 hours.  
The least experienced first officer had 1,096 hours of total flight time and the most 
experienced first officer had 17,734 hours of total flight time, with a mean of 6,838 
hours.  Only two first officers (4%) had less than 1,500 hours of total flight time and 
neither were involved in an accident citing pilot performance as a causal or contributing 
factor.  The findings suggest that first officers with less than 1,500 hours of total flight 
time did not contribute to any major U.S. air carrier accidents between 1991 and 2010.  
This finding may be of particular interest with regard to the total flight time requirements 
imposed by Public Law 111-216.  It is, however, important to point out that it is highly 
likely there were proportionately very few first officers with less than 1,500 hours of total 
time who were employed by U.S. air carriers operating under 14 CFR 121 during this 
period.   
 The least experienced captain had 111 hours in make/model and the most 
experienced captain had 16,000 hours in make/model, with a mean of 3,113 hours.  The 
least experienced first officer had 20 hours in make/model and the most experienced first 
officer had 8,060 hours in make/model, with a mean of 1,683 hours.  The least 
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experienced captain had 26 hours as a captain in the accident aircraft make/model and the 
most experienced captain had 16,000 hours as a captain in the accident aircraft 
make/model, with a mean of 2,048 hours.  The least experienced first officer had 20 
hours as a first officer in the accident aircraft make/model and the most experienced first 
officer had 8,060 hours as a first officer in the accident aircraft make/model, with a mean 
of 1,503 hours. 
 With regard to flying assignment, the captain was performing flying duties and 
the first officer was performing monitoring duties in twenty-two (45%) of the accidents.  
Twenty-five (54%) of the forty-six accidents for which data was available occurred 
during the first day of crew pairing on the current pairing/sequence and twenty-nine 
(59%) of the forty-nine accidents for which data was available occurred during the first 
leg of the day.  Of the twenty-four accidents for which data was available, thirteen (54%) 
of the accident crews had been paired together in the past on at least one other 
pairing/sequence other than the accident pairing/sequence. 
 With regard to causal and contributing factors, thirty-four (68%) of the fifty 
accidents included in this study cited pilot performance as a causal or contributing factor.  
Fifteen (30%) of the accidents cited the environment as a causal or contributing factor.  
Twelve (24%) of the accidents cited mechanical factors as a causal or contributing factor 
and thirty-one (62%) cited other persons as a causal or contributing factor.  A comparison 
between the 1991-2000 and 2001-2010 year groups indicated there was not a significant 
difference between groups with regard to the involvement of pilot performance, 




Conclusions Relevant to Public Law 111-216 
 The Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Extension Act of 2010 will require all 
flight crewmembers, to include first officers, serving in 14 CFR 121 U.S. air carrier 
operations to hold an ATP certificate and possess at least 1,500 hours of total flight 
experience.  There is, however, a provision within the Act which authorizes the FAA to 
grant credit for specific academic training courses toward the 1,500 total flight hour 
requirement if a determination is made “…that allowing a pilot to take specific academic 
training courses will enhance safety more than requiring the pilot to fully comply with the 
flight hours requirement” (Government Printing Office, 2010).  The FAA previously 
sought comment on whether to permit "...academic credit in lieu of required flight hours 
or experience" (FAA, 2010).   
 Of the 50 accidents investigated in this study, all fifty captains (100%) had at least 
2,500 hours of total flight time and forty-eight first officers (96%) had at least 2,000 
hours of total flight time at the time of the accident.  There were only two first officers 
(4%) with less than 1,500 hours of total time, having 1,096 and 1,420 hours respectively, 
and neither were involved in an accident citing pilot performance as a causal or 
contributing factor.  These findings do not support the notion that a 1,500 hour total flight 
time requirement will contribute to the safety of 14 CFR 121 air carrier operations, as 
neither (0%) of the first officers with less than 1,500 hours of total flight time were 
involved in a major U.S. air carrier accident which cited pilot performance as a causal or 
contributing factor. 
 There was, however, a disproportionate increase between 1991-2000 and 2001-
2010 in the distribution of major U.S. air carrier accidents involving commercially 
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certificated first officers, irrespective of the citing/not citing of pilot performance, X2(df = 
1, N = 50) = 9.175, p = 0.002.  Between 1991 and 2000, twenty-eight (90%) of the thirty-
one first officers held an ATP certificate while only three (10%) held a commercial 
certificate.  Between 2001 and 2010, ten (53%) of the nineteen first officers held an ATP 
certificate and nine (47%) held a commercial certificate.  Of the nine commercially 
certificated first officers involved in an accident between 2001 and 2010, seven (78%) 
were involved in an accident citing pilot performance as a causal or contributing factor.  
While an ATP certification requirement for first officers will certainly eliminate the 
possibility of any future air carrier accidents involving commercially certified first 
officers, it is not possible to predict whether such a change will contribute to the 
enhancement of safety for 14 CFR 121 air carrier operations.  It is possible there will 




















 Administrators and regulators need to proceed cautiously with the way in which 
changes to the existing regulations are written into the new regulations.  Current 
regulations allow a commercially certificated first officer involved in 14 CFR 121 
operations to perform second-in-command duties but require the captain, or pilot-in-
command, to possess at least an ATP certificate with 1,500 hours of total flight time.  If 
the decision is made to grant  academic credit in lieu of required flight hours or 
experience for the issuance of an ATP certificate, there needs to be some type of 
mechanism in place to ensure it does not create an unintended automatic reduction to the 
current pilot-in-command requirements.   
Recommendation #2: 
 The FAA also sought comment as to whether there should still be a prescribed 
minimum number of flight hours "...for a commercial pilot to serve as SIC in Part 121 
operations...If the FAA were to credit academic study" (FAA, 2010).  This study was 
limited to only those accidents which occurred while operating under 14 CFR 121 and all 
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but two of the pilots had over 2,000 hours of total flight time.  As a result, this study does 
not provide the quantitative data necessary to make a recommendation with regard to 
what constitutes an appropriate reduction in flight hours.  What can be stated is that 100% 
of the captains and 96% of the first officers included in this study had well over 1,500 
hours of total flight time at the time of their accident.  However, there are a significant 
number of aircraft accident reports (AAR) and aircraft accident briefs (AAB) for 
accidents involving operations conducted under 14 CFR 91 and 14 CFR 135.  Part 91 and 
Part 135 operations are often a bridge between the employment opportunities which are 
available early in one's career and the air carrier operations available to the seasoned 
pilot.  Perhaps the data contained within those accident reports would shed additional 
light on the distribution of accidents with regard to total flight time at the lower and 
intermediate flight levels.  Such a study might help to identify the levels of exposed risk 
for pilots with less than 1,500 hours of total flight time and aid in recommendations as to 
what constitutes an appropriate or acceptable reduction in flight time without a 
compromise to safety.  
Recommendation #3: 
 There is little to no quantitative or qualitative data to support the notion that 
graduates of a collegiate aviation program or other academic course of study are any 
more or any less safe than those pilots who have not been exposed to such an academic 
course of study.  It might be of benefit to better understand the academic and experiential 
backgrounds of those pilots involved and those not involved in one or more aircraft 
accidents.  Perhaps data such as this would help to identify whether exposure to certain 
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academic courses, training, or other such preparation correlates to a reduction in the 
likelihood of being involved in an accident. 
Recommendation #4: 
 It is unclear what impact the regulations which stem from Public Law 111-216 
will have on the pilot supply pipeline, collegiate aviation institutions, regional air 
carriers, major air carriers, and/or other sectors of the aviation industry.  However, there 
have been concerns that such changes might have one or more unintended negative 
consequences.  Therefore, it is recommended that such data be tracked and monitored to 
ensure the cost of safety does not come at too great an economic cost, costs which might 
otherwise degrade other efficiencies already present in the current system. 
Recommendation #5: 
 Finally, administrators, regulators, and researchers need to ensure there is a way 
to track and monitor the outcomes of any new regulations which alter the existing 
certification and flight time requirements.  It is important that such regulations, which 
will likely impact a number of pilots and other parties, actually yield a benefit to safety.  
Otherwise, they come only at a cost.  This will ensure any such regulatory changes are 
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NTSB Report NTSB ID DBA Scheduled Non-Scheduled Passenger Cargo 
AAR-11/02 CEN09MA142  N/A  X 
AAR-10/04 DCA09MA021  X  X  
AAR-10/03 DCA09MA026  X  X  
AAR-10/01 DCA09MA027 X X  X  
AAR-09/03 DCA07MA310  X  X  
AAR-08/02 DCA07FA037  X  X  
AAR-08/01 DCA07MA072 X X  X  
AAR-07/07 DCA06MA022  X   X 
AAR-07/06 DCA06MA009  X  X  
AAR-07/05 DCA06MA064  X  X  
AAR-07/04 DCA06MA010 X X  X  
AAR-06/03 DCA04MA068  X   X 
AAR-06/01 DCA05MA004 X X  X  
AAB-06/02 FTW03MA160  X  X  
AAR-05/02 DCA04MA045 X X  X  
AAR-05/01 DCA04MA011  N/A  X 
AAR-04/04 DCA02MA001  X  X  
AAR-04/02 DCA02MA054  X   X 
AAR-04/01 DCA03MA022 X X  X  
AAR-03/02 DCA00MA026  X   X 
AAB-02/04 DCA00MA030  X  X  
AAR-02/01 DCA00MA023  X  X  
AAR-01/02 DCA99MA060  X  X  
AAR-01/01 DCA91MA023  X  X  
AAB-01/01 DCA98MA023  X  X  
AAR-00/03 DCA96MA070  X  X  
AAR-00/02 DCA97MA055  X   X 
AAR-99/01 DCA94MA076  X  X  
AAR-98/03 DCA96MA079  X   X 
AAR-98/02 DCA97MA059  X   X 
AAR-98/01 DCA96MA068  X  X  
AAR-97/06 DCA96MA054  X  X  
AAR-97/03 NYC97MA005  X  X  
AAR-97/01 FTW96FA118  X  X  
AAR-96/07 MIA96FA059  X  X  
AAR-96/05 DCA96MA008  X  X  
AAR-96/04 DCA96MA029  X  X X 
AAR-96/03 ATL95MA106  X  X  
AAR-96/01 DCA95MA001 X X  X  
AAR-95/05 CHI95MA044A  X  X  
AAR-95/03 DCA94MA065  X  X  
AAR-95/01 DCA94MA038  X  X  
AAR-94/06 DCA94MA033 X X  X  
AAR-94/04 DCA93RA060 X  X  X 
AAR-94/01 DCA93MA040  X  X  
AAR-93/04 DCA92MA044  X  X  
AAR-93/02 DCA92MA025  X  X  
AAR-92/05 DCA92MA022  X   X 
AAR-91/09 DCA91MA021  N/A  X 










































































































































































NTSB Report NTSB ID Phase of Flight 
AAR-11/02 CEN09MA142 Approach 
AAR-10/04 DCA09MA021 Takeoff 
AAR-10/03 DCA09MA026 Climb 
AAR-10/01 DCA09MA027 Approach 
AAR-09/03 DCA07MA310 Climb 
AAR-08/02 DCA07FA037 Landing 
AAR-08/01 DCA07MA072 Landing 
AAR-07/07 DCA06MA022 Descent 
AAR-07/06 DCA06MA009 Landing 
AAR-07/05 DCA06MA064 Takeoff 
AAR-07/04 DCA06MA010 Climb 
AAR-06/03 DCA04MA068 Approach 
AAR-06/01 DCA05MA004 Approach 
AAB-06/02 FTW03MA160 Landing 
AAR-05/02 DCA04MA045 Landing 
AAR-05/01 DCA04MA011 Landing 
AAR-04/04 DCA02MA001 Climb 
AAR-04/02 DCA02MA054 Approach 
AAR-04/01 DCA03MA022 Takeoff 
AAR-03/02 DCA00MA026 Takeoff 
AAB-02/04 DCA00MA030 Landing 
AAR-02/01 DCA00MA023 Cruise 
AAR-01/02 DCA99MA060 Landing 
AAR-01/01 DCA91MA023 Approach 
AAB-01/01 DCA98MA023 Approach 
AAR-00/03 DCA96MA070 Climb 
AAR-00/02 DCA97MA055 Landing 
AAR-99/01 DCA94MA076 Approach 
AAR-98/03 DCA96MA079 Cruise 
AAR-98/02 DCA97MA059 Takeoff 
AAR-98/01 DCA96MA068 Takeoff 
AAR-97/06 DCA96MA054 Climb 
AAR-97/03 NYC97MA005 Approach 
AAR-97/01 FTW96FA118 Landing 
AAR-96/07 MIA96FA059 Approach 
AAR-96/05 DCA96MA008 Approach 
AAR-96/04 DCA96MA029 Takeoff 
AAR-96/03 ATL95MA106 Takeoff 
AAR-96/01 DCA95MA001 Maneuvering 
AAR-95/05 CHI95MA044A Takeoff 
AAR-95/03 DCA94MA065 Approach 
AAR-95/01 DCA94MA038 Takeoff 
AAR-94/06 DCA94MA033 Descent 
AAR-94/04 DCA93RA060 Approach 
AAR-94/01 DCA93MA040 Landing 
AAR-93/04 DCA92MA044 Takeoff 
AAR-93/02 DCA92MA025 Takeoff 
AAR-92/05 DCA92MA022 Approach 
AAR-91/09 DCA91MA021 Takeoff 
























































NTSB Report NTSB ID Captain First Officer 
AAR-11/02 CEN09MA142 52 26 
AAR-10/04 DCA09MA021 50 34 
AAR-10/03 DCA09MA026 57 49 
AAR-10/01 DCA09MA027 47 24 
AAR-09/03 DCA07MA310 59 43 
AAR-08/02 DCA07FA037 27 28 
AAR-08/01 DCA07MA072 31 46 
AAR-07/07 DCA06MA022 59 40 
AAR-07/06 DCA06MA009 59 34 
AAR-07/05 DCA06MA064 35 44 
AAR-07/04 DCA06MA010 37 34 
AAR-06/03 DCA04MA068 49 37 
AAR-06/01 DCA05MA004 48 29 
AAB-06/02 FTW03MA160 50 44 
AAR-05/02 DCA04MA045 33 26 
AAR-05/01 DCA04MA011 59 44 
AAR-04/04 DCA02MA001 42 34 
AAR-04/02 DCA02MA054 55 44 
AAR-04/01 DCA03MA022 25 27 
AAR-03/02 DCA00MA026 43 35 
AAB-02/04 DCA00MA030 52 43 
AAR-02/01 DCA00MA023 53 57 
AAR-01/02 DCA99MA060 48 35 
AAR-01/01 DCA91MA023 52 42 
AAB-01/01 DCA98MA023 42 40 
AAR-00/03 DCA96MA070 58 57 
AAR-00/02 DCA97MA055 46 39 
AAR-99/01 DCA94MA076 45 38 
AAR-98/03 DCA96MA079 47 41 
AAR-98/02 DCA97MA059 42 26 
AAR-98/01 DCA96MA068 40 37 
AAR-97/06 DCA96MA054 35 52 
AAR-97/03 NYC97MA005 48 38 
AAR-97/01 FTW96FA118 50 37 
AAR-96/07 MIA96FA059 43 42 
AAR-96/05 DCA96MA008 39 38 
AAR-96/04 DCA96MA029 53 56 
AAR-96/03 ATL95MA106 45 43 
AAR-96/01 DCA95MA001 29 30 
AAR-95/05 CHI95MA044A 57 38 
AAR-95/03 DCA94MA065 38 Unknown 
AAR-95/01 DCA94MA038 57 47 
AAR-94/06 DCA94MA033 52 43 
AAR-94/04 DCA93RA060 54 49 
AAR-94/01 DCA93MA040 59 40 
AAR-93/04 DCA92MA044 54 53 
AAR-93/02 DCA92MA025 44 30 
AAR-92/05 DCA92MA022 59 37 
AAR-91/09 DCA91MA021 44 28 

























































NTSB Report NTSB ID Captain First Officer 
AAR-11/02 CEN09MA142 M F 
AAR-10/04 DCA09MA021 M M 
AAR-10/03 DCA09MA026 M M 
AAR-10/01 DCA09MA027 M F 
AAR-09/03 DCA07MA310 M M 
AAR-08/02 DCA07FA037 M M 
AAR-08/01 DCA07MA072 M M 
AAR-07/07 DCA06MA022 M M 
AAR-07/06 DCA06MA009 M M 
AAR-07/05 DCA06MA064 M M 
AAR-07/04 DCA06MA010 F M 
AAR-06/03 DCA04MA068 M M 
AAR-06/01 DCA05MA004 M M 
AAB-06/02 FTW03MA160 M M 
AAR-05/02 DCA04MA045 M M 
AAR-05/01 DCA04MA011 M F 
AAR-04/04 DCA02MA001 M M 
AAR-04/02 DCA02MA054 M M 
AAR-04/01 DCA03MA022 F M 
AAR-03/02 DCA00MA026 M M 
AAB-02/04 DCA00MA030 M M 
AAR-02/01 DCA00MA023 M M 
AAR-01/02 DCA99MA060 M M 
AAR-01/01 DCA91MA023 M F 
AAB-01/01 DCA98MA023 M M 
AAR-00/03 DCA96MA070 M M 
AAR-00/02 DCA97MA055 M M 
AAR-99/01 DCA94MA076 M M 
AAR-98/03 DCA96MA079 M M 
AAR-98/02 DCA97MA059 M M 
AAR-98/01 DCA96MA068 M M 
AAR-97/06 DCA96MA054 F M 
AAR-97/03 NYC97MA005 M M 
AAR-97/01 FTW96FA118 M M 
AAR-96/07 MIA96FA059 M M 
AAR-96/05 DCA96MA008 M M 
AAR-96/04 DCA96MA029 M M 
AAR-96/03 ATL95MA106 M M 
AAR-96/01 DCA95MA001 M M 
AAR-95/05 CHI95MA044A M M 
AAR-95/03 DCA94MA065 M M 
AAR-95/01 DCA94MA038 M M 
AAR-94/06 DCA94MA033 M M 
AAR-94/04 DCA93RA060 M M 
AAR-94/01 DCA93MA040 M M 
AAR-93/04 DCA92MA044 M M 
AAR-93/02 DCA92MA025 M M 
AAR-92/05 DCA92MA022 M M 
AAR-91/09 DCA91MA021 M M 

























































NTSB Report NTSB ID Captain First Officer 
AAR-11/02 CEN09MA142 ATP Commercial 
AAR-10/04 DCA09MA021 ATP ATP 
AAR-10/03 DCA09MA026 ATP ATP 
AAR-10/01 DCA09MA027 ATP Commercial 
AAR-09/03 DCA07MA310 ATP Commercial 
AAR-08/02 DCA07FA037 ATP Commercial 
AAR-08/01 DCA07MA072 ATP ATP 
AAR-07/07 DCA06MA022 ATP ATP 
AAR-07/06 DCA06MA009 ATP ATP 
AAR-07/05 DCA06MA064 ATP ATP 
AAR-07/04 DCA06MA010 ATP Commercial 
AAR-06/03 DCA04MA068 ATP Commercial 
AAR-06/01 DCA05MA004 ATP Commercial 
AAB-06/02 FTW03MA160 ATP ATP 
AAR-05/02 DCA04MA045 ATP Commercial 
AAR-05/01 DCA04MA011 ATP ATP 
AAR-04/04 DCA02MA001 ATP ATP 
AAR-04/02 DCA02MA054 ATP ATP 
AAR-04/01 DCA03MA022 ATP Commercial 
AAR-03/02 DCA00MA026 ATP ATP 
AAB-02/04 DCA00MA030 ATP ATP 
AAR-02/01 DCA00MA023 ATP ATP 
AAR-01/02 DCA99MA060 ATP ATP 
AAR-01/01 DCA91MA023 ATP ATP 
AAB-01/01 DCA98MA023 ATP ATP 
AAR-00/03 DCA96MA070 ATP ATP 
AAR-00/02 DCA97MA055 ATP ATP 
AAR-99/01 DCA94MA076 ATP ATP 
AAR-98/03 DCA96MA079 ATP ATP 
AAR-98/02 DCA97MA059 ATP ATP 
AAR-98/01 DCA96MA068 ATP ATP 
AAR-97/06 DCA96MA054 ATP ATP 
AAR-97/03 NYC97MA005 ATP ATP 
AAR-97/01 FTW96FA118 ATP ATP 
AAR-96/07 MIA96FA059 ATP ATP 
AAR-96/05 DCA96MA008 ATP ATP 
AAR-96/04 DCA96MA029 ATP ATP 
AAR-96/03 ATL95MA106 ATP ATP 
AAR-96/01 DCA95MA001 ATP Commercial 
AAR-95/05 CHI95MA044A ATP ATP 
AAR-95/03 DCA94MA065 ATP ATP 
AAR-95/01 DCA94MA038 ATP ATP 
AAR-94/06 DCA94MA033 ATP ATP 
AAR-94/04 DCA93RA060 ATP ATP 
AAR-94/01 DCA93MA040 ATP Commercial 
AAR-93/04 DCA92MA044 ATP ATP 
AAR-93/02 DCA92MA025 ATP ATP 
AAR-92/05 DCA92MA022 ATP Commercial 
AAR-91/09 DCA91MA021 ATP ATP 



















































































































NTSB Report NTSB ID Captain First Officer 
AAR-11/02 CEN09MA142 13,935 2,109 
AAR-10/04 DCA09MA021 13,100 8,000 
AAR-10/03 DCA09MA026 19,663 15,643 
AAR-10/01 DCA09MA027 3,379 2,244 
AAR-09/03 DCA07MA310 14,000 7,000 
AAR-08/02 DCA07FA037 5,600 2,600 
AAR-08/01 DCA07MA072 4,500 3,900 
AAR-07/07 DCA06MA022 25,000 7,500 
AAR-07/06 DCA06MA009 15,000 8,500 
AAR-07/05 DCA06MA064 4,710 6,564 
AAR-07/04 DCA06MA010 2,820 1,420 
AAR-06/03 DCA04MA068 2,500 2,488 
AAR-06/01 DCA05MA004 4,234 2,856 
AAB-06/02 FTW03MA160 9,500 10,000 
AAR-05/02 DCA04MA045 6,071 2,000 
AAR-05/01 DCA04MA011 21,000 15,000 
AAR-04/04 DCA02MA001 8,050 4,403 
AAR-04/02 DCA02MA054 13,500 8,000 
AAR-04/01 DCA03MA022 2,790 1,096 
AAR-03/02 DCA00MA026 13,329 4,511 
AAB-02/04 DCA00MA030 11,000 5,022 
AAR-02/01 DCA00MA023 17,750 8,140 
AAR-01/02 DCA99MA060 10,234 4,292 
AAR-01/01 DCA91MA023 9,902 3,903 
AAB-01/01 DCA98MA023 11,000 5,638 
AAR-00/03 DCA96MA070 18,800 17,000 
AAR-00/02 DCA97MA055 11,000 3,703 
AAR-99/01 DCA94MA076 12,000 9,119 
AAR-98/03 DCA96MA079 12,344 6,535 
AAR-98/02 DCA97MA059 12,154 2,641 
AAR-98/01 DCA96MA068 12,000 6,500 
AAR-97/06 DCA96MA054 8,928 6,448 
AAR-97/03 NYC97MA005 10,024 6,800 
AAR-97/01 FTW96FA118 17,500 2,200 
AAR-96/07 MIA96FA059 4,381 7,707 
AAR-96/05 DCA96MA008 8,000 5,100 
AAR-96/04 DCA96MA029 16,455 17,734 
AAR-96/03 ATL95MA106 9,500 3,800 
AAR-96/01 DCA95MA001 7,867 5,176 
AAR-95/05 CHI95MA044A 18,651 10,353 
AAR-95/03 DCA94MA065 8,065 12,980 
AAR-95/01 DCA94MA038 23,000 16,000 
AAR-94/06 DCA94MA033 20,000 6,500 
AAR-94/04 DCA94RA060 20,727 15,350 
AAR-94/01 DCA93MA040 12,562 4,454 
AAR-93/04 DCA92MA044 20,149 15,242 
AAR-93/02 DCA92MA025 9,820 4,507 
AAR-92/05 DCA92MA022 16,382 5,082 
AAR-91/09 DCA91MA021 10,505 3,820 

























































NTSB Report NTSB ID Captain First Officer 
AAR-11/02 CEN09MA142 2,052 130 
AAR-10/04 DCA09MA021 6,300 1,500 
AAR-10/03 DCA09MA026 4,765 37 
AAR-10/01 DCA09MA027 111 774 
AAR-09/03 DCA07MA310 3,004 3,000 
AAR-08/02 DCA07FA037 4,243 22 
AAR-08/01 DCA07MA072 1,200 1,200 
AAR-07/07 DCA06MA022 16,000 2,100 
AAR-07/06 DCA06MA009 4,500 2,000 
AAR-07/05 DCA06MA064 3,082 3,564 
AAR-07/04 DCA06MA010 1,630 71 
AAR-06/03 DCA04MA068 1,337 145 
AAR-06/01 DCA05MA004 2,510 107 
AAB-06/02 FTW03MA160 5,400 1,200 
AAR-05/02 DCA04MA045 3,814 20 
AAR-05/01 DCA04MA011 2,602 1,918 
AAR-04/04 DCA02MA001 1,723 1,835 
AAR-04/02 DCA02MA054 2,754 1,983 
AAR-04/01 DCA03MA022 1,100 706 
AAR-03/02 DCA00MA026 2,128 2,080 
AAB-02/04 DCA00MA030 9,870 2,522 
AAR-02/01 DCA00MA023 4,150 8,060 
AAR-01/02 DCA99MA060 5,518 182 
AAR-01/01 DCA91MA023 1,732 1,077 
AAB-01/01 DCA98MA023 1,319 3,731 
AAR-00/03 DCA96MA070 5,490 4,700 
AAR-00/02 DCA97MA055 1,253 95 
AAR-99/01 DCA94MA076 4,064 3,644 
AAR-98/03 DCA96MA079 2,504 1,338 
AAR-98/02 DCA97MA059 2,522 1,592 
AAR-98/01 DCA96MA068 2,300 500 
AAR-97/06 DCA96MA054 2,116 2,148 
AAR-97/03 NYC97MA005 3,756 2,200 
AAR-97/01 FTW96FA118 220 450 
AAR-96/07 MIA96FA059 1,061 205 
AAR-96/05 DCA96MA008 4,230 2,281 
AAR-96/04 DCA96MA029 2,905 4,804 
AAR-96/03 ATL95MA106 3,500 552 
AAR-96/01 DCA95MA001 1,548 3,657 
AAR-95/05 CHI95MA044A 3,178 251 
AAR-95/03 DCA94MA065 1,970 3,180 
AAR-95/01 DCA94MA038 6,000 2,400 
AAR-94/06 DCA94MA033 300 1,700 
AAR-94/04 DCA93RA060 1,527 492 
AAR-94/01 DCA93MA040 555 376 
AAR-93/04 DCA92MA044 2,397 2,953 
AAR-93/02 DCA92MA025 2,200 29 
AAR-92/05 DCA92MA022 2,382 3,135 
AAR-91/09 DCA91MA021 505 510 

























































NTSB Report NTSB ID Captain First Officer 
AAR-11/02 CEN09MA142 1,896 130 
AAR-10/04 DCA09MA021 915 1,500 
AAR-10/03 DCA09MA026 Unknown 37 
AAR-10/01 DCA09MA027 111 774 
AAR-09/03 DCA07MA310 831 3,000 
AAR-08/02 DCA07FA037 2,459 22 
AAR-08/01 DCA07MA072 1,100 1,200 
AAR-07/07 DCA06MA022 16,000 2,100 
AAR-07/06 DCA06MA009 Unknown 2,000 
AAR-07/05 DCA06MA064 1,567 Unknown 
AAR-07/04 DCA06MA010 430 71 
AAR-06/03 DCA04MA068 88 145 
AAR-06/01 DCA05MA004 719 107 
AAB-06/02 FTW03MA160 600 1,200 
AAR-05/02 DCA04MA045 1,120 20 
AAR-05/01 DCA04MA011 2,602 1,918 
AAR-04/04 DCA02MA001 1,723 1,835 
AAR-04/02 DCA02MA054 861 526 
AAR-04/01 DCA03MA022 1,100 706 
AAR-03/02 DCA00MA026 2,128 2,080 
AAB-02/04 DCA00MA030 5,302 2,522 
AAR-02/01 DCA00MA023 4,150 8,060 
AAR-01/02 DCA99MA060 5,518 182 
AAR-01/01 DCA91MA023 891 1,077 
AAB-01/01 DCA98MA023 424 3,731 
AAR-00/03 DCA96MA070 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-00/02 DCA97MA055 318 95 
AAR-99/01 DCA94MA076 3,269 3,644 
AAR-98/03 DCA96MA079 1,621 237 
AAR-98/02 DCA97MA059 2,522 1,592 
AAR-98/01 DCA96MA068 2,300 500 
AAR-97/06 DCA96MA054 1,784 2,148 
AAR-97/03 NYC97MA005 3,578 2,200 
AAR-97/01 FTW96FA118 220 450 
AAR-96/07 MIA96FA059 26 205 
AAR-96/05 DCA96MA008 1,514 2,281 
AAR-96/04 DCA96MA029 1,102 4,804 
AAR-96/03 ATL95MA106 2,500 552 
AAR-96/01 DCA95MA001 1,548 3,657 
AAR-95/05 CHI95MA044A 3,178 251 
AAR-95/03 DCA94MA065 1,970 3,180 
AAR-95/01 DCA94MA038 6,000 2,400 
AAR-94/06 DCA94MA033 300 Unknown 
AAR-94/04 DCA93RA060 1,527 Unknown 
AAR-94/01 DCA93MA040 555 376 
AAR-93/04 DCA92MA044 1,574 2,953 
AAR-93/02 DCA92MA025 1,400 29 
AAR-92/05 DCA92MA022 2,382 1,143 
AAR-91/09 DCA91MA021 505 510 

























































NTSB Report NTSB ID Captain First Officer 
AAR-11/02 CEN09MA142 Monitoring Flying 
AAR-10/04 DCA09MA021 Flying Monitoring 
AAR-10/03 DCA09MA026 Monitoring Flying 
AAR-10/01 DCA09MA027 Flying Monitoring 
AAR-09/03 DCA07MA310 Flying Monitoring 
AAR-08/02 DCA07FA037 Flying Monitoring 
AAR-08/01 DCA07MA072 Monitoring Flying 
AAR-07/07 DCA06MA022 Monitoring Flying 
AAR-07/06 DCA06MA009 Flying Monitoring 
AAR-07/05 DCA06MA064 Monitoring Flying 
AAR-07/04 DCA06MA010 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-06/03 DCA04MA068 Monitoring Flying 
AAR-06/01 DCA05MA004 Flying Monitoring 
AAB-06/02 FTW03MA160 Monitoring Flying 
AAR-05/02 DCA04MA045 Monitoring Flying 
AAR-05/01 DCA04MA011 Monitoring Flying 
AAR-04/04 DCA02MA001 Monitoring Flying 
AAR-04/02 DCA02MA054 Monitoring Flying 
AAR-04/01 DCA03MA022 Flying Monitoring 
AAR-03/02 DCA00MA026 Monitoring Flying 
AAB-02/04 DCA00MA030 Flying Monitoring 
AAR-02/01 DCA00MA023 Monitoring Flying 
AAR-01/02 DCA99MA060 Flying Monitoring 
AAR-01/01 DCA91MA023 Flying Monitoring 
AAB-01/01 DCA98MA023 Flying Monitoring 
AAR-00/03 DCA96MA070 Flying Monitoring 
AAR-00/02 DCA97MA055 Flying Monitoring 
AAR-99/01 DCA94MA076 Monitoring Flying 
AAR-98/03 DCA96MA079 Monitoring Flying 
AAR-98/02 DCA97MA059 Monitoring Flying 
AAR-98/01 DCA96MA068 Monitoring Flying 
AAR-97/06 DCA96MA054 Flying Monitoring 
AAR-97/03 NYC97MA005 Flying Monitoring 
AAR-97/01 FTW96FA118 Monitoring Flying 
AAR-96/07 MIA96FA059 Monitoring Flying 
AAR-96/05 DCA96MA008 Flying Monitoring 
AAR-96/04 DCA96MA029 Flying Monitoring 
AAR-96/03 ATL95MA106 Flying Monitoring 
AAR-96/01 DCA95MA001 Monitoring Flying 
AAR-95/05 CHI95MA044A Monitoring Flying 
AAR-95/03 DCA94MA065 Monitoring Flying 
AAR-95/01 DCA94MA038 Flying Monitoring 
AAR-94/06 DCA94MA033 Flying Monitoring 
AAR-94/04 DCA93RA060 Flying Monitoring 
AAR-94/01 DCA93MA040 Monitoring Flying 
AAR-93/04 DCA92MA044 Monitoring Flying 
AAR-93/02 DCA92MA025 Flying Monitoring 
AAR-92/05 DCA92MA022 Monitoring Flying 
AAR-91/09 DCA91MA021 Monitoring Flying 

























































 This Trip Sequence  
NTSB Report NTSB ID First Day of Pairing First Leg of Day First Paring Together 
AAR-11/02 CEN09MA142 Yes Yes Unknown 
AAR-10/04 DCA09MA021 No Yes No 
AAR-10/03 DCA09MA026 No No Yes 
AAR-10/01 DCA09MA027 Yes Yes Unknown 
AAR-09/03 DCA07MA310 Yes Yes Unknown 
AAR-08/02 DCA07FA037 Yes No No 
AAR-08/01 DCA07MA072 Yes Yes Yes 
AAR-07/07 DCA06MA022 No Yes Unknown 
AAR-07/06 DCA06MA009 Yes Yes Unknown 
AAR-07/05 DCA06MA064 No Yes Yes 
AAR-07/04 DCA06MA010 Yes No Yes 
AAR-06/03 DCA04MA068 Unknown Yes Unknown 
AAR-06/01 DCA05MA004 No No No 
AAB-06/02 FTW03MA160 No No Unknown 
AAR-05/02 DCA04MA045 Yes Yes Yes 
AAR-05/01 DCA04MA011 No No Unknown 
AAR-04/04 DCA02MA001 Yes Yes No 
AAR-04/02 DCA02MA054 Yes Yes Yes 
AAR-04/01 DCA03MA022 Yes Yes No 
AAR-03/02 DCA00MA026 Yes Yes No 
AAB-02/04 DCA00MA030 Yes Yes Unknown 
AAR-02/01 DCA00MA023 Yes Yes Unknown 
AAR-01/02 DCA99MA060 Yes No Yes 
AAR-01/01 DCA91MA023 No Yes No 
AAB-01/01 DCA98MA023 No Yes Unknown 
AAR-00/03 DCA96MA070 Yes Yes Unknown 
AAR-00/02 DCA97MA055 Unknown Yes Unknown 
AAR-99/01 DCA94MA076 No No Yes 
AAR-98/03 DCA96MA079 No Yes Unknown 
AAR-98/02 DCA97MA059 Unknown Yes Unknown 
AAR-98/01 DCA96MA068 No Yes Unknown 
AAR-97/06 DCA96MA054 No No Unknown 
AAR-97/03 NYC97MA005 Yes Yes No 
AAR-97/01 FTW96FA118 No No Yes 
AAR-96/07 MIA96FA059 Yes No Yes 
AAR-96/05 DCA96MA008 No No Unknown 
AAR-96/04 DCA96MA029 Yes Yes Yes 
AAR-96/03 ATL95MA106 Yes Yes Unknown 
AAR-96/01 DCA95MA001 Yes No Unknown 
AAR-95/05 CHI95MA044A No No Unknown 
AAR-95/03 DCA94MA065 Yes No Unknown 
AAR-95/01 DCA94MA038 Yes No No 
AAR-94/06 DCA94MA033 Yes Yes Unknown 
AAR-94/04 DCA93RA060 No No Yes 
AAR-94/01 DCA93MA040 No Yes Yes 
AAR-93/04 DCA92MA044 Unknown Unknown Unknown 
AAR-93/02 DCA92MA025 No No Unknown 
AAR-92/05 DCA92MA022 No Yes No 
AAR-91/09 DCA91MA021 No No No 
























































 Captain First Officer 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Drugs Alcohol Drugs Alcohol 
AAR-11/02 CEN09MA142 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
AAR-10/04 DCA09MA021 Negative Negative Negative Not Conducted 
AAR-10/03 DCA09MA026 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
AAR-10/01 DCA09MA027 Negative 1 Negative Negative Negative 
AAR-09/03 DCA07MA310 Not Conducted Not Conducted Not Conducted Not Conducted 
AAR-08/02 DCA07FA037 No Not Conducted No Not Conducted 
AAR-08/01 DCA07MA072 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
AAR-07/07 DCA06MA022 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
AAR-07/06 DCA06MA009 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
AAR-07/05 DCA06MA064 Negative Negative Negative 2 Negative 
AAR-07/04 DCA06MA010 Negative 3 Negative Negative 3 Negative 
AAR-06/03 DCA04MA068 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
AAR-06/01 DCA05MA004 Negative 4 Negative Negative 5 Negative 
AAB-06/02 FTW03MA160 Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown 
AAR-05/02 DCA04MA045 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
AAR-05/01 DCA04MA011 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
AAR-04/04 DCA02MA001 Negative Positive 6 Negative 7 Negative 
AAR-04/02 DCA02MA054 Negative 8 Negative Negative Negative 
AAR-04/01 DCA03MA022 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
AAR-03/02 DCA00MA026 Negative Not Conducted Negative Not Conducted 
AAB-02/04 DCA00MA030 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
AAR-02/01 DCA00MA023 Negative Negative 9 Negative Negative 9 
AAR-01/02 DCA99MA060 Negative Negative Not Conducted Not Conducted 
AAR-01/01 DCA91MA023 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
AAB-01/01 DCA98MA023 Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown 
AAR-00/03 DCA96MA070 Negative Negative 10 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-00/02 DCA97MA055 Negative Unknown Negative Unknown 
AAR-99/01 DCA94MA076 Negative Negative 11 Negative Negative 11 
AAR-98/03 DCA96MA079 Negative Unknown Negative Unknown 
AAR-98/02 DCA97MA059 Negative Unknown Negative Unknown 
AAR-98/01 DCA96MA068 Negative Not Conducted Negative Not Conducted 
AAR-97/06 DCA96MA054 Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown 
AAR-97/03 NYC97MA005 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
AAR-97/01 FTW96FA118 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
AAR-96/07 MIA96FA059 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
AAR-96/05 DCA96MA008 Negative Not Conducted Negative Not Conducted 
AAR-96/04 DCA96MA029 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
AAR-96/03 ATL95MA106 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
AAR-96/01 DCA95MA001 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
AAR-95/05 CHI95MA044A Negative Negative Negative Negative 
AAR-95/03 DCA94MA065 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
AAR-95/01 DCA94MA038 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
AAR-94/06 DCA94MA033 Negative Not Conducted Negative Not Conducted 
AAR-94/04 DCA93RA060 Negative Negative Negative 12 Negative 
AAR-94/01 DCA93MA040 Negative Not Conducted Negative Not Conducted 
AAR-93/04 DCA92MA044 Negative Not Conducted Negative Not Conducted 
AAR-93/02 DCA92MA025 Negative Negative Negative Not Conducted 13 
AAR-92/05 DCA92MA022 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
AAR-91/09 DCA91MA021 Negative Negative Negative Negative 
AAR-91/08 DCA91MA018A Negative 14 Negative Negative Negative 
186 
 
1.  The captain tested positive for Diltiazem, "FAA medical records indicated that he was 
taking this medicine to control hypertension" (NTSB, 2010). 
 
2.  "A low amount of pseudoephedrine was detected...Pseudoephedrine is a decongestant 
that is available without a prescription in various preparations that are marketed for the 
treatment of cold or allergy symptoms" (NTSB, 2007). 
 
3.  The captain’s toxicological test revealed diphenhydramine, “commonly known by the 
trade name Benadryl” and the first officer’s test revealed quinine, which “is found in 
tonic water” (NTSB, 2006). 
 
4.  "A urine specimen collected from the captain tested positive for acetaminophen" 
(NTSB, 2006). 
 
5.  "Blood and liver specimens obtained from the first officer revealed an unspecified 
quantity of quinine...Quinine is found in tonic water" (NTSB, 2006). 
 
6.  The NTSB stated “ethanol in specimens can be the result of the postmortem 
production of ethanol” (NTSB, 2002). 
 
7.  The first officer’s specimen tested “positive for ephedrine and pseudoephedrine” 
which are “…present in many over-the-counter medications” (NTSB, 2002). 
 
8.  "The urine specimen collected from the captain tested positive for morphine and 
acetaminophen.  A review of emergency room hospital records indicated that the captain 
was administered morphine intravenously" (NTSB, 2004). 
 
9.  “Although the analysis detected ethanol in the tissue specimens of both pilots, the 
analysis report noted that the ethanol found was consistent with postmortem ethanol 
production” (NTSB, 2002). 
 
10.  “…the presence of small amounts of alcohol in some of the specimens was most 
likely ‘from postmortem ethanol production’ caused by decomposition” (NTSB, 2000). 
 
11.  "Although ethanol was detected in muscle tissue samples from both the captain and 
first officer, the toxicological reports stated that 'the delay in the collection and the 





12.  “The first officer tested positive for codeine, which is a pain suppressant.  According 
to personnel in the hospital trauma center, this drug was most probably administered after 
the accident” (NTSB, 1994). 
 
13.  "Voluntary blood and urine samples from the first officer were requested by the 
Safety Board, and this request was denied" (NTSB, 1993). 
 
14.  "CAMI reported that the captain of USA1493 had 1.6 ug/ml of Phenobarbital in his 
urine" (NTSB, 1991).  However, the NTSB stated in its analysis that this medication did 






























































































 Properly Certificated and Qualified 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Captain First Officer 
AAR-11/02 CEN09MA142 Yes Yes 
AAR-10/04 DCA09MA021 Yes Yes 
AAR-10/03 DCA09MA026 Yes Yes 
AAR-10/01 DCA09MA027 Yes Yes 
AAR-09/03 DCA07MA310 Yes Yes 
AAR-08/02 DCA07FA037 Yes Yes 
AAR-08/01 DCA07MA072 Yes Yes 
AAR-07/07 DCA06MA022 Yes Yes 
AAR-07/06 DCA06MA009 Yes Yes 
AAR-07/05 DCA06MA064 Yes Yes 
AAR-07/04 DCA06MA010 Yes Yes 
AAR-06/03 DCA04MA068 Yes Yes 
AAR-06/01 DCA05MA004 Yes Yes 
AAB-06/02 FTW03MA160 Yes Yes 
AAR-05/02 DCA04MA045 Yes No 
AAR-05/01 DCA04MA011 Yes Yes 
AAR-04/04 DCA02MA001 Yes Yes 
AAR-04/02 DCA02MA054 Yes Yes 
AAR-04/01 DCA03MA022 Yes Yes 
AAR-03/02 DCA00MA026 Yes Yes 
AAB-02/04 DCA00MA030 Yes Yes 
AAR-02/01 DCA00MA023 Yes Yes 
AAR-01/02 DCA99MA060 Yes Yes 
AAR-01/01 DCA91MA023 Yes Yes 
AAB-01/01 DCA98MA023 Yes Yes 
AAR-00/03 DCA96MA070 Yes Yes 
AAR-00/02 DCA97MA055 Yes Yes 
AAR-99/01 DCA94MA076 Yes Yes 
AAR-98/03 DCA96MA079 Yes Yes 
AAR-98/02 DCA97MA059 Yes Yes 
AAR-98/01 DCA96MA068 Yes Yes 
AAR-97/06 DCA96MA054 Yes Yes 
AAR-97/03 NYC97MA005 Yes Yes 
AAR-97/01 FTW96FA118 Yes Yes 
AAR-96/07 MIA96FA059 Yes Yes 
AAR-96/05 DCA96MA008 Yes Yes 
AAR-96/04 DCA96MA029 Yes Yes 
AAR-96/03 ATL95MA106 Yes Yes 
AAR-96/01 DCA95MA001 Yes Yes 
AAR-95/05 CHI95MA044A Yes Yes 
AAR-95/03 DCA94MA065 Yes Yes 
AAR-95/01 DCA94MA038 Yes Yes 
AAR-94/06 DCA94MA033 Yes Yes 
AAR-94/04 DCA93RA060 Yes Yes 
AAR-94/01 DCA93MA040 Yes Yes 
AAR-93/04 DCA92MA044 Yes Yes 
AAR-93/02 DCA92MA025 Yes Yes 
AAR-92/05 DCA92MA022 Yes Yes 
AAR-91/09 DCA91MA021 Yes Yes 
























































 Accidents, Incidents, Violations 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Captain First Officer 
AAR-11/02 CEN09MA142 No No 
AAR-10/04 DCA09MA021 No No 
AAR-10/03 DCA09MA026 No No 
AAR-10/01 DCA09MA027 No No 
AAR-09/03 DCA07MA310 No No 
AAR-08/02 DCA07FA037 No No 
AAR-08/01 DCA07MA072 No No 
AAR-07/07 DCA06MA022 No No 
AAR-07/06 DCA06MA009 No No 
AAR-07/05 DCA06MA064 No No 
AAR-07/04 DCA06MA010 No No 
AAR-06/03 DCA04MA068 No No 
AAR-06/01 DCA05MA004 No No 
AAB-06/02 FTW03MA160 No No 
AAR-05/02 DCA04MA045 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-05/01 DCA04MA011 No No 
AAR-04/04 DCA02MA001 No No 
AAR-04/02 DCA02MA054 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-04/01 DCA03MA022 No No 
AAR-03/02 DCA00MA026 Unknown Unknown 
AAB-02/04 DCA00MA030 No No 
AAR-02/01 DCA00MA023 No No 
AAR-01/02 DCA99MA060 No No 
AAR-01/01 DCA91MA023 No No 
AAB-01/01 DCA98MA023 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-00/03 DCA96MA070 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-00/02 DCA97MA055 No No 
AAR-99/01 DCA94MA076 No No 
AAR-98/03 DCA96MA079 No No 
AAR-98/02 DCA97MA059 Yes No 
AAR-98/01 DCA96MA068 No No 
AAR-97/06 DCA96MA054 Yes Unknown 
AAR-97/03 NYC97MA005 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-97/01 FTW96FA118 No No 
AAR-96/07 MIA96FA059 Yes Unknown 
AAR-96/05 DCA96MA008 No No 
AAR-96/04 DCA96MA029 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-96/03 ATL95MA106 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-96/01 DCA95MA001 No No 
AAR-95/05 CHI95MA044A No No 
AAR-95/03 DCA94MA065 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-95/01 DCA94MA038 No No 
AAR-94/06 DCA94MA033 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-94/04 DCA93RA060 No No 
AAR-94/01 DCA93MA040 No No 
AAR-93/04 DCA92MA044 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-93/02 DCA92MA025 No No 
AAR-92/05 DCA92MA022 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-91/09 DCA91MA021 Yes Unknown 
























































 Driver's License Suspensions/ Revocations 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Captain First Officer 
AAR-11/02 CEN09MA142 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-10/04 DCA09MA021 No No 
AAR-10/03 DCA09MA026 No No 
AAR-10/01 DCA09MA027 No No 
AAR-09/03 DCA07MA310 No No 
AAR-08/02 DCA07FA037 No No 
AAR-08/01 DCA07MA072 No No 
AAR-07/07 DCA06MA022 No No 
AAR-07/06 DCA06MA009 No No 
AAR-07/05 DCA06MA064 No No 
AAR-07/04 DCA06MA010 No No 
AAR-06/03 DCA04MA068 No No 
AAR-06/01 DCA05MA004 No No 
AAB-06/02 FTW03MA160 No No 
AAR-05/02 DCA04MA045 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-05/01 DCA04MA011 No Yes 
AAR-04/04 DCA02MA001 No No 
AAR-04/02 DCA02MA054 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-04/01 DCA03MA022 No No 
AAR-03/02 DCA00MA026 Unknown Unknown 
AAB-02/04 DCA00MA030 No No 
AAR-02/01 DCA00MA023 No No 
AAR-01/02 DCA99MA060 No No 
AAR-01/01 DCA91MA023 Unknown Unknown 
AAB-01/01 DCA98MA023 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-00/03 DCA96MA070 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-00/02 DCA97MA055 No No 
AAR-99/01 DCA94MA076 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-98/03 DCA96MA079 No No 
AAR-98/02 DCA97MA059 Unknown No 
AAR-98/01 DCA96MA068 No No 
AAR-97/06 DCA96MA054 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-97/03 NYC97MA005 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-97/01 FTW96FA118 No No 
AAR-96/07 MIA96FA059 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-96/05 DCA96MA008 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-96/04 DCA96MA029 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-96/03 ATL95MA106 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-96/01 DCA95MA001 No No 
AAR-95/05 CHI95MA044A Unknown Unknown 
AAR-95/03 DCA94MA065 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-95/01 DCA94MA038 No No 
AAR-94/06 DCA94MA033 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-94/04 DCA93RA060 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-94/01 DCA93MA040 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-93/04 DCA92MA044 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-93/02 DCA92MA025 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-92/05 DCA92MA022 Unknown Unknown 
AAR-91/09 DCA91MA021 No No 
























































 Past Unsatisfactory Flight Examinations 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Captain First Officer 
AAR-11/02 CEN09MA142 No No 
AAR-10/04 DCA09MA021 No No 
AAR-10/03 DCA09MA026 No No 
AAR-10/01 DCA09MA027 Yes Yes 
AAR-09/03 DCA07MA310 No No 
AAR-08/02 DCA07FA037 No No 
AAR-08/01 DCA07MA072 No No 
AAR-07/07 DCA06MA022 No No 
AAR-07/06 DCA06MA009 No No 
AAR-07/05 DCA06MA064 No No 
AAR-07/04 DCA06MA010 No No 
AAR-06/03 DCA04MA068 Yes Yes 
AAR-06/01 DCA05MA004 No No 
AAB-06/02 FTW03MA160 No No 
AAR-05/02 DCA04MA045 Yes No 
AAR-05/01 DCA04MA011 No Yes 
AAR-04/04 DCA02MA001 No No 
AAR-04/02 DCA02MA054 No No 
AAR-04/01 DCA03MA022 No No 
AAR-03/02 DCA00MA026 No No 
AAB-02/04 DCA00MA030 No No 
AAR-02/01 DCA00MA023 No No 
AAR-01/02 DCA99MA060 No No 
AAR-01/01 DCA91MA023 No No 
AAB-01/01 DCA98MA023 No No 
AAR-00/03 DCA96MA070 No No 
AAR-00/02 DCA97MA055 Yes No 
AAR-99/01 DCA94MA076 No No 
AAR-98/03 DCA96MA079 No No 
AAR-98/02 DCA97MA059 No No 
AAR-98/01 DCA96MA068 No No 
AAR-97/06 DCA96MA054 No No 
AAR-97/03 NYC97MA005 No No 
AAR-97/01 FTW96FA118 No Yes 
AAR-96/07 MIA96FA059 No No 
AAR-96/05 DCA96MA008 No No 
AAR-96/04 DCA96MA029 No No 
AAR-96/03 ATL95MA106 No No 
AAR-96/01 DCA95MA001 No No 
AAR-95/05 CHI95MA044A No No 
AAR-95/03 DCA94MA065 No No 
AAR-95/01 DCA94MA038 No No 
AAR-94/06 DCA94MA033 No No 
AAR-94/04 DCA93RA060 No No 
AAR-94/01 DCA93MA040 No No 
AAR-93/04 DCA92MA044 No No 
AAR-93/02 DCA92MA025 No No 
AAR-92/05 DCA92MA022 Yes No 
AAR-91/09 DCA91MA021 No No 























































NTSB Report: AAR-11/02 
Findings 
1. Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Aircraft control-Flight crew - C 
2. Aircraft-Aircraft oper/perf/capability-Performance/control parameters-Airspeed-Not attained/maintained - C 
3. Environmental issues-Conditions/weather/phenomena-Ceiling/visibility/precip-Freezing rain/sleet-Effect on 
equipment 
4. Personnel issues-Action/decision-Action-Incorrect action performance-Pilot - F 
5. Personnel issues-Action/decision-Info processing/decision-(general)-Flight crew - F 
6. Personnel issues-Physical-Alertness/Fatigue-Lack of sleep-Pilot - F 
7. Personnel issues-Physical-Alertness/Fatigue-Circadian rhythms or jetlag-Pilot - F 
8. Personnel issues-Task performance-Communication (personnel)-CRM/MRM techniques-Flight crew - F 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2011). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-11/02 CEN09MA142 Factor/Cause Not Cited Not Cited Not Cited 




NTSB Report:  AAR-10/04 
Findings 
1. Aircraft-Aircraft oper/perf/capability-Performance/control parameters-Directional control-Not attained/maintained-C 
2. Aircraft-Aircraft oper/perf/capability-Performance/control parameters-Crosswind correction-Not attained/maintained 
- C 
3. Environmental issues-Conditions/weather/phenomena-Wind-Crosswind-Response/compensation - C 
4. Personnel issues-Action/decision-Action-Incomplete action-Pilot - C 
5. Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Aircraft control-Pilot 
6. Environmental issues-Conditions/weather/phenomena-Wind-Crosswind-Availability of related info - F 
7. Organizational issues-Management-Communication (organizational)-Between groups/organizations-ATC - F 
8. Organizational issues-Support/oversight/monitoring-Training-(general)-Not specified - F 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2010). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-10/04 DCA09MA021 Cause Factor Not Cited Factor 





NTSB Report:  AAR-10/03 
Findings 
1. Environmental issues-Physical environment-Object/animal/substance-Animal(s)/bird(s)-Effect on equipment - C 
2. Organizational issues-Development-Selection/certification/testing-Equip certification/testing-FAA/Regulator - F 
3. Aircraft-Aircraft oper/perf/capability-Performance/control parameters-(general)-Related operating info - F 
4. Aircraft-Aircraft oper/perf/capability-Performance/control parameters-Airspeed-Not attained/maintained - F 
5. Environmental issues-Task environment-Pressures/demands-Other pressure/demand-Effect on personnel - F 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2010). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-10/03 DCA09MA026 Factor Factor/Cause Not Cited Factor 








NTSB Report:  AAR-10/01 
Findings 
1. Aircraft-Aircraft systems-Navigation system-Stall warning system-Incorrect use/operation - C 
2. Personnel issues-Action/decision-Action-Incorrect action selection-Pilot - C 
3. Personnel issues-Psychological-Attention/monitoring-Monitoring equip/instruments-Flight crew - F 
4. Personnel issues-Task performance-Communication (personnel)-CRM/MRM techniques-Flight crew - F 
5. Personnel issues-Task performance-Workload management-(general)-Pilot - F 
6. Organizational issues-Management-Policy/procedure-Adequacy of policy/proc-Operator - F 
7. Environmental issues-Conditions/weather/phenomena-Temp/humidity/pressure-Conducive to structural icing-Not 
specified 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2010). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-10/01 DCA09MA027 Factor/Cause Not Cited Not Cited Factor 




NTSB Report:  AAR-09/03 
Findings 
1. TURBINE ASSEMBLY 
2. (C) CHECKLIST - FLIGHTCREW 
3. (C) PROCEDURE INADEQUATE - COMPANY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL 
4. (C) INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE OF OPERATION - COMPANY/OPERATOR MGMT 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2009). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-09/03 DCA07MA310 Cause Not Cited Not Cited Cause 




NTSB Report:  AAR-08/02 
Findings 
1. (F) WEATHER CONDITION - SNOW 
2. (C) IN-FLIGHT PLANNING/DECISION - IMPROPER - PILOT IN COMMAND 
3. (F) FATIGUE - FLIGHTCREW 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2008). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-08/02 DCA07FA037 Factor/Cause Factor Not Cited Not Cited 


















NTSB Report:  AAR-08/01 
Findings 
1. (C) MISSED APPROACH - NOT PERFORMED - FLIGHTCREW 
2. (F) FATIGUE - PILOT IN COMMAND 
3. (F) AIRPORT FACILITIES,RUNWAY/LANDING AREA CONDITION - OTHER 
4. (F) PROCEDURE INADEQUATE - COMPANY/OPERATOR MANAGEMENT 
5. OBJECT - ANTENNA 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2008). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-08/01 DCA07MA072 Factor/Cause Factor Not Cited Factor 




NTSB Report:  AAR-07/07 
Findings 
1. (C) CARGO/BAGGAGE - FIRE 
2. (F) FIRE EXTINGUISHER,CARGO - LACK OF 
3. FIRE WARNING SYSTEM,CARGO - INADEQUATE 
4. SMOKE DETECTOR(S) - INADEQUATE 
5. (F) ACFT/EQUIP,INADEQUATE STANDARD/REQUIREMENT 
6. (F) INADEQUATE CERTIFICATION/APPROVAL 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2007). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-07/07 DCA06MA022 Not Cited Not Cited Not Cited Factor 




NTSB Report:  AAR-07/06 
Findings 
1. (C) THRUST REVERSER - INADEQUATE 
2. (C) PROCEDURES/DIRECTIVES - NOT FOLLOWED - FLIGHTCREW 
3. (C) LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH AIRCRAFT - FLIGHTCREW 
4. (F) PROCEDURE INADEQUATE 
5. (F) CONDITION(S)/STEP(S) INSUFFICIENTLY DEFINED - COMPANY/OPERATOR MANAGEMENT 
6. OBJECT - FENCE 
7. OBJECT - VEHICLE 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2007). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-07/06 DCA06MA009 Cause Not Cited Not Cited Factor 














NTSB Report:  AAR-07/05 
Findings 
1. LIGHT CONDITION - DARK NIGHT 
2. (F) PROCEDURES/DIRECTIVES - NOT FOLLOWED - FLIGHTCREW 
3. (C) BECAME LOST/DISORIENTED - INATTENTIVE - FLIGHTCREW 
4. (C) WRONG TAXI ROUTE - NOT DETECTED - FLIGHTCREW 
5. (F) INSTRUCTIONS,WRITTEN/VERBAL - NOT REQUIRED - FAA(OTHER/ORGANIZATION) 
6. (F) PROCEDURE INADEQUATE - FAA(OTHER/ORGANIZATION) 
7. (C) WRONG RUNWAY - INATTENTIVE - FLIGHTCREW 
8. (C) WRONG RUNWAY - NOT DETECTED - FLIGHTCREW 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2007). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-07/05 DCA06MA064 Factor/Cause Not Cited Not Cited Factor 




NTSB Report:  AAR-07/04 
Findings 
1. (C) WING - FAILURE,TOTAL 
2. (C) MAINTENANCE - INADEQUATE - COMPANY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL 
3. (C) PROCEDURE INADEQUATE - COMPANY/OPERATOR MANAGEMENT 
4. (C) INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE OF OPERATION - FAA(ORGANIZATION) 
5. TERRAIN CONDITION – GROUND 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2007). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-07/04 DCA06MA010 Not Cited Not Cited Cause Cause 




NTSB Report:  AAR-06/03 
Findings 
1. (C) FLUID,FUEL - STARVATION 
2. (C) CHECKLIST - NOT FOLLOWED - PILOT IN COMMAND 
3. (F) PREFLIGHT PLANNING/PREPARATION - INADEQUATE - PILOT IN COMMAND 
4. (F) INATTENTIVE - PILOT IN COMMAND 
5. (F) CHECKLIST - DELAYED - PILOT IN COMMAND 
6. (F) ENGINE INSTRUMENTS,FUEL QUANTITY GAGE - STARVATION 
7. (F) IN-FLIGHT PLANNING/DECISION - INADEQUATE - FLIGHTCREW 
8. (F) INATTENTIVE - FLIGHTCREW 
9. (F) AIRCRAFT HANDLING - NOT RECOGNIZED - FLIGHTCREW 
10. TERRAIN CONDITION - GROUND 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2006). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-06/03 DCA04MA068 Factor/Cause Not Cited Not Cited Not Cited 










NTSB Report:  AAR-06/01 
Findings 
1. (F) LIGHT CONDITION - NIGHT 
2. (C) MINIMUM DESCENT ALTITUDE - CONTINUED BELOW - FLIGHTCREW 
3. OBJECT - TREE(S) 
4. (C) CREW/GROUP COORDINATION - INADEQUATE - FLIGHTCREW 
5. (F) FATIGUE - FLIGHTCREW 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2006). 
  
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-06/01 DCA05MA004 Factor/Cause Factor Not Cited Not Cited 




NTSB Report:  AAB-06/02 
Findings 
1. (F) WEATHER CONDITION - THUNDERSTORM 
2. (F) WEATHER CONDITION - GUSTS 
3. (F) WEATHER CONDITION - VARIABLE WIND 
4. (F) WEATHER CONDITION - RAIN 
5. (F) FLIGHT INTO KNOWN ADVERSE WEATHER - CONTINUED - FLIGHTCREW 
6. (F) VISUAL LOOKOUT - REDUCED - FLIGHTCREW 
7. (C) PROPER ALIGNMENT - NOT MAINTAINED - FLIGHTCREW 
8. (C) DIRECTIONAL CONTROL - NOT MAINTAINED - FLIGHTCREW 
9. OBJECT - RUNWAY LIGHT 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2006). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAB-06/02 FTW03MA160 Factor/Cause Factor Not Cited Not Cited 




NTSB Report:  AAR-05/02 
Findings 
1. FLARE - IMPROPER 
2. (C) RECOVERY FROM BOUNCED LANDING - ATTEMPTED - PILOT IN COMMAND 
3. (C) GO-AROUND - NOT PERFORMED - PILOT IN COMMAND 
4. LANDING GEAR,MAIN GEAR - OVERLOAD 
5. LANDING GEAR,MAIN GEAR - FAILURE 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2005). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-05/02 DCA04MA045 Cause Not Cited Not Cited Not Cited 













NTSB Report:  AAR-05/01 
Findings 
1. (C) PROPER ALIGNMENT - IMPROPER - COPILOT/SECOND PILOT 
2. (C) FLARE - IMPROPER - COPILOT/SECOND PILOT 
3. (C) SUPERVISION - INADEQUATE - CHECK PILOT 
4. (C) LANDING GEAR,MAIN GEAR - OVERLOAD 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2005). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-05/01 DCA04MA011 Cause Not Cited Not Cited Not Cited 




NTSB Report:  AAR-04/04 
Findings 
1. COMPENSATION FOR WIND CONDITIONS - PERFORMED 
2. (F) WEATHER CONDITION - GUSTS 
3. (C) RUDDER - EXCESSIVE 
4. (F) INADEQUATE TRAINING - COMPANY/OPERATOR MANAGEMENT 
5. VERTICAL STABILIZER - OVERLOAD 
6. VERTICAL STABILIZER - FAILURE 
7. (C) VERTICAL STABILIZER - SEPARATION 
8. AIRCRAFT CONTROL - NOT POSSIBLE 
9. TERRAIN CONDITION – GROUND 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2004). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-04/04 DCA02MA001 Cause Factor Cause Factor 




NTSB Report:  AAR-04/02 
Findings 
1. (F) LIGHT CONDITION - DARK NIGHT 
2. (C) PROPER GLIDEPATH - NOT ATTAINED - FLIGHTCREW 
3. (F) FATIGUE - FLIGHTCREW 
4. (C) CREW/GROUP COORDINATION - INADEQUATE 
5. TERRAIN CONDITION - RUNWAY 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2004). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-04/02 DCA02MA054 Factor/Cause Factor Not Cited Not Cited 















NTSB Report:  AAR-04/01 
Findings 
1. (C) FLT CONTROL SYST,ELEVATOR CONTROL - MOVEMENT RESTRICTED 
2. (C) MAINTENANCE,ADJUSTMENT - IMPROPER - OTHER MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL 
3. (C) IMPROPER USE OF PROCEDURE - COMPANY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL 
4. (F) INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE OF OPERATION - COMPANY/OPERATOR MGMT 
5. (C) AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE,TAKEOFF CAPABILITY - DETERIORATED 
6. MAINTENANCE,ADJUSTMENT 
7. (F) INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE OF OPERATION - FAA(ORGANIZATION) 
8. (C) AIRCRAFT WEIGHT AND BALANCE 
9. (C) MATERIAL INADEQUATE - COMPANY/OPERATOR MANAGEMENT 
10. (F) INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE OF OPERATION - FAA(ORGANIZATION) 
11. AIRCRAFT WEIGHT AND BALANCE 
12. (F) INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE,INADEQUATE PROCEDURE - FAA(ORGANIZATION) 
13. AIRCRAFT WEIGHT AND BALANCE 
14. (F) INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE,INADEQUATE PROCEDURE - COMPANY/OPERATOR MGMT 
15. TERRAIN CONDITION - GROUND 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2004). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-04/01 DCA03MA022 Not Cited Not Cited Cause Factor/Cause 




NTSB Report:  AAR-03/02 
Findings 
1. (C) MISCELLANEOUS,BOLT/NUT/FASTENER/CLAMP/SPRING - NOT SECURED 
2. (C) MAINTENANCE,INSTALLATION - INADEQUATE 
3. (C) MAINTENANCE,INSPECTION - INADEQUATE 
4. (C) FLT CONTROL SYST,ELEVATOR TRIM/TAB CONTROL - DISCONNECTED 
5. (C) FLT CONTROL SYST,ELEVATOR TRIM/TAB CONTROL - MOVEMENT RESTRICTED 
6. (C) AIRCRAFT CONTROL - RESTRICTED 
7. TERRAIN CONDITION - GROUND 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2003). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-03/02 DCA00MA026 Not Cited Not Cited Cause Cause 




NTSB Report:  AAB-02/04 
Findings 
1. (C) AIRSPEED - EXCESSIVE - FLIGHTCREW 
2. (C) FLIGHTCREW 
3. (C) IMPROPER DECISION - FLIGHTCREW 
4. (C) GO-AROUND - NOT PERFORMED - FLIGHTCREW 
5. (F) IMPROPER DECISION - ATC PERSONNEL(DEP/APCH) 
6. OBJECT - FENCE 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2002). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAB-02/04 DCA00MA030 Cause Not Cited Not Cited Factor 






NTSB Report:  AAR-02/01 
Findings 
1. (C) LUBRICANT,GREASE - INADEQUATE 
2. (C) MAINTENANCE,LUBRICATION - INADEQUATE - COMPANY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL 
3. PROCEDURE INADEQUATE 
4. (F) INSUFFICIENT STANDARDS/REQUIREMENTS - COMPANY/OPERATOR MGMT 
5. (F) INADEQUATE CERTIFICATION/APPROVAL - FAA(ORGANIZATION) 
6. (C) FLT CONTROL SYST,HORIZ STAB DRIVE - WORN 
7. (C) MAINTENANCE,INSPECTION - INADEQUATE - COMPANY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL 
8. PROCEDURE INADEQUATE 
9. (F) INSUFFICIENT STANDARDS/REQUIREMENTS - COMPANY/OPERATOR MGMT 
10. (F) INADEQUATE CERTIFICATION/APPROVAL - FAA(ORGANIZATION) 
11. FLT CONTROL SYST,HORIZ STAB DRIVE - STRIPPED THREAD 
12. (F) INADEQUATE CERTIFICATION/APPROVAL - MANUFACTURER 
13. (C) AIRCRAFT CONTROL - NOT POSSIBLE 
14. TERRAIN CONDITION – WATER 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2002). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-02/01 DCA00MA023 Not Cited Not Cited Cause Factor/Cause 




NTSB Report:  AAR-01/02 
Findings 
1. (C) FLIGHT INTO KNOWN ADVERSE WEATHER - CONTINUED - FLIGHTCREW 
2. (F) FATIGUE - FLIGHTCREW 
3. (C) IMPROPER DECISION - FLIGHTCREW 
4. (F) PROCEDURES/DIRECTIVES - NOT COMPLIED WITH - FLIGHTCREW 
5. (F) IMPROPER USE OF PROCEDURE - FLIGHTCREW 
6. (C) SPOILER EXTENSION - NOT VERIFIED - FLIGHTCREW 
7. (F) REVERSERS - EXCESSIVE - FLIGHTCREW 
8. (F) IMPROPER USE OF EQUIPMENT/AIRCRAFT - FLIGHTCREW 
9. (F) OBJECT - APPROACH LIGHT/NAVAID 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2001). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-01/02 DCA99MA060 Factor/Cause Factor Not Cited Not Cited 




NTSB Report:  AAR-01/01 
Findings 
1. (C) FLIGHT CONTROL,RUDDER SURFACE - UNCOMMANDED 
2. (C) FLIGHT CONTROL,RUDDER - JAMMED 
3. AIRCRAFT CONTROL - NOT POSSIBLE 
4. TERRAIN CONDITION - GROUND 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2001). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-01/01 DCA91MA023 Not Cited Not Cited Cause Not Cited 






NTSB Report:  AAB-01/01 
Findings 
1. WEATHER CONDITION - LOW CEILING 
2. (F) AUTOPILOT - IMPROPER 
3. VISUAL/AURAL DETECTION - PILOT IN COMMAND 
4. (C) AIRCRAFT CONTROL - NOT MAINTAINED - FLIGHTCREW 
5. COMMUNICATIONS/INFORMATION/ATC - NOT COMPLIED WITH - ATC PERSONNEL(LCL/GND/CLNC) 
6. AIR/GROUND COMMUNICATIONS - NOT USED - ATC PERSONNEL(LCL/GND/CLNC) 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2001). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAB-01/01 DCA98MA023 Cause Not Cited Factor Not Cited 




NTSB Report:  AAR-00/03 
Findings 
1. ELECTRICAL SYSTEM - UNDETERMINED 
2. FUEL SYSTEM,TANK - EXPLODED 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2000). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-00/03 DCA96MA070 Not Cited Not Cited Not Cited Not Cited 




NTSB Report:  AAR-00/02 
Findings 
1. (C) AIRCRAFT CONTROL - INADEQUATE - PILOT IN COMMAND 
2. LANDING GEAR,MAIN GEAR ATTACHMENT - SEPARATION 
3. LANDING GEAR,MAIN GEAR ATTACHMENT - OVERLOAD 
4. WING - SEPARATION 
5. WING - OVERLOAD 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 2000). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-00/02 DCA97MA055 Cause Not Cited Not Cited Not Cited 


















NTSB Report:  AAR-99/01 
Findings 
1. (C) FLIGHT CONTROL,RUDDER SURFACE - UNCOMMANDED 
2. (C) FLIGHT CONTROL,RUDDER - JAMMED 
3. AIRCRAFT CONTROL - NOT POSSIBLE 
4. TERRAIN CONDITION - GROUND 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 1999). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-99/01 DCA94MA076 Not Cited Not Cited Cause Not Cited 




NTSB Report:  AAR-98/03 
Findings 
1. (C) CARGO/BAGGAGE - SMOKE 
2. (C) CARGO/BAGGAGE - FIRE 
3. (C) CARGO/BAGGAGE - UNDETERMINED 
4. SUPERVISION - INADEQUATE - PILOT IN COMMAND 
5. HAZARDOUS MATERIAL 
6. INFORMATION INSUFFICIENT - OTHER GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 1998). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-98/03 DCA96MA079 Not Cited Not Cited Not Cited Not Cited 




NTSB Report:  AAR-98/02 
Findings 
1. (C) AIRCRAFT WEIGHT AND BALANCE - INADEQUATE 
2. (C) IMPROPER USE OF PROCEDURE - OTHER PERSON 
3. (C) INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE OF OPERATION - COMPANY/OPERATOR MGMT 
4. (C) INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE OF OPERATION - FAA(ORGANIZATION) 
5. (C) TRIM SETTING - IMPROPER 
6. (C) AIRCRAFT CONTROL - NOT POSSIBLE - PILOT IN COMMAND 
7. (C) AIRSPEED - NOT MAINTAINED 
8. STALL 
9. TERRAIN CONDITION - GROUND 
10. OBJECT – VEHICLE 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 1998). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-98/02 DCA97MA059 Not Cited Not Cited Not Cited Cause 
Associated Findings    1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
 










NTSB Report:  AAR-98/01 
Findings 
1. 1 ENGINE 
2. (C) COMPRESSOR ASSEMBLY,ROTOR DISC - FATIGUE 
3. (C) MAINTENANCE,INSPECTION - INADEQUATE - COMPANY MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL 
4. (C) COMPRESSOR ASSEMBLY,ROTOR DISC - FRACTURED 
5. COMPRESSOR ASSEMBLY,ROTOR DISC - SEPARATION 
6. MISC,ENGINE UNCONTAINED FAILURE 
7. FUSELAGE,CABIN - FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 1998). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-98/01 DCA96MA068 Not Cited Not Cited Cause Cause 




NTSB Report:  AAR-97/06 
Findings 
1. (C) HAZARDOUS MATERIAL - IMPROPER 
2. (C) PROCEDURE INADEQUATE - OTHER PERSON 
3. (C) CARGO/BAGGAGE - IMPROPER 
4. (C) MAINTENANCE - INADEQUATE - COMPANY/OPERATOR MANAGEMENT 
5. (C) SMOKE DETECTOR(S) - NOT INSTALLED 
6. (C) FIRE EXTINGUISHER,CARGO - NOT INSTALLED 
7. (C) INSUFFICIENT STANDARDS/REQUIREMENTS - FAA(ORGANIZATION) 
8. FUSELAGE,CARGO COMPARTMENT - FIRE 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 1997). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-97/06 DCA96MA054 Not Cited Not Cited Not Cited Cause 




NTSB Report:  AAR-97/03 
Findings 
1. (F) WEATHER CONDITION - RAIN 
2. (F) WEATHER CONDITION - FOG 
3. (C) DISTANCE/ALTITUDE - MISJUDGED - PILOT IN COMMAND 
4. (C) VISUAL ILLUSION - PILOT IN COMMAND 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 1997). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-97/03 NYC97MA005 Cause Factor Not Cited Not Cited 














NTSB Report:  AAR-97/01 
Findings 
1. (F) CHECKLIST - NOT COMPLIED WITH - FLIGHTCREW 
2. HYDRAULIC SYSTEM - NOT SELECTED - FLIGHTCREW 
3. (F) CHECKLIST - NOT USED - FLIGHTCREW 
4. (F) GEAR DOWN AND LOCKED - NOT VERIFIED - FLIGHTCREW 
5. (C) GO-AROUND - NOT PERFORMED - PILOT IN COMMAND 
6. (F) INADEQUATE SUBSTANTIATION PROCESS - COMPANY/OPERATOR MGMT 
7. (F) INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE OF OPERATION - FAA(ORGANIZATION) 
8. WHEELS UP LANDING - INADVERTENT 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 1997). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-97/01 FTW96FA118 Factor/Cause Not Cited Not Cited Factor 




NTSB Report:  AAR-96/07 
Findings 
1. WEATHER CONDITION - TEMPERATURE,LOW 
2. LANDING GEAR,NOSE GEAR STRUT - IMPROPER 
3. LANDING GEAR,GEAR SWITCH - MOVEMENT RESTRICTED 
4. EMERGENCY PROCEDURE - PERFORMED - FLIGHTCREW 
5. ELECTRICAL SYSTEM,CIRCUIT BREAKER - OPEN 
6. (F) CHECKLIST - INACCURATE - COMPANY/OPERATOR MANAGEMENT 
7. (C) PLANNING/DECISION - IMPROPER - FLIGHTCREW 
8. (C) CIRCUIT BREAKER - SELECTED - FLIGHTCREW 
9. (F) LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH AIRCRAFT - FLIGHTCREW 
10. (C) SPOILER EXTENSION - INADVERTENT ACTIVATION - FLIGHTCREW 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 1996). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-96/07 MIA96FA059 Factor/Cause Not Cited Not Cited Factor 




NTSB Report:  AAR-96/05 
Findings 
1. LIGHT CONDITION - DARK NIGHT 
2. WEATHER CONDITION - RAIN 
3. WEATHER CONDITION - HIGH WIND 
4. WEATHER CONDITION - GUSTS 
5. (F) APPROACH/DEPARTURE CONTROL SERVICE - INADEQUATE - ATC PERSONNEL(DEP/APCH) 
6. (F) ALTIMETER SETTING - NOT OBTAINED - FLIGHTCREW 
7. (C) MINIMUM DESCENT ALTITUDE - BELOW - FLIGHTCREW 
8. OBJECT - TREE(S) 
9. OBJECT - ANTENNA 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 1996). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-96/05 DCA96MA008 Factor/Cause Not Cited Not Cited Factor 






NTSB Report:  AAR-96/04 
Findings 
1. (F) AIRPORT FACILITIES,RUNWAY/LANDING AREA CONDITION - SNOW COVERED 
2. (F) AIRPORT FACILITIES,RUNWAY/LANDING AREA CONDITION - ICY 
3. (F) NOSEWHEEL STEERING - EXCESSIVE - PILOT IN COMMAND 
4. (F) DIRECTIONAL CONTROL - NOT MAINTAINED - PILOT IN COMMAND 
5. (F) PROCEDURE INADEQUATE - COMPANY/OPERATOR MANAGEMENT 
6. (F) PROCEDURE INADEQUATE - MANUFACTURER 
7. (F) FACILITY INADEQUATE 
8. (C) ABORTED TAKEOFF - DELAYED - PILOT IN COMMAND 
9. (F) THROTTLE/POWER CONTROL - IMPROPER USE OF - PILOT IN COMMAND 
10. OBJECT - AIRPORT SIGN/MARKER 
11. OBJECT - OTHER 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 1996). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-96/04 DCA96MA029 Factor/Cause Factor Not Cited Factor 




NTSB Report:  AAR-96/03 
Findings 
1. (C) COMPRESSOR ASSEMBLY,ROTOR DISC - FATIGUE 
2. (C) MAINTENANCE,INSPECTION - IMPROPER - OTHER MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL 
3. (F) MAINTENANCE,RECORDKEEPING - INADEQUATE - OTHER MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL 
4. (F) PROCEDURE INADEQUATE - OTHER MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL 
5. (C) COMPRESSOR ASSEMBLY,ROTOR DISC - FAILURE 
6. ABORTED TAKEOFF - PERFORMED 
7. FUSELAGE - FIRE 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 1996). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-96/03 ATL95MA106 Not Cited Not Cited Cause Factor/Cause 




NTSB Report:  AAR-96/01 
Findings 
1. WEATHER CONDITION - ICING CONDITIONS 
2. (C) AIRFRAME - ICE 
3. (C) ACFT/EQUIP,INADEQUATE AIRCRAFT MANUALS - MANUFACTURER 
4. (C) AIRCRAFT/EQUIPMENT INADEQUATE - MANUFACTURER 
5. (C) INADEQUATE SUBSTANTIATION PROCESS - OTHER GOVT ORGANIZATION 
6. (F) INADEQUATE SUBSTANTIATION PROCESS - FAA(ORGANIZATION) 
7. (F) INFORMATION INSUFFICIENT - FAA(OTHER/ORGANIZATION) 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 1996). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-96/01 DCA95MA001 Not Cited Cause Not Cited Factor/Cause 








NTSB Report:  AAR-95/05 
Findings 
1. (C) WRONG RUNWAY - SELECTED - PILOT OF OTHER AIRCRAFT 
2. EXPECTANCY - PILOT OF OTHER AIRCRAFT 
3. (F) COMMUNICATIONS/INFORMATION/ATC - INADEQUATE 
4. (F) RADAR,ASDE - UNAVAILABLE 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 1995). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-95/05 CHI95MA044A Not Cited Not Cited Not Cited Factor/Cause 




NTSB Report:  AAR-95/03 
Findings 
1. WEATHER CONDITION - MICROBURST/WET 
2. (C) IN-FLIGHT PLANNING/DECISION - IMPROPER - FLIGHTCREW 
3. WEATHER CONDITION - WINDSHEAR 
4. (C) WEATHER EVALUATION - INADEQUATE - FLIGHTCREW 
5. (C) AIRCRAFT HANDLING - IMPROPER - FLIGHTCREW 
6. (C) UNSAFE/HAZARDOUS CONDITION WARNING - INADEQUATE - ATC PERSONNEL(LCL/GND/CLNC) 
7. (F) PROCEDURE INADEQUATE - FAA(OTHER/ORGANIZATION) 
8. (F) SUPERVISION - INADEQUATE - ATC PERSONNEL(SUPERVISOR) 
9. (F) PROCEDURE INADEQUATE - COMPANY/OPERATOR MANAGEMENT 
10. (F) WARNING SYSTEM(OTHER) - INADEQUATE 
11. (F) ACFT/EQUIP,INADEQUATE DESIGN - MANUFACTURER 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 1995). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-95/03 DCA94MA065 Cause Not Cited Not Cited Factor/Cause 





NTSB Report:  AAR-95/01 
Findings 
1. (C) CHECKLIST - NOT COMPLIED WITH - FLIGHTCREW 
2. (C) ANTI-ICE/DEICE SYSTEM - NOT USED - FLIGHTCREW 
3. (F) WEATHER CONDITION - SNOW 
4. (F) WEATHER CONDITION - TEMPERATURE,LOW 
5. (F) PITOT/STATIC SYSTEM - OBSTRUCTED 
6. (C) ABORTED TAKEOFF - DELAYED - FLIGHTCREW 
7. ABORT ABOVE V1 - PERFORMED - FLIGHTCREW 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 1995). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-95/01 DCA94MA038 Cause Factor Not Cited Not Cited 










NTSB Report:  AAR-94/06 
Findings 
1. ALL ENGINES 
2. (C) THROTTLE/POWER CONTROL - IMPROPER USE OF - PILOT IN COMMAND 
3. (C) ACFT/EQUIP,INADEQUATE DESIGN - MANUFACTURER 
4. (C) INSUFFICIENT STANDARDS/REQUIREMENTS,AIRCRAFT - MANUFACTURER 
5. (C) INSUFFICIENT STANDARDS/REQUIREMENTS,AIRCRAFT - FAA(ORGANIZATION) 
6. (C) INSUFFICIENT STANDARDS/REQUIREMENTS,AIRCRAFT - OTHER GOVT ORGANIZATION 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 1994). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-94/06 DCA94MA033 Cause Not Cited Not Cited Cause 




NTSB Report:  AAR-94/04 
Findings 
1. (C) JUDGMENT - POOR - PILOT IN COMMAND 
2. (C) IN-FLIGHT PLANNING/DECISION - IMPROPER - PILOT IN COMMAND 
3. (C) FATIGUE - PILOT IN COMMAND 
4. (C) AIRCRAFT HANDLING - INADEQUATE - PILOT IN COMMAND 
5. (F) FATIGUE(FLIGHT AND GROUND SCHEDULE) - FLIGHTCREW 
6. (C) PROCEDURES/DIRECTIVES - NOT FOLLOWED - PILOT IN COMMAND 
7. (F) FATIGUE(LACK OF SLEEP) - FLIGHTCREW 
8. (C) REMEDIAL ACTION - NOT PERFORMED - PILOT IN COMMAND 
9. (F) FATIGUE(CIRCADIAN RHYTHM) - FLIGHTCREW 
10. STALL/MUSH - INADVERTENT - PILOT IN COMMAND 
11. (F) INADEQUATE TRAINING - FLIGHTCREW 
12. AIRPORT/FACILITIES - INOPERATIVE 
13. (F) COMMUNICATIONS/INFORMATION/ATC - INADEQUATE - OTHER GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 1994). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-94/04 DCA93RA060 Factor/Cause Not Cited Not Cited Factor 




NTSB Report:  AAR-94/01 
Findings 
1. (C) DIRECTIONAL CONTROL - NOT MAINTAINED - PILOT IN COMMAND 
2. LANDING GEAR,NOSE GEAR - OVERLOAD 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 1994). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-94/01 DCA93MA040 Cause Not Cited Not Cited Not Cited 











NTSB Report:  AAR-93/04 
Findings 
1. (C) STALL WARNING SYSTEM - FAILURE,PARTIAL 
2. (C) MAINTENANCE,AAIP/PROGRESSIVE PROGRAM - INADEQUATE - COMPANY/OPERATOR 
MANAGEMENT 
3. (C) ACFT/EQUIP,INADEQUATE DESIGN - MANUFACTURER 
4. STALL WARNING SYSTEM - FALSE INDICATION 
5. (C) CREW/GROUP COORDINATION - INADEQUATE - PILOT IN COMMAND 
6. (C) CREW/GROUP COORDINATION - INADEQUATE - COPILOT/SECOND PILOT 
7. GROUND LOOP/SWERVE - INTENTIONAL - PILOT IN COMMAND 
8. LANDING GEAR,NOSE GEAR - OVERLOAD 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 1993). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-93/04 DCA92MA044 Cause Not Cited Cause Cause 




NTSB Report:  AAR-93/02 
Findings 
1. (F) WEATHER CONDITION - ICING CONDITIONS 
2. (F) WING - ICE 
3. (C) ICE/FROST REMOVAL FROM AIRCRAFT - NOT IDENTIFIED - PILOT IN COMMAND 
4. (C) INFORMATION INSUFFICIENT - COMPANY/OPERATOR MANAGEMENT 
5. (C) INFORMATION INSUFFICIENT - FAA(OTHER/ORGANIZATION) 
6. (F) PROCEDURES/DIRECTIVES - NOT FOLLOWED - PILOT IN COMMAND 
7. (F) PROCEDURES/DIRECTIVES - NOT FOLLOWED - COPILOT/SECOND PILOT 
8. (F) CREW/GROUP COORDINATION - INADEQUATE - PILOT IN COMMAND 
9. (F) CREW/GROUP COORDINATION - INADEQUATE - COPILOT/SECOND PILOT 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 1993). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-93/02 DCA92MA025 Factor/Cause Factor Not Cited Cause 




NTSB Report:  AAR-92/05 
Findings 
1. LIGHT CONDITION - DARK NIGHT 
2. WEATHER CONDITION - LOW CEILING 
3. WEATHER CONDITION - RAIN 
4. WEATHER CONDITION - FOG 
5. (F) FLIGHT/NAV INSTRUMENTS,ATTITUDE DIRECTOR IND(ADI) - UNDETERMINED 
6. (C) AIRCRAFT CONTROL - NOT MAINTAINED - PILOT IN COMMAND 
7. (F) SPATIAL DISORIENTATION - PILOT IN COMMAND 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 1992). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-92/05 DCA92MA022 Factor/Cause Not Cited Factor Not Cited 









NTSB Report:  AAR-91/09 
Findings 
1. (F) WEATHER CONDITION - SNOW 
2. (C) WING - ICE 
3. (C) AIRCRAFT PREFLIGHT - NOT PERFORMED - PILOT IN COMMAND 
4. (C) ICE/FROST REMOVAL FROM AIRCRAFT - NOT PERFORMED - PILOT IN COMMAND 
5. (C) INADEQUATE TRAINING - COMPANY/OPERATOR MANAGEMENT 
6. (C) ACFT/EQUIP,INADEQUATE AIRCRAFT MANUALS - MANUFACTURER 
7. (C) ACFT/EQUIP,INADEQUATE AIRCRAFT MANUALS - FAA(OTHER/ORGANIZATION) 
8. STALL - INADVERTENT - PILOT IN COMMAND 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 1991). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-91/09 DCA91MA021 Cause Factor/Cause Not Cited Cause 




NTSB Report:  AAR-91/08 
Findings 
1. (C) SUPERVISION - INADEQUATE - ATC PERSONNEL(SUPERVISOR) 
2. (F) INADEQUATE SUBSTANTIATION PROCESS - FAA(ORGANIZATION) 
3. (C) ATC CLEARANCE - IMPROPER - ATC PERSONNEL(LCL/GND/CLNC) 
4. OBJECT - AIRCRAFT PARKED/STANDING 
 
Findings Legend: (C) = Cause, (F) = Factor (NTSB, 1991). 
 
NTSB Report NTSB ID Pilot Performance Environmental Mechanical Other Persons 
AAR-91/08 DCA91MA018A Not Cited Not Cited Not Cited Factor/Cause 











































































Report Primary Non-Person Related Event Measurement 
AAR-10/03 Animals/birds Environment 
AAR-08/02 Weather Condition - snow Environment 
AAR-08/01 Airport facilities, Runway/Landing area condition - other Environment 
AAR-07/07 Cargo/Baggage - fire Aircraft 
AAR-07/07 Fire Extinguisher, cargo - lack of Aircraft 
AAR-07/06 Thrust Reverser - inadequate Aircraft 
AAR-07/04 Wing - failure, total Aircraft 
AAR-06/03 Fluid, fuel - starvation Aircraft 
AAR-06/03 Engine instruments, fuel quantity gage - starvation Aircraft 
AAR-06/01 Light condition - night Environment 
AAB-06/02 Weather condition - thunderstorm Environment 
AAB-06/02 Weather condition - gusts Environment 
AAB-06/02 Weather condition - variable wind Environment 
AAB-06/02 Weather condition - rain Environment 
AAR-05/01 Landing gear, main gear - overload Aircraft 
AAR-04/04 Weather condition - gusts Environment 
AAR-04/04 Vertical stabilizer - separation Aircraft 
AAR-04/02 Light condition - dark night Environment 
AAR-04/01 Flt control system, elevator control - movement restricted Aircraft 
AAR-04/01 Aircraft performance, takeoff capability - deteriorated Aircraft 
AAR-03/02 Flt control syst, elevator trim/tab control - disconnected Aircraft 
AAR-03/02 Flt control syst, elevator trim/tab control - movement restricted Aircraft 
AAR-03/02 Aircraft control - restricted Aircraft 
AAR-03/02 Miscellaneous, bolt/nut/fastener/clamp/spring - not secured Aircraft 
AAR-02/01 Flt control syst, horiz stab drive - worn Aircraft 
AAR-02/01 Aircraft control - not possible Aircraft 
AAR-02/01 Lubricant, grease - inadequate Aircraft 
AAR-01/02 Object - approach light/navaid Environment 
AAR-01/01 Flight control, rudder surface - uncommanded Aircraft 
AAR-01/01 Flight control, rudder - jammed Aircraft 
AAB-01/01 Autopilot - improper Aircraft 
AAR-99/01 Flight control, rudder surface - uncommanded Aircraft 
AAR-99/01 Flight control, rudder - jammed Aircraft 
AAR-98/03 Cargo/baggage - smoke Aircraft 
AAR-98/03 Cargo/baggage - fire Aircraft 
AAR-98/03 Cargo/baggage - undetermined Aircraft 
AAR-98/01 Compressor assembly, rotor disc - fatigue Aircraft 
AAR-98/01 Compressor assembly, rotor disc - fractured Aircraft 
AAR-97/06 Smoke detector(s) - not installed Aircraft 
AAR-97/06 Hazardous material - improper Aircraft 
AAR-97/06 Cargo/baggage - improper Aircraft 
216 
 
Report Primary Non-Person Related Event Measurement 
AAR-97/06 Fire extinguisher, cargo - not installed Aircraft 
AAR-97/03 Weather condition - rain Environment 
AAR-97/03 Weather condition - fog Environment 
AAR-96/04 Airport facilities, runway/landing area condition - snow covered Environment 
AAR-96/04 Airport facilities, runway/landing area condition - icy Environment 
AAR-96/03 Compressor assembly, rotor disc - fatigue Aircraft 
AAR-96/03 Compressor assembly, rotor disc - failure Aircraft 
AAR-96/01 Airframe - ice Environment 
AAR-95/05 Radar, ASDE - unavailable Environment 
AAR-95/03 Warning system (other) - inadequate Aircraft 
AAR-95/01 Weather condition - snow Environment 
AAR-95/01 Weather condition - temperature, low Environment 
AAR-95/01 Pitot/static system - obstructed Environment 
AAR-93/04 Stall warning system - failure, partial Aircraft 
AAR-93/02 Weather condition - icing conditions Environment 
AAR-93/02 Wing - ice Environment 
AAR-92/05 Flight/Nav instruments, attitude director ind (ADI) - undetermined Aircraft 
AAR-91/09 Weather condition - snow Environment 
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with less than 1,500 hours of total flight time, neither were involved in an 
accident which cited pilot performance as a causal or contributing factor.  This 
finding did not support the notion that a 1,500 hour total flight time requirement 
will contribute to the safety of air carrier operations conducted under 14 CFR 121.  
However, the findings of this study also indicate there was a significant increase 
between 1991-2000 and 2001-2010 with regard to the distribution of accidents 
involving a first officer who's highest certificate was a commercial pilot 
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